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Israelisation and the Colonisation of Papuan Consciousness

Wam'ndanak'me: The Unfenced Mind

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Abstract

This study builds upon the Psycho-Cosmocide paradigm by introducing the Lani cosmological concept of Wam'ndanak'me as a diagnostic category through which to understand the colonisation of Papuan consciousness. Wam'ndanak'me denotes an unfenced garden that has been left unprotected by its cultivators, into which any wandering pig — and, by extension, any person — may enter and feed without consequence or accountability. I argue that this agrarian image provides a more precise phenomenology of Papuan ontological dispossession than the term 'colonisation' alone, as it encompasses not only occupation, but also the absence of boundaries. In this state, a mind, like a land, ceases to be defended and becomes susceptible to indefinite occupation by competing external claimants. The discussion traces the historical sequence through which the Papuan mind became Wam'ndanak'me. This sequence begins with the unsettled etymology of the name 'Papua', and continues through the reach of the Tidore and Ternate Sultanates in the fifteenth century, the successive encounters of the Portuguese, Spanish, British and Dutch from the sixteenth century onwards, the Dutch colonial and missionary project from 1898 to 1962, the rupture of the 1969 Act of Free Choice, Indonesian integration and the contemporary proliferation of identifications sourced from outside the region, such as Indonesian nationalism, evangelical Christianity and, most recently, Christian Zionism, which compete to occupy the space of Papuan self-understanding. The analysis then offers a detailed case study of the latter, termed the 'Israelisation of the Papuan mind', situating it within the wider Pacific rise of Christian Zionism and the Psycho-Cosmocide account of the Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus (CPCV). The conclusion is that the decolonisation of Papuan land cannot proceed without a parallel decolonisation of Papuan interiority, or the rebuilding of the fence.

Keywords: Wam'ndanak'me; West Papua; Colonisation of Consciousness; Christian Zionism; Israelisation; Decolonial Theory; Indigenous Cosmology; Psycho-Cosmocide

Note on Wam'ndanak'me

Before beginning the main argument, it is useful to provide readers unfamiliar with Lani cosmology with a brief introduction to the paper's central term. *Wam'ndanak'me* is a concept from the Lani language of the highlands in the central mountain range of the island known to the outside world as New Guinea. It is a compound term built from three elements: 'wam', meaning 'pig'; 'n'ndak', denoting an 'opening', 'breach', or 'absence of enclosure' – a state of being left without a fence, wall, or guard; and 'me', denoting 'place', 'space', 'situation', or 'condition'. Combined, the term refers to a specific and recurring feature of Lani horticultural life: a garden that has been cultivated to the point of exhaustion, whose soil no longer yields anything, and which the owners therefore no longer maintain. Once the fence falls or is deliberately left open, the garden becomes accessible to any wandering pig — one's own, a neighbour's or a stranger's — which can then enter and feed on whatever remains. The land is not stolen in a single dramatic act; it is simply no longer defended and so entered repeatedly by whoever happens to be nearby with an appetite.

This paper takes that agrarian image and, by extension, applies it to the mind. In the argument developed here, *Wam'ndanak'me* names the ontological condition of a colonised consciousness: a mind whose original fence — the boundary of an intact cosmology, defended by ritual, taboo, initiation and generational transmission — has broken down. This leaves the mind open to indefinite occupation by any idea, story, god or flag that approaches it without the discrimination or defence that an intact fence would otherwise provide. This concept is developed in detail and distinguished from related terminology in decolonial theory in Section 2 below. This note is intended to provide the reader with an overview before the main argument begins.

Author's note

Readers will notice that this work frequently cites the author's own publications. This reflects the cumulative nature of the Psycho-Cosmocide research programme, rather than being an attempt at self-reference for its own sake. The concepts developed throughout this work, including Psycho-Cosmocide, the Cosmobian World, the Synthobian World, Participatory Extinction, Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus, Wonesis and related analytical frameworks, form part of an integrated body of philosophical research spanning multiple publications. As with any evolving theoretical framework, the Psycho-Cosmocide corpus has been constructed incrementally, with each paper introducing, refining, testing or extending concepts that become foundational for subsequent works. References to earlier publications therefore provide the conceptual continuity necessary for readers to understand the framework's evolution, coherence, and internal architecture, while avoiding unnecessary repetition of arguments developed elsewhere. Although many of the concepts originated within this body of work, they are presented for critical examination rather than authoritative acceptance. The author welcomes rigorous engagement with, critique of, refinement of, and independent application of the framework across different historical, philosophical, and civilisational contexts. This publication is therefore one contribution to a larger, ongoing philosophical project investigating how human worlds are created, transformed and destroyed.

1. Introduction: The Problem Beneath the Problem

There is now an extensive body of scholarly and activist literature on West Papua, largely organised around a familiar set of themes: human rights violations, military occupation, resource extraction, genocide, self-determination, and the contested legality of the 1969 Act of Free Choice. These bodies of work are indispensable, and the argument advanced here does not dispute their evidentiary weight. Yet they share a common limitation: they describe what has been done to the Papuan people and their land without adequately theorising what has happened, and continues to happen, within the Papuan mind. This paper addresses that internal dimension directly through a concept drawn not from Western political theory but from Lani cosmology itself: *Wam'ndanak'me*.

This argument forms part of the wider theoretical project I call the Psycho-Cosmocide paradigm, developed across the *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series*. These working papers are self-published within this series and have not undergone independent peer review; they are cited here for conceptual continuity across the paradigm, rather than as externally validated scholarship. The paradigm argues that the destruction unfolding in West Papua cannot be understood solely in terms of physical violence, demographic decline, territorial dispossession, or political domination. Rather, it constitutes a civilisational assault on cosmology itself: the total system of meaning, relationships, obligations, memory, and law through which a people know who they are, where they stand within existence, and to whom or what they owe responsibility. Earlier papers in this series have developed this argument through several interconnected theoretical frameworks. These include the Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus (CPCV), which explains how foreign cosmological systems infiltrate, incubate within, and ultimately overwrite an indigenous host cosmology; the Eight Atlases of Human Existence and the Seven Existential Cages, which map the domains through which this transformation occurs; and the concept of the Cosmobian, a mode of being organised by an intact relational cosmology, in contrast to the fragmented condition produced through colonisation. This paper introduces a further concept that completes this theoretical architecture: *Wam'ndanak'me*—the unfenced garden.

This analysis is prompted by a specific and unsettling contemporary phenomenon: the emergence, among some Papuans, of fervent identification with Israel, Jewish peoplehood and biblical Judaic geography — an identification that is often stronger than that of many Israelis or Jews themselves. In some circles, Israeli flags are now as visible in parts of the Papuan public sphere as the Morning Star flag, which is criminalised by the Indonesian state.

This phenomenon is referred to in this paper as the *Israelisation of the Papuan mind*. Throughout this study, Israelisation denotes the internalisation of a particular settler-colonial political and theological framework as an alternative basis for Papuan self-understanding. It is used as an analytical concept and does not claim to represent the views of Jewish people, Judaism, or the State of Israel, any more than the paper's discussion of missionary Christianity claims to represent Christianity as a whole. Rather, the concept describes a specific process through which an external cosmological framework becomes incorporated into Papuan consciousness.

A related methodological point should be made explicit here rather than left to inference. This paper, like the wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus, uses an epidemiological register—virus, infection, incubation, host—as its master vocabulary for describing how any external cosmological system comes to occupy Papuan consciousness, whatever that system's origin or content. That vocabulary was developed for, and is applied identically to, Indonesian nationalism and missionary Christianity in earlier working papers in this series (Kogoya, 2026b, 2026p), and it is applied here to Christian Zionism for the same structural reason: the object of analysis in every case is the mechanism of transmission and reproduction, not the moral or theological content of what is transmitted. The choice to retain this vocabulary in a case study specifically concerned with Papuan identification with Jewish peoplehood and the State of Israel is a conscious one. It is flagged here because a vocabulary of infection applied to this particular case, read in isolation from the framework's consistent use elsewhere, could be mistaken for a claim about Judaism, Jewish people, or Israel themselves. It is not. It is a claim about the political theology of Christian Zionism as one further instance of a structural pattern applied symmetrically, in this paper and throughout the corpus, to every cosmological system examined, including Indonesian nationalism and Christianity.

This phenomenon is best understood neither as a bizarre aberration nor simply as an authentic theological conviction. Instead, it represents the latest and most visible manifestation of a much older, structurally recurring process: the entry of external cosmological "pigs" into a Papuan mind whose ancestral fences were broken centuries ago and have never been rebuilt.

To develop this argument, the discussion proceeds both historically and theoretically. Section 2 elaborates the concept of Wam'ndanak'me and situates it within the three-phase model of the Papuan mind developed elsewhere in the Psycho-Cosmocide paradigm. Section 3 traces the deep historical layers of contact that first breached the fence, examining the contested etymology of *Papua*, the tributary and slave-raiding networks of the eastern Indonesian sultanates, and successive European encounters. Section 4 analyses the Dutch colonial and missionary period as the era in which this process became systematic and institutionalised. Section 5 examines the political rupture of the 1960s and the emergence of a specifically Papuan nationalist consciousness that was already partially shaped by earlier colonial formations. Section 6 turns to the contemporary competition among three overlapping orientations within Papuan consciousness—Indonesian nationalist, foreign religious, and Papuan nationalist—and presents Israelisation as a case study situated within the broader rise of Christian Zionism across the Pacific. Section 7 places Wam'ndanak'me in conversation with the work of Frantz Fanon, Sylvia Wynter, and wider decolonial theory. Section 8 revisits an earlier, less fully theorised expression of the same underlying intuition, drawn from my 2018 conference paper on Papuan nationhood as a state of mind. Section 9 concludes by considering what the decolonisation of the Papuan mind would require.

2. Wam'ndanak'me: Theorising the Unfenced Garden

In the cosmology of the Lani people of the central highlands of New Guinea, Wam'ndanak'me is a compound term. *Wam* means pig, *n'ndak* denotes an opening or breach in an enclosure, and

me refers to place, space, situation, or condition. Together, the term describes a familiar feature of Lani horticultural life: a garden that has been cultivated to the point of exhaustion, whose soil no longer produces, and which its owners therefore cease to maintain. Once the fence collapses, or is deliberately left open, the garden becomes accessible to any wandering pig—one's own, a neighbour's, or a stranger's—which enters and feeds on whatever remains. The land is not taken through a single dramatic act of theft; it simply ceases to be defended and is entered repeatedly by whoever happens to pass with an appetite, occupying a space that belongs to no one in particular and, therefore, to everyone in general.

Earlier work developed the principle of Land as First Ontology to explain the condition of Papuan land under Indonesian rule and the wider logic of extractive colonialism. It argued that land is not merely one value among many but the ontological ground upon which every cosmology, institution, and metaphysical claim ultimately rests (Kogoya, 2026g). When a people lose the authority to defend the land that grounds their existence, they lose far more than territory; they lose the conditions through which their world remains coherent.

Read through this lens, West Papua itself has become Wam'ndanak'me. The homeland of hundreds of Papuan families, clans, and tribes has become a space that no recognised Papuan authority can defend in its entirety. State security forces, transmigrant settlements, mining corporations, logging concessions, plantation industries, foreign interests, and increasingly Papuans themselves all enter and compete within the same political and geographical space. Like an unfenced garden, the territory becomes available to whoever possesses the power to enter and extract from it.

This condition is reflected in a saying that circulates widely in Papuan vernacular discourse. It is reproduced here as an oral, vernacular formulation rather than a documented statement attributable to a named speaker or publication, and its evidentiary status should be read accordingly:

"Papuans sell land to buy alcohol, while Indonesians sell alcohol to buy land."

Whether literally true or not in every case, the saying expresses a deeper diagnosis. It reflects a condition in which Papuan self-worth, ancestral memory, systems of value, customary law, and collective purpose have been progressively weakened through the long process of settler colonialism. The issue, therefore, is not simply the loss of individual customary lands. Throughout West Papua, Papuan communities continue to defend their own territories with remarkable determination. The concern of this paper lies at another level altogether: West Papua as a single political homeland—the territorial space that would constitute a sovereign Papuan state. It is this larger territorial whole, rather than individual customary domains, that has become Wam'ndanak'me.

Territorial Wam'ndanak'me has occurred, and continues to occur, because the Papuan mind first became Wam'ndanak'me. Before outsiders could occupy the land, they first entered the world through which Papuans understood the land. It was within the Papuan psyche that foreign gods, stories, symbols, institutions, flags, heroes, and systems of meaning first appeared and began to reproduce themselves. The transformation of physical space is therefore not the beginning of the process but one of its consequences. The geography of West Papua became

Wam'ndanak'me because the Papuan mind had already become Wam'ndanak'me: a functioning cosmology is a fenced field, cultivated across generations, and when that fence is broken—through conquest, missionary activity, dispossession, humiliation, or the cumulative exhaustion of resisting external domination—the mind becomes open to any idea, story, god, flag, or worldview that approaches, takes root, and begins to reproduce.

Earlier work conceptualised this process as the Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus (CPCV): the gradual infiltration, incubation, and eventual overwriting of an indigenous host cosmology by an external cosmological system (Kogoya, 2026b). The domains through which this transformation unfolds have been mapped through the Eight Atlases of Human Existence and the Seven Existential Cages, which identify the principal dimensions of human existence in which cosmological restructuring takes place (Kogoya, 2026c, 2026d).

The metaphor of Wam'ndanak'me must be understood with precision. It does not imply that Papuans are passive, incapable of agency, or somehow destined for dispossession. Nor does it suggest that the opening of the fence results from cultural deficiency. In Lani horticultural practice, a garden is often left open for sound ecological reasons. After years of cultivation, the soil becomes exhausted and requires a prolonged period of forest regeneration before it can sustain life again. The unfenced garden is therefore not a symbol of failure but part of a wider ecological cycle governed by practical knowledge. The metaphor instead describes a structural condition: protecting any boundary—whether territorial, cultural, or cosmological—requires continuous labour and collective coordination that no society can sustain indefinitely under prolonged conquest, missionary intervention, political domination, and demographic transformation. Eventually, breaches emerge through which external systems of meaning, institutions, and identities can enter.

The central question here is therefore not simply why the fence fell. The historical processes through which those breaches emerged are examined in Sections 3 to 5. The deeper philosophical question is what happens once the fence has fallen, how the unfenced condition reproduces itself across generations, and what would be required to rebuild the cosmological boundaries through which a people once organised their existence.

Building on this earlier work (Kogoya, 2025, 2026a), the Psycho-Cosmocide paradigm distinguishes three historical formations of Papuan consciousness.

The first formation is the original indigenous cosmological order. It was not "Papuan" in the modern, pan-ethnic, or territorial sense. Rather, it consisted of diverse, localised worlds organised through families, clans, languages, and tribal networks that developed across the island over many millennia. Each possessed its own ancestral genealogies, mythic histories, moral law, ritual practices, and cosmological account of existence.

Within this first formation, the condition later described as Wam'ndanak'me did not yet exist because no external cosmological claimant had entered these worlds in a sustained way. The fences remained intact, maintained through ritual, initiation, customary law, oral tradition, and the continual reproduction of ancestral knowledge. Earlier work in this series has described this condition as Cosmobian existence: a mode of being grounded in reciprocal relationships among land, ecology, kinship, memory, and the wider cosmos. Its organising logic differed

fundamentally from the extractive civilisational systems that would later confront it (Kogoya, 2026f, 2026h).

The second formation emerged through prolonged contact with external civilisations. As Section 3 demonstrates, sustained interaction with Asiatic maritime networks—and later European colonial powers—began long before the nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial period commonly presented as the beginning of Papuan history. During this phase, indigenous cosmologies were not immediately displaced but progressively penetrated. Travellers, traders, missionaries, administrators, and colonial institutions introduced foreign gods, moral systems, political concepts, historical narratives, and images of civilisation. Their presence was frequently justified through a discourse of salvation or progress in which Papuans were portrayed as primitive, pagan, backward, or deficient. This marked the emergence of the first Wam'ndanak'me of the Papuan mind. The cosmological fence was not broken by a single conqueror but by successive waves of outsiders, each leaving behind new meanings, institutions, and claims upon Papuan consciousness.

The third formation arose during the political transformations of the 1940s to the 1960s. Unlike the first, it was not organised around local cosmologies, nor was it simply an extension of the second. It represented the emergence of a genuinely new political consciousness: the idea of a sovereign Papuan people and, however briefly, a Papuan state. Forged through Dutch decolonisation initiatives yet profoundly reshaped by Indonesian incorporation, this consciousness assembled fragments of indigenous cosmology within the language of modern nationalism, sovereignty, and international law. It was therefore neither a return to the pre-contact order nor a complete acceptance of imported civilisational frameworks, but a hybrid historical formation produced under colonial conditions.

Today this third formation remains the most politically vulnerable, institutionally under-resourced, criminalised, and structurally embattled of the three competing orientations within Papuan consciousness. It exists alongside two powerful rivals: the national consciousness cultivated through the Indonesian state and a growing array of external religious and ideological formations. The most recent and striking example of the latter is the process of Israelisation examined in Section 6. Previous studies argue that the long-term survival of this third formation depends less upon moral appeals to international sympathy than upon the development of durable institutions capable of sustaining sovereign statehood (Kogoya, 2026i).

3. The Fence Before It Fell: Naming, Tribute, and the Deep History of Contact

Any account of how the Papuan mind became Wam'ndanak'me must begin with a simple but revealing observation: the name by which the land and its peoples are known throughout the outside world is itself a product of external naming. The origin of the word *Papua* remains a matter of scholarly debate. The most widely repeated explanation, ultimately deriving from Malay lexicography, holds that the term originated from the Malay words *papuwah* or *puah-puah*, meaning "frizzy-haired," and was used by outsiders to describe the distinctive hair

texture of the island's inhabitants (Etymonline, n.d.). For more than a century this derivation was treated as established fact and reproduced across English, Dutch, Spanish, and other encyclopaedic and lexicographical works.

However, the Dutch historian J. H. F. Sollewijn Gelpke demonstrated through a detailed philological investigation that this apparent consensus rested upon a surprisingly thin and repeatedly recycled chain of citation rather than firm primary evidence. His research showed that several sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Portuguese and Moluccan sources associated the term with both black skin and frizzy hair. The Portuguese chronicler Diogo do Couto, for example, recorded that the Moluccans called the inhabitants "Papuas" because they were black and had frizzy hair, and that the Portuguese subsequently adopted this usage from them (Sollewijn Gelpke, 1993). Sollewijn Gelpke also identified an alternative Biak-language etymology, suggesting that the term may have originated from a local expression referring to the Raja Ampat Islands as "the lands lying under the sunset," before later being generalised to encompass the wider island (Sollewijn Gelpke, 1993).

Yet from this vantage point, the precise etymology is less significant than the structural process through which the name entered history. Whether the word ultimately derives from Malay, Moluccan, Portuguese, or Biak usage, the crucial fact is that it first appeared in the historical record as an exonym—a designation applied from outside rather than generated by the peoples it described. Over time, that external designation was circulated, repeated, institutionalised, and eventually embraced by those to whom it referred, part of a longer pattern of shifting signifiers through which colonial and national vocabularies have been imposed upon, and gradually absorbed into, Papuan self-understanding (Oxford Political Review, 2024).

This pattern is not unique to the Papuan case but exemplifies what related work in this series terms naming as taxonomy of value rather than neutral description: an early European expedition account glossed the Malay papuwah as "woolly" or "fuzzy" hair, "first applied to the natives on account of their mops of hair," before the name migrated from a bodily characteristic to an entire people and, eventually, an island (Wollaston, 1912, p. 25, as cited in Kogoya, 2026n). Once embedded in maps, missionary literature, and later racial science, this classification acquired the appearance of objective knowledge and travelled across generations of explorers and administrators who never needed to have met a Papuan to already know, in advance, what a Papuan was (Douglas, 2008, as cited in Kogoya, 2026n).

This process reached an important political moment in April 1961 when the Dutch-sponsored New Guinea Council formally adopted Papua as the official name of the territory. As Sollewijn Gelpke notes, the choice intentionally distinguished the Indigenous inhabitants from the predominantly straight-haired Malay populations to the west by adopting a name that had long been associated with the physical distinctiveness of the island's peoples (Sollewijn Gelpke, 1993).

From the standpoint of Wam'ndanak'me, the significance of this history extends beyond philology. Before outsiders occupied Papuan territory, they had already named it. Before Papuans increasingly came to understand themselves collectively as *Papuans*, they were increasingly recognising themselves through a designation whose historical origins lay beyond their own cosmological traditions. The issue is therefore not whether the name *Papua* is

authentic or should somehow be abandoned. Rather, it concerns the historical process through which an externally produced designation becomes naturalised to the point that its external origins are no longer questioned.

In this sense, the name itself may be understood as one of the earliest "pigs" to enter the garden. It represents one of the first instances in which an external system of classification crossed the cosmological fence and gradually became incorporated into Papuan self-understanding. Identity begins not only through self-description but also through the internalisation of names first given by others.

Even before European ships appeared along the coasts of New Guinea, the sultanates of Ternate and Tidore, centred on the small volcanic islands of the Moluccas, had already established tributary and extractive relationships with parts of coastal and island Papua. These relationships were organised around the regular extraction of slaves, forest products, spices, resins, bird-of-paradise plumes, and other valuable commodities. Long before formal European colonialism, therefore, sections of Papua had already been incorporated into wider regional systems of political authority and economic extraction.

Historical evidence indicates that Tidore had extended its influence over the Raja Ampat Islands and parts of the New Guinea mainland from at least the late fifteenth century. Both oral tradition and historical scholarship attribute this expansion to Gurabesi, a Biak naval leader who allied with Tidore in its struggle against Ternate. In recognition of his military support, Gurabesi married into the Tidore royal family and was entrusted with authority over the Raja Ampat domains (Andaya, 1993; Gaffney et al., 2024). His story illustrates that Papuans were not merely passive subjects of external expansion but also active participants whose political alliances shaped the emerging regional order.

Within this tributary system, Papuan coastal communities were required to deliver tribute in the form of massoy bark, nutmeg, turtle shell, spices, bird-of-paradise feathers, resins, slaves, or goods of equivalent value. Failure to fulfil these obligations could provoke a hongí expedition: a punitive naval campaign originally developed to enforce the Moluccan spice monopoly and later extended into Papuan waters (Andaya, 1993; Globalsecurity.org, 2012). Tribute was therefore sustained not only through commerce but also through the credible threat of organised violence.

The importance of Papua within these wider regional networks is further demonstrated by the work of Markus Vink, whose research on early modern Indian Ocean slavery identifies Papuan communities among the stateless societies of the eastern archipelago that were raided by, and at times raided on behalf of, the Muslim maritime states of Ternate and Tidore (Vink, 2003). Commercial federations centred on the Uli Lima alliance of Ternate and the Uli Siwa alliance of Tidore coordinated these systems of exchange and extraction across a vast maritime zone stretching from Sulawesi to the Papuan coast (Andaya, 1993).

These relationships were not uniformly characterised by domination. They also generated shifting political alliances. During the late eighteenth century, the Tidorean prince Nuku, in his rebellion against Dutch control, proclaimed himself "Sultan of Tidore and Papua" and drew much of his military strength from Papuan communities and allies in south-eastern Halmahera

(Andaya, 1993; Fatgehipon & Priyo Utomo, 2020). The history of Papuan engagement with the Moluccan sultanates was therefore neither one of simple conquest nor straightforward subordination. It was a complex and changing political relationship marked by tribute, warfare, commerce, diplomacy, and occasional anti-colonial cooperation.

Viewed this way, however, the significance of this history extends beyond political or economic relations. These tributary networks constituted one of the earliest sustained breaches in the cosmological fence. Long before European colonial administrations or Christian missions established themselves in New Guinea, external political authorities had already entered portions of the Papuan world, introducing new obligations, hierarchies, loyalties, systems of exchange, and conceptions of power. The significance of this period lies not in the complete replacement of Papuan cosmologies but in the gradual opening through which successive external worlds could enter. In the language of Wam'ndanak'me, these tributary systems represent some of the earliest "pigs" to pass through the fence, initiating a process of cosmological intrusion that later colonial powers would dramatically expand.

Ligia Giay's archival study of the Papuan slave trade reveals that Papuans entered the written historical record as early as 724 CE, when a Papuan girl was presented by the Sumatran polity of Sriwijaya as a gift to the Chinese imperial court. Giay further documents that, as late as 1680, Chinese imperial envoys in Batavia sought to purchase two Papuan slaves from the Dutch East India Company specifically as objects of rarity, valued for their distinctive complexion, hair, and distant origin (Giay, 2016). Drawing on Jack Goody's concept of "victim societies," Giay argues that New Guinea functioned not simply as a reservoir of slaves but as a politically fragmented frontier vulnerable to both external raiding and internal capture and sale. This vulnerability was observed firsthand by the naturalist Alfred Russel Wallace, who described travelling near Ternate in a vessel crewed largely by enslaved Papuans who had been lent to him (Wallace, 1869/2014, as cited in Giay, 2016).

Long before colonial administration or Christian missions began restructuring Papuan consciousness, Papuan bodies had already become objects of external desire. They were gifted between courts, traded across maritime networks, purchased as curiosities, and incorporated into regional systems of tribute, commerce, and slavery.

This pre-European history is significant for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that the breach in the Papuan cosmological fence did not begin with European colonialism but with the earlier expansion of regional maritime powers and their tributary networks. Tribute and slavery were never merely economic relationships. They also established hierarchies of authority, obligation, prestige, and, increasingly, religious influence. The gradual spread of Islam along sections of the Papuan coast emerged within these same zones of sustained contact and political dependency.

Second, this history demonstrates that Papua had already become a place of strategic interest to outsiders centuries before European colonial expansion. Its people, forests, labour, and natural resources had long been incorporated into wider systems of extraction. By the time Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and British vessels entered Papuan waters during the sixteenth century, the cosmological fence had already endured centuries of intermittent pressure.

The earliest recorded European contact is generally attributed to the Portuguese navigator Jorge de Meneses, who probably reached the island in 1526–1527 while sailing toward the Moluccas (Britannica, 2026). By then, Malay and, according to some accounts, Chinese traders had already maintained commercial and extractive relationships with western New Guinea for generations (Britannica, 2026). The first documented European attempt to establish a permanent colony came much later, in 1793, when the British naval officer Lieutenant John Hayes attempted to found a settlement near present-day Manokwari. The effort failed (Britannica, 2026).

The Dutch formally claimed the western half of New Guinea as part of the Dutch East Indies in 1828, although this claim remained largely nominal until permanent administrative posts were established at Fakfak and Manokwari in 1898 (Britannica, 2026). Throughout much of this period, the sultanates of Bacan, Ternate, and Tidore continued to assert nominal authority over parts of western New Guinea and collected tribute—including slaves—from Papuan coastal communities on behalf of the Dutch administration. Judging New Guinea to have little immediate economic value, the Dutch found indirect rule through Tidore administratively more efficient than direct occupation (Fatgehipon & Priyo Utomo, 2020; Globalsecurity.org, 2012).

From the perspective adopted here, this long historical sequence reveals that Wam'ndanak'me was not created by a single colonial encounter but emerged through successive waves of external intrusion. Tributary systems, slave-raiding networks, Malay and Chinese traders, intermittent Portuguese, Spanish, and British expeditions, and the gradual consolidation of Dutch sovereignty each crossed the cosmological fence in different ways. Each entered the Papuan world, extracted something of value, and left behind new relationships, obligations, categories, or institutions.

None of these encounters, taken individually, reconstructed Papuan consciousness in its entirety. Yet each widened the breach. Each normalised the presence of outsiders within spaces that had previously been organised according to indigenous cosmologies. By the time the twentieth-century colonial state and missionary enterprise arrived, the fence had already been weakened by centuries of cumulative pressure. What had once been intermittent visits by successive "pigs" was about to become something qualitatively different: the deliberate and systematic cultivation of a new consciousness within the unfenced garden. It is to that transformation that the next section now turns.

4. Planting the Farm: Dutch Colonialism and Missionary Cultivation, 1898–1942

From the perspective of Wam'ndanak'me, the period between the establishment of permanent Dutch administrative posts in 1898 and the Japanese occupation in 1942 marks a decisive historical shift. What had previously been an incidental consequence of trade, tribute, and intermittent contact became a deliberate, institutionally organised project of cultivation. If the previous chapter described successive breaches in the cosmological fence, this chapter examines what happened once outsiders remained inside the garden. The objective was no

longer simply to enter Papuan space, but to cultivate it: to prepare the soil, plant new ideas, reshape moral imagination, and gradually produce a different kind of human being.

Dutch rule combined direct colonial administration with an extensive missionary apparatus. Recent historical scholarship has described this arrangement as a form of "dual colonialism", in which evangelisation, education, civilisation, and pacification were pursued as a single integrated project through the close cooperation of Dutch missionaries and the colonial state (Timmer, as cited in Derksen, 2016; see also Chauvel & Pouwer, as cited in Derksen, 2016). In southern Dutch New Guinea between 1920 and 1942, this project depended heavily upon hundreds of Catholic *goeroes*—teachers recruited from the Kei and Tanimbar Islands of southeastern Maluku, approximately one thousand kilometres from the southern Papuan coast. These teachers carried out the everyday work of education, evangelisation, and local administration that the relatively small number of European missionaries and colonial officials could not perform themselves (Derksen, 2016).

For this analysis, this detail is especially significant. The ideas planted in Papuan consciousness during this period did not arrive solely through Europeans. They were also carried by fellow colonised Indonesians who served as intermediaries of empire. Having themselves been shaped by Christian and partially Europeanised cosmologies, these teachers became cultivators of a new moral, religious, and symbolic order within Papuan society. The cultivation of the Papuan mind therefore proceeded not only through European authority but also through the agency of colonised intermediaries whose own worlds had already undergone profound cosmological transformation.

The Protestant Missionary Teachers College at Mei Wondama in Manokwari provides a striking illustration of the missionary project's broader ambitions. During the early 1930s its graduates began fostering the idea of a unified Papuan political consciousness, while the college's principal, Rev. I. S. Kijne, composed the hymn *Hai Tanahku Papua* ("Oh My Land Papua"), which was later adopted as the national anthem of the briefly independent Papuan polity proclaimed in 1961 (Rizzo, 2004).

From the standpoint of Wam'ndanak'me, this episode reveals one of the deepest paradoxes of colonial cultivation. The anthem through which Papuans later expressed their aspirations for national self-determination was composed within a missionary institution established for religious conversion, using musical and linguistic forms introduced from outside. Over time, it came to be embraced as an authentic expression of Papuan nationhood, even though its historical origins lay within one of the very institutions responsible for transforming Papuan consciousness. The significance of this observation is not to diminish the anthem's importance within Papuan nationalism, but to demonstrate how external cultural forms can become internalised so completely that their foreign origins gradually disappear from collective memory.

Alongside the missionary project, a more explicitly settler-colonial vision briefly emerged through the Nieuw Guinea Beweging (New Guinea Movement). Founded in the Netherlands in 1923 by Dutch right-wing nationalists, the movement envisaged transforming Papua into a "tropical Netherlands." The scheme attracted only a few hundred settlers and had largely collapsed by 1938 (Rizzo, 2004). Although unsuccessful, the movement anticipated a political

imagination that would later assume far greater significance under Indonesian rule: the belief that Papuan land existed as an available space upon which an entirely new society could be established. In this sense, the failed Dutch project foreshadowed the much larger programmes of transmigration, militarised settlement, and demographic transformation implemented after 1969.

The Dutch administration's own attitude towards Papuan political development was more complex and ultimately proved decisive for the emergence of the third historical formation of Papuan consciousness. Following the 1949 Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conference, the Netherlands transferred sovereignty over the Dutch East Indies to the newly established Republic of Indonesia but retained control over Dutch New Guinea, citing the substantial ethnic and cultural differences between Papuans and the predominantly Malay-Austronesian populations of the rest of the archipelago (History Guild, 2024).

Throughout the 1950s, Dutch policy increasingly shifted towards preparing the territory for eventual self-government. The administration established the New Guinea Council in 1961 and implemented the policy of Papuanisation, through which Papuan civil servants were trained and promoted into positions previously reserved for Dutch officials (History Guild, 2024; Rizzo, 2004). Scholarship on this transition notes that close, and at times genuinely collegial, relationships developed between young Dutch administrators and their Papuan counterparts. Shared Western education created common institutional languages, while Dutch officials remained dependent upon Papuan knowledge, authority, and local legitimacy (Visser, n.d.).

It was during this period that the third historical formation of Papuan consciousness, introduced in Section 2, began to emerge. The Morning Star flag was first raised on 1 December 1961, the New Guinea Council became the principal political institution of the emerging nation, and *Hai Tanahku Papua*, composed decades earlier by a Dutch missionary, was adopted as the national anthem. Unlike the first cosmological formation or the externally imposed structures of the second, this third formation represented the emergence of a modern political consciousness centred upon the idea of a sovereign Papuan people and state.

Yet this new consciousness never had sufficient time to consolidate. Before its institutions could mature, the geopolitical settlement of the early 1960s abruptly replaced one external sovereign with another. The third formation of the Papuan mind therefore entered history before it had secured either institutional stability or political sovereignty. It inherited fragments of indigenous cosmology, missionary education, Dutch administrative practice, and modern nationalism, only to confront incorporation into the Indonesian state before those elements could cohere into an independent political order. The next chapter examines how this fragile political consciousness entered its most intense period of contestation under Indonesian rule.

5. Rupture: The Act of Free Choice and the Indonesian Mind

The New York Agreement of August 1962 marked one of the decisive ruptures in modern Papuan history. Negotiated between the Netherlands and Indonesia under sustained American diplomatic pressure during the Cold War, the agreement transferred the administration of Dutch New Guinea first to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), which

governed the territory between October 1962 and April 1963, before handing authority to Indonesia. In return, Indonesia undertook to conduct an "Act of Free Choice", through which the Papuan population would determine its own political future (Drooglever, 2009; McGibbon, 2006).

When the Act of Free Choice was finally held in 1969, however, it departed fundamentally from the principle implied by its name. Rather than a territory-wide referendum, approximately 1,025 carefully selected Papuan representatives voted under Indonesian administration and international observation. Numerous contemporary accounts and subsequent historical studies describe the delegates as having acted under intense military pressure before unanimously endorsing integration with Indonesia (Drooglever, 2009). Pieter Drooglever's comprehensive historical investigation, commissioned decades later by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, remains the most detailed scholarly reconstruction of the political, procedural, and coercive conditions surrounding the process (Drooglever, 2009).

Viewed within this framework, the significance of this episode extends beyond questions of international law or electoral legitimacy. It marks the interruption of the third historical formation of Papuan consciousness introduced in Section 2. The political consciousness that had begun to emerge around the New Guinea Council, the Morning Star flag, and the Dutch programme of Papuanisation was deprived of the institutional continuity required for its consolidation. Before it could mature into a stable political order, it was confronted by a far more powerful rival: the Indonesian nation-state.

This moment therefore represents more than a transfer of territorial sovereignty. It marks the beginning of the systematic cultivation of what this paper calls the Indonesian mind within Papua. Through schools, government administration, military occupation, development programmes, transmigration, bureaucratic incorporation, and the promotion of Papuan intermediaries into state institutions, Indonesian nationalism increasingly became the dominant framework through which Papuans were encouraged to understand themselves, their history, and their future. The objective was not merely to govern Papuan territory but to reorganise the symbolic and political world through which Papuans interpreted that territory.

Within the vocabulary of Wam'ndanak'me, the gardeners changed, but the cultivation continued. If Dutch colonialism and missionary institutions had planted the first systematic crop within the breached garden, Indonesian rule sought to reorganise the entire field according to a different political cosmology. New symbols replaced older ones, new historical narratives displaced earlier memories, and new loyalties were cultivated through the institutions of the modern state. The unfenced garden remained open, but its principal cultivator had changed.

Contemporary human rights reporting suggests that this process has continued well into the twenty-first century. Reports produced by the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) and associated organisations up to May 2026 document ongoing military operations, the displacement of more than 107,000 people, and repeated lethal incidents involving Indonesian security forces, including reported drone strikes in the central highlands (ULMWP, 2026a, 2026b; ILPS Commission 10, 2026). While these publications originate from advocacy organisations and should therefore be read alongside independent scholarship, many of their broad descriptions converge with a substantial body of research produced by the

International Crisis Group, the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, and historians such as Rodd McGibbon, all of whom describe a conflict that has now extended into its seventh decade (International Crisis Group, 2003; IPAC, 2024; McGibbon, 2004, 2006; Budiardjo & Liem, 1988).

Understood this way, the enduring significance of this conflict lies not only in its violence or its contested political status. It concerns the continued struggle over the architecture of Papuan consciousness itself. Competing claims over territory, sovereignty, memory, history, education, religion, and political legitimacy all converge upon the same underlying question: which cosmology will ultimately organise the Papuan mind? The next section examines one of the most recent and striking manifestations of that struggle through the phenomenon described here as the Israelisation of the Papuan mind.

6. Three Minds in Competition and the Israelisation of the Papuan Mind

By the early twenty-first century, the Papuan mind—if one can still speak of a single mind rather than the multiple and unevenly overlapping forms of consciousness produced by centuries of historical transformation—had become the principal site of competition among several rival cosmological projects. What had once been a relatively coherent indigenous world had gradually become an unfenced psychological landscape in which different systems of meaning, loyalty, memory, and political imagination competed to define what it now meant to be Papuan.

Within this framework, this competition is organised around three major historical formations of consciousness.

The first is the Indonesian nationalist mind, cultivated through the institutions of the modern Indonesian state. Schools, universities, the civil service, military structures, development programmes, public administration, national ceremonies, and the symbols and narratives of Indonesian nationhood collectively encourage Papuans to understand themselves primarily as citizens of the Republic of Indonesia. The project extends beyond political administration to the gradual internalisation of Indonesian historical memory, civic identity, and national destiny.

The second is the foreign religious mind, whose foundations were established through nineteenth- and twentieth-century missionary Christianity but which has since been expanded through transnational evangelical, Pentecostal, and charismatic Christian movements. Earlier work argues that this process has operated not merely through religious conversion but through a wider reorganisation of cosmological orientation. Religiosity, developmentalism, and the rhetoric of progress and success function together as interconnected systems of psychological reorientation that gradually dismantle the indigenous cosmological world while presenting that dismantling as hope, salvation, or civilisation (Kogoya, 2026k).

The third is the Papuan nationalist mind, which emerged during the political rupture of 1961–1969 and remains the only major project whose primary point of reference is Papuan political self-determination. Today it survives principally through the international advocacy of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP), the armed resistance of the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB), churches, customary leaders, civil society

organisations, and dispersed networks throughout the Papuan diaspora. Yet it remains chronically under-resourced, politically criminalised within Papua itself, and structurally deprived of the institutional support available to its rivals.

Earlier work in this series has interpreted the coexistence of these competing formations as a form of soft civil war. Unlike conventional civil war, in which conflict is fought openly through armed violence, or institutional conflict, in which domination is exercised through law and bureaucracy, soft civil war unfolds primarily within consciousness itself. It is a prolonged struggle over memory, identity, legitimacy, history, and the authority to define reality. The battlefield is no longer only the forest, the village, or the parliament, but the symbolic architecture through which Papuans understand themselves and their future (Kogoya, 2026j).

It is within this wider struggle that the phenomenon described in this paper as the Israelisation of the Papuan mind should be understood. Israelisation is not presented as an isolated theological curiosity, nor as an accusation directed towards Judaism, Jewish people, or the State of Israel. Rather, it represents the latest and most visible manifestation of a much older historical process through which external cosmological systems enter an already unfenced psychological landscape, take root, and gradually reorganise indigenous consciousness from within. In the language of Wam'ndanak'me, the garden had long ceased to belong exclusively to its original custodians. Israelisation represents one of the newest crops planted within it.

This locates Israelisation within the second historical formation of consciousness identified above—the foreign religious mind. This development should not be understood as an isolated Papuan phenomenon; rather, it forms part of a broader transformation occurring across Melanesia and the wider Pacific, where new currents of evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity have increasingly reshaped political imagination alongside religious belief.

Over the past two decades, Christian Zionism has become a significant influence within parts of the Pacific. Broadly understood, Christian Zionism holds that the modern State of Israel fulfils biblical prophecy, that Jerusalem occupies a central place in the anticipated Second Coming of Christ, and that Christians therefore have a religious obligation to support the State of Israel (Australian Institute of International Affairs, 2024). Although expressed in different ways across different societies, these theological commitments have increasingly been accompanied by visible political consequences.

One illustration is the growing diplomatic alignment of several Pacific states with Israel. Papua New Guinea relocated its embassy to Jerusalem, with then Prime Minister James Marape arguing that a Christian identity was incomplete without recognising Jerusalem as Israel's capital. Nauru formally recognised Jerusalem as Israel's capital in 2019, while Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Nauru, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Tonga have repeatedly voted against United Nations resolutions calling for greater protection of civilians in Gaza (Australian Institute of International Affairs, 2024; RNZ, 2025). Scholars and regional analysts have linked this pattern, at least in part, to the expanding influence of evangelical churches whose theological networks, institutional relationships, and financial support often extend to American Christian Zionist organisations.

Among the most influential of these organisations is Christians United for Israel (CUFI), which reports approximately ten million members. Its founder, Pastor John Hagee, argues that the biblical covenant concerning the land of Israel continues to impose moral and political obligations upon contemporary Christians to support the modern Israeli state (Al Jazeera, 2021). Through missionary partnerships, conferences, media, churches, and transnational evangelical networks, these interpretations have circulated far beyond North America and become embedded within Christian communities throughout the Pacific.

Yet Christian identification with Israel is not entirely new within the region. Long before the recent expansion of evangelical Christianity, some Pacific communities had already developed local traditions linking themselves to ancient Israel. These include claims of descent from the Lost Tribes of Israel among some communities in the Solomon Islands and the Papua New Guinea Highlands, as well as practices such as the use of Hebrew prayers among the Gogodala people of western Papua New Guinea (Australian Jewish News, 2025). These traditions demonstrate that biblical Israel has long functioned as a symbolic resource through which some Pacific peoples have interpreted their own histories and identities.

The significance of this broader regional context is that it provides the historical and theological environment within which the Israelisation of the Papuan mind has emerged. The Papuan case therefore should not be understood simply as an isolated theological preference or individual religious conviction. Rather, it represents one local expression of a wider transnational movement whose ideas, symbols, institutions, and political commitments have increasingly circulated across the Pacific. The following section examines how these wider currents have entered Papuan consciousness and how, within the framework of Wam'ndanak'me, they have become incorporated into an already contested cosmological landscape.

West Papua's own Christian institutional history provides fertile ground for this development. The largest Protestant denomination in the Papuan provinces, the Evangelical Christian Church in Tanah Papua (*Gereja Kristen Injili di Tanah Papua*, GKITP), traces its origins to the German Gossner Mission, whose first missionaries arrived in 1855. From 1870 onwards, the church received substantial support from the Netherlands Reformed Church before becoming an autonomous synod in 1956. Today, according to the World Council of Churches, it remains one of the most influential religious institutions in Papuan spiritual, political, and social life (World Council of Churches, n.d.). The significance of this history lies not simply in the spread of Christianity itself, but in the enduring institutional infrastructure through which successive theological movements have continued to circulate within Papuan society.

Previous studies argue that the sacred geography of the Abrahamic traditions—above all, Jerusalem—has progressively travelled from its Middle Eastern origins to the farthest reaches of the colonised world, becoming a cosmological centre around which Papuan metaphysical orientation has increasingly been reorganised (Kogoya, 2026e). Building upon this missionary foundation, more recent evangelical, charismatic, and Pentecostal movements have further expanded the circulation of Christian Zionist theology, reinforcing biblical-prophetic narratives that place contemporary Israel at the centre of sacred history.

One visible consequence has been the increasing appearance of Israeli flags, symbols, and rhetoric within sections of the Papuan public sphere. These are not merely expressions of

international political preference but manifestations of a broader symbolic orientation in which biblical Israel has become intertwined with Christian identity, religious imagination, and public expressions of faith.

The social and political consequences of this orientation have become increasingly apparent. In 2025, Merince Kogoya, a finalist representing Papua Pegunungan in the Miss Indonesia pageant, was disqualified after a video resurfaced showing her waving an Israeli flag. The incident also contravened Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regulation No. 3 of 2019, which prohibits the public display of Israeli state symbols (Tempo.co, 2025; Muhammadiyah, 2023). Taken alone, a single disqualification is anecdotal; its significance here lies in what it reveals about the underlying legal and symbolic tension—Israeli symbolism circulating publicly enough among Papuans to trigger a state sanction despite its illegality—rather than in the incident functioning as a stand-alone proof of a broader trend. The following paragraph situates it alongside independent commentary identifying a wider regional pattern.

The irony is striking. Israeli flags now circulate openly in parts of the Papuan public sphere, while the Morning Star flag—the principal symbol of Papuan nationhood—continues to be criminalised by the Indonesian state, with its public display frequently resulting in arrest and prosecution (Free West Papua Campaign, n.d.). One flag represents a distant nation located thousands of kilometres away; the other represents the homeland upon which Papuans themselves stand. Yet under existing political conditions, the former can often function as a visible religious symbol while the latter remains a prohibited political symbol.

This symbolic inversion has not gone unnoticed within Papuan political discourse. Independent of the Merince Kogoya case, commentators analysing Indonesia's wider debates surrounding Israel and Palestine separately identify Christian communities in Papua and Minahasa as significant centres of pro-Israel sentiment, interpreting the public display of Israeli flags as an expression of minority religious identity intertwined with local political narratives (Sasmita, 2026). Read together, the disqualification and this independent regional commentary corroborate one another: the former documents a specific triggering incident, the latter situates it within an observed pattern rather than treating it as an isolated occurrence. In September 2025, ULMWP Interim President Benny Wenda drew an explicit comparison, asking why Indonesia, which recognises both Israel and Palestine, could not similarly recognise West Papua (ULMWP, 2025). Although intended as a political argument about diplomatic recognition, the comparison inadvertently illustrates a deeper transformation. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has itself become one of the principal symbolic frameworks through which Papuans increasingly articulate their own struggle for justice, sovereignty, and international recognition.

From the perspective developed here, these developments represent more than changing political sympathies or theological preferences. They reveal an ongoing reorganisation of cosmological orientation. The symbolic centre through which many Papuans imagine sacred history, moral obligation, political hope, and ultimate destiny increasingly lies beyond Papua itself. Within the language of Wam'ndanak'me, another field has matured within the unfenced garden. The question is no longer whether new crops have been planted, but what those crops gradually teach the garden to remember, to desire, and ultimately to become.

This paper argues that the phenomenon described as the Israelisation of the Papuan mind should be understood within the wider framework of Wam'ndanak'me, rather than treated simply as an unusual example of Pacific religious politics or contemporary Christian enthusiasm. Viewed structurally, it represents the continuation of a much longer historical process. The names of Jesus, Jerusalem, heaven, hell, Abraham, and the wider sacred geography of the Abrahamic traditions did not emerge from within Papuan cosmology. They entered Papuan consciousness through successive waves of missionary activity, education, translation, and religious instruction that gradually reorganised the symbolic architecture through which reality itself was interpreted.

The significance of this contemporary prominence of biblical Israel lies not in the adoption of new religious beliefs as such, but in the further relocation of moral imagination, historical memory, and political hope towards symbolic centres situated far beyond Papua itself.

Within the language of Wam'ndanak'me, this process resembles the female pig that enters the unfenced garden and never returns to its original home because it has found food, shelter, companionship, and the conditions necessary to reproduce. The issue is not the initial entry but the establishment of a self-sustaining presence that gradually reshapes the garden from within. Once established, new symbolic worlds begin to reproduce themselves across generations through families, churches, schools, rituals, institutions, and collective memory until their external origins are no longer consciously recognised.

Related work in this series names this mechanism directly: the *Shamhat Mechanism*, the use of counterfeit transcendence to detach a cosmopolitan being from its original world while presenting the detachment as fulfilment (Kogoya, 2026o). What is decisive is that the encounter is not experienced as a swindle. What is offered — status, salvation, comfort, belonging — is genuinely delivered. “The tragedy is not that he is deceived about what he receives, but that he is not told the full cost of what he is paying” (Kogoya, 2026o, sec. “The Shamhat Mechanism”). This is why Israelisation is better understood as seduction than imposition, and why it cannot be addressed through counter-argument alone: the desire is not mistaken, it has been restructured.

This restructuring follows a documented sequence. Companion work in this series traces an eleven-stage Life Cycle of Infection running from Exposure and Entry, through Seduction and Trust, to Internalisation, Identity Formation, Reproduction, Intergenerational Transmission, and finally Civilisational Permanence — the point at which a code is “so deeply embedded... that removing it would require the coordinated dismantling of an entire society’s institutional architecture” (Kogoya, 2026p, sec. “Life Cycle of Infection,” Stage 11: Civilisational Permanence). The Merince Kogoya disqualification and the diplomatic alignments discussed above mark a population moving through the middle stages of this sequence — Trust and Acceptance consolidating into Identity Formation — rather than a discrete or completed event.

Seen in this light, the intensity with which some Papuans identify with biblical Israel is not merely a matter of theological preference or international political sympathy. It reflects a deeper structural condition. A people whose claims to land, identity, political recognition, and historical legitimacy have repeatedly been denied or marginalised may understandably find profound meaning in biblical narratives centred upon exile, covenant, suffering, return, and the

restoration of a homeland. The attraction of these narratives lies not simply in their religious content but in their capacity to provide symbolic coherence for experiences of dispossession and collective longing.

Yet it is precisely here that this framework locates its central concern. The question is not whether these narratives possess spiritual value, nor whether individuals should be free to embrace them. Rather, it asks what occurs when a people increasingly interprets its deepest historical aspirations through a covenant, sacred geography, and cosmological memory that originated elsewhere. The argument advanced here is that the tragedy lies not in learning another people's story, but in the gradual displacement of one's own. The more Papuan hopes for restoration become organised through an inherited external covenant, the more difficult it becomes to recover and reconstruct the indigenous cosmological foundations from which a distinctly Papuan future might emerge.

This analysis does not depend upon any judgement regarding the theological truth or falsity of Christian Zionism, nor does it question the sincerity of Papuan Christians, many of whom find genuine consolation, moral guidance, community, and hope through their faith under conditions of prolonged political uncertainty and hardship. The concern of the Psycho-Cosmocide paradigm is therefore neither theological nor personal. It is structural. It asks not whether a belief is true, but what role that belief performs within the wider ecology of Papuan consciousness and how it reorganises the architecture through which a people remembers its past, interprets its present, and imagines its future.

From this perspective, every cosmology competes for finite symbolic space within the human psyche. The more consciousness becomes organised around the sacred geography, historical memory, covenant, prophetic destiny, and moral imagination of another civilisation, the less symbolic capacity remains for cultivating and transmitting one's own. The issue is therefore not the adoption of new beliefs in itself, but the gradual displacement of indigenous cosmological orientation by an external symbolic order that increasingly becomes the primary framework through which reality is understood.

This is what related work in this series calls *Chromatic Tragedy*: destruction that “arrives cloaked in development, religion, education, progress, modernity, and participation,” such that “the forces dismantling a colonised world become indistinguishable from the very institutions that teach its people to imagine a better future” (Kogoya, 2026q, sec. “Chromatic Tragedy”). Israelisation does not feel like loss because it is not experienced as loss. It is experienced, sincerely, as hope.

This is precisely the logic captured by Wam'ndanak'me. The problem is not that everything entering an unfenced garden is inherently hostile. Some arrivals may indeed nourish, protect, or enrich the garden. The deeper problem is structural: an unfenced garden possesses no enduring means of distinguishing between what cultivates its own life and what gradually reorganises it according to another ecological logic. Once the boundaries of cosmological self-orientation have been weakened, successive symbolic systems may establish themselves, reproduce across generations, and eventually become accepted as natural features of the landscape itself.

Within the framework developed throughout this paper, the Israelisation of the Papuan mind therefore represents neither an isolated religious phenomenon nor a uniquely Papuan anomaly. It is the most recent and visible expression of a much longer historical process through which externally generated cosmologies have progressively reorganised Papuan consciousness from within. The central question is not whether these cosmologies possess meaning or value, but whether the Papuan people retain sufficient cosmological sovereignty to remember, renew, and reproduce the symbolic foundations of their own world alongside them.

Israelisation therefore is not the cause of Wam'ndanak'me. It is evidence that Wam'ndanak'me already exists.

Having traced this process through its contemporary expression, the discussion now turns to the relationship between Wam'ndanak'me and established currents within decolonial thought, asking where this framework converges with existing scholarship and where it proposes a distinct theoretical departure.

7. Wam'ndanak'me in Conversation with Decolonial Theory

The concept of Wam'ndanak'me enters into conversation with several major currents of decolonial and postcolonial thought. Yet it does so from a different starting point. Rather than beginning with colonial domination as a political relationship, it begins with cosmological integrity as the fundamental condition of human existence. Its central question is therefore not simply how domination is exercised, but what becomes of a people once the symbolic architecture through which they understand reality has lost the capacity to regulate itself. The problem is no longer merely colonialism. It is the progressive reorganisation of consciousness itself.

Approached this way, Frantz Fanon's analysis of the colonised psyche remains indispensable. Fanon demonstrated with extraordinary clarity how the colonised subject gradually internalises the coloniser's hierarchy of value until the coloniser's gaze becomes the measure through which the colonised judges themselves (Fanon, 1963). Psycho-Cosmocide shares this diagnosis but argues that the Papuan condition reveals an additional historical complexity. The Papuan mind has not been reorganised by a single colonising consciousness. Rather, it has become the meeting ground of successive cosmological occupations. Sultanate Islam, Dutch colonial administration, missionary Christianity, Indonesian nationalism, global developmentalism, and transnational evangelical movements have each entered the same psychological landscape without entirely eliminating those that came before. Instead of replacement, the dominant historical pattern is accumulation. Each new cosmology settles upon the remnants of the previous one until consciousness becomes layered with multiple external centres of gravity. The metaphor of Wam'ndanak'me captures this cumulative occupation more precisely than a binary distinction between coloniser and colonised.

A similar dialogue emerges with Sylvia Wynter's critique of the overrepresentation of Western *Man* as the universal model of humanity, a critique that has informed this author's own prior treatment of ontological enclosure and colonial consent (Wynter, 2003; Kogoya, 2026d). Wynter demonstrates that coloniality succeeds not because it openly announces itself as one

possible way of being human, but because it silently presents itself as humanity itself. The Psycho-Cosmocide paradigm extends this insight beyond anthropology into cosmology. Every dominant symbolic order seeks not merely political obedience but existential exclusivity. Indonesian nationalism presents itself as the natural horizon of citizenship. Missionary Christianity presents itself as the natural horizon of salvation. Christian Zionism presents itself as the natural horizon of sacred history. Each offers not one interpretation among many but the definitive framework through which reality, morality, destiny, and belonging are to be understood. In this sense, each cultivates its own cosmological monopoly within the symbolic ecology of Papuan consciousness.

The conversation with Walter Mignolo proceeds from a similar point. Mignolo's distinction between colonialism as historical conquest and coloniality as the enduring organisation of knowledge, power, and being remains one of the foundational insights of decolonial scholarship, and resonates with this author's earlier account of Papuan colonial consciousness as a struggle for reality that continues inside, and not merely after, formal decolonisation (Kogoya, 2026l). Psycho-Cosmocide accepts this distinction while proposing that coloniality itself operates upon an even deeper substrate: the cosmological conditions that make any system of knowledge possible. Political independence may dismantle colonial administration, and constitutional sovereignty may restore legal authority, but neither necessarily restores cosmological sovereignty. A nation may recover its territory while continuing to inhabit another civilisation's sacred geography, another civilisation's prophetic future, another civilisation's historical memory, and another civilisation's ultimate horizon of meaning. In such circumstances, political decolonisation and cosmological recolonisation coexist within the same society.

A further caution belongs here, drawn from a companion analysis of Plato's cave conducted elsewhere in this series. Resistance movements that contest a cosmology using only that cosmology's own conceptual instruments risk becoming, in that paper's phrase, "shadows of the same fire" (Kogoya, 2026r, sec. "What Plato Missed") — opposition that remains legible only within the terms the dominant order has already supplied. This is a caution Wam'ndanak'me must apply to itself as much as to Israelisation: the rebuilding of the fence cannot simply install a Papuan nationalist cosmology as the new sole occupant of the garden, using the same logic of exclusive symbolic monopoly it criticises elsewhere. The correction that paper proposes — Wone understood not as a rival abstraction to be reached by ascent, but as a relational ordering principle "known through" land, language, and kinship rather than apart from them (Kogoya, 2026r, sec. on Wone) — is the same correction this paper's account of cosmological sovereignty requires.

A further methodological clarification belongs here, since the argument developed throughout this paper raises a question any careful reader will ask: what, if anything, could count as evidence against the claim that the Papuan mind is Wam'ndanak'me? If Indonesian nationalism, missionary Christianity, and now Christian Zionism are each read as confirming instances of the same underlying unfenced condition, the diagnosis risks appearing unfalsifiable—capable of explaining any outcome after the fact rather than ruling any outcome out in advance. This paper does not claim empirical falsifiability in the sense demanded of a

scientific hypothesis, nor does it need to: Wam'ndanak'me is offered as a phenomenological and historical diagnostic category, in the same interpretive register as Fanon's account of the colonised psyche or Wynter's account of coloniality, not as a predictive model to be tested against future data. What the framework does rule out, and what would count as evidence against it, is more precise than it may first appear: a Papuan cosmological order that successfully excluded, absorbed on its own terms, or indigenised an external claim—one in which the reproduction of an imported symbolic system remained subordinate to, rather than constitutive of, self-understanding—would be evidence of an intact rather than a breached fence. The paper's own account of the first historical formation in Section 2, and its acknowledgement that boundary maintenance is an achievable condition rather than a permanent absence, already supplies this contrast case. Distinguishing cultivation-under-sovereignty from occupation-without-consent is therefore not incidental to the argument but is the argument's operative test, and it is one the historical record can in principle fail to support in any given case.

It is here that Wam'ndanak'me departs most significantly from existing decolonial theory. Much decolonial scholarship understandably describes the colonised mind through metaphors of trauma, rupture, fragmentation, alienation, or epistemic violence. These diagnoses remain profoundly important. Yet they often leave unanswered a further question: what continues to exist beneath the damage?

The Lani image of the unfenced garden offers a different answer. The soil itself has not disappeared. It remains alive beneath the weeds, the invasive growth, and the accumulated debris of successive occupations. What has been lost is not the existence of the garden but its capacity to regulate what enters, what reproduces, and what ultimately defines it. The central task is therefore not the impossible fantasy of removing everything that has ever entered from outside. Human history has never unfolded through absolute isolation, nor would such isolation be desirable. Cultures have always learned, exchanged, adapted, and transformed. The problem arises when a people gradually lose the capacity to distinguish between what they have consciously integrated into their own world and what has silently reorganised that world from within.

The Psycho-Cosmocide paradigm therefore relocates the site of decolonisation itself. Decolonisation is not completed when flags change, constitutions are rewritten, or international recognition is achieved. Nor is it completed simply by recovering historical memory. It begins only when a people recover cosmological sovereignty—the collective capacity to determine which worlds they will cultivate, which memories they will transmit, which symbolic centres they will inhabit, and which futures they will ultimately reproduce.

This is the philosophical horizon within which the companion framework of Wonesis should be understood (Kogoya, 2026m). Wonesis is neither a religion, nor an ideology, nor another universal theory competing for civilisational dominance. It is a disciplined practice of cosmological restoration grounded in land, memory, reciprocity, and existential responsibility. If Psycho-Cosmocide diagnoses the progressive transformation of the unfenced garden, Wonesis asks how that garden may once again become capable of recognising itself, protecting itself, and cultivating life according to its own living architecture. The deepest struggle of

decolonisation, therefore, is not ultimately over territory, institutions, or governments. It is over the conditions through which a civilisation remembers how to become itself again.

8. A Prior Articulation: *Papua as a State of Mind*

The central intuition developed throughout this paper did not emerge fully formed with the concepts of Wam'ndanak'me or the broader Psycho-Cosmocide paradigm. It first appeared several years earlier in a much shorter and less theoretically developed reflection. Looking back, that earlier work can now be understood as the first articulation of a problem that this paper has sought to describe with greater conceptual precision.

In December 2018, I wrote a paper entitled "Ideology of the Papua Nation Will Never Die" at *Kurumbi Wone*. The paper argued that Papua had ceased to function merely as the name of a territory or a people. Instead, it had become what I described as a state of mind—an interior condition carrying its own memories, values, moral imagination, emotional attachments, and way of inhabiting the world. Papua, in this sense, was no longer reducible to the political geography administered by the Indonesian state. It had become a living architecture of consciousness (Kogoya, 2018).

The central claim of that paper was that this interior reality could not be extinguished through the ordinary instruments by which states exercise power. Military occupation, bureaucratic administration, economic development, diplomatic isolation, or international recognition could alter the political condition of Papua, but they could not, by themselves, erase the deeper consciousness through which Papuans continued to remember themselves. I summarised that conviction in a formulation that has remained with me ever since:

"Indonesia can bring Papuan people out of Papua, but Indonesia will never bring Papua out of Papuans." (Kogoya, 2018)

At the time, this statement was largely an expression of political conviction. It asserted the resilience of Papuan consciousness but did not yet possess the conceptual vocabulary required to explain why that resilience persisted despite generations of colonisation, missionary transformation, political incorporation, and civilisational reorganisation. The argument remained intuitive rather than theoretical.

Read retrospectively, however, that earlier paper can now be understood as the first glimpse of what Wam'ndanak'me later made visible. The language of the state of mind identified the existence of an interior world that political domination could not fully extinguish. The concept of Wam'ndanak'me explains the historical condition of that interior world. It reveals that Papuan consciousness has never remained untouched. Across successive centuries it has been entered, cultivated, reorganised, and layered by multiple cosmological systems: the tributary worlds of Tidore and Ternate, missionary Christianity, Dutch colonial administration, Indonesian nationalism, global developmentalism, and, more recently, transnational Christian Zionism. These successive occupations have not erased the garden; they have transformed the conditions under which it continues to live.

Yet the garden itself has not disappeared. Beneath the accumulated layers of external cultivation, the soil remains capable of regeneration. Like an unfenced field left fallow after repeated occupation, its fertility may become obscured, depleted, or overgrown, but it is not extinguished. New growth remains possible because the living ground from which Papuan consciousness first emerged has never been entirely destroyed.

Seen in this light, the 2018 assertion that "the ideology of the Papua nation will never die" and the present theory of Wam'ndanak'me are not separate arguments but successive stages in the evolution of the same philosophical project. The earlier work affirmed the endurance of the garden. The present work explains both the condition of that garden and the historical processes through which it became unfenced. What was once expressed as political intuition has now been reformulated as philosophical diagnosis. The question is no longer simply whether the Papuan mind survives. The deeper question is how a civilisation remembers itself after centuries of cosmological occupation, and what must be rebuilt before that memory can once again become the organising centre of its own future.

9. Conclusion: Rebuilding the Fence

This paper has argued that the historical transformation of the Papuan world cannot be adequately understood through the language of territorial occupation, military violence, human rights violations, or even colonialism alone, important though each of these remains. These describe what happened to Papuan bodies, institutions, and lands. They do not fully explain what happened to the cosmological architecture through which Papuans understood existence itself.

To address that deeper problem, this paper has introduced the Lani concept of Wam'ndanak'me as a new diagnostic category within the broader Psycho-Cosmocide paradigm. More than a cultural metaphor, Wam'ndanak'me describes a cosmobian condition: the progressive loss of a people's capacity to regulate the symbolic worlds that enter, reproduce, and ultimately organise their consciousness. An unfenced garden is not defined by the hostility of those who enter it. It is defined by the absence of the boundary that once distinguished cultivation from occupation.

Tracing the historical movement from the contested naming of Papua, through the tributary systems of Tidore and Ternate, the successive encounters with Portuguese, Spanish, British, and Dutch expansion, the institutional cultivation of missionary Christianity, the political rupture of 1962–1969, Indonesian incorporation, and the contemporary competition among Indonesian nationalism, transnational religious movements, and Papuan nationalism, this paper has argued that Papuan consciousness has undergone nearly five centuries of cumulative cosmological occupation. Each historical formation entered an already unfenced psychological landscape. None needed to eradicate its predecessors completely because the deeper condition—the absence of cosmological sovereignty—remained unresolved.

Within this longer historical trajectory, the Israelisation of the Papuan mind has been examined not as an isolated theological curiosity nor as a judgement upon Christian faith, but as one of the clearest contemporary manifestations of this enduring structure. The widespread circulation of Israeli symbols, biblical geographies, covenantal narratives, and prophetic imaginations

within Papuan consciousness demonstrates how external cosmologies continue to provide symbolic resources through which Papuans seek to articulate questions of justice, suffering, land, belonging, and historical hope. That these narratives have become meaningful is not the central problem. The deeper question is why a people whose own cosmological inheritance once organised those questions increasingly requires another civilisation's sacred memory to express them.

The argument developed here therefore proposes cosmological decolonisation as the indispensable companion to political decolonisation. Political sovereignty alone cannot restore a civilisation whose deepest symbolic coordinates remain organised elsewhere. Constitutions may be rewritten. Flags may be raised. International recognition may eventually be achieved. Yet if the fundamental architecture of memory, meaning, sacred geography, historical imagination, and existential orientation continues to derive primarily from external cosmologies, then decolonisation remains incomplete.

Rebuilding the fence does not mean sealing Papua off from the rest of humanity, nor rejecting everything that has entered over the past five centuries. Such a project would be neither possible nor desirable. Human civilisations have always learned from one another, exchanged ideas, and transformed through encounter. The question is not whether outside worlds should enter, but whether Papuans retain the collective authority to determine what they receive, how they transform it, and whether it ultimately serves the flourishing of their own civilisation rather than its gradual replacement.

It is precisely here that the companion framework of Wonesis becomes significant. Wonesis does not seek to replace one universal doctrine with another. Nor does it ask Papuans to recover a romanticised or untouched past that no longer exists. Rather, it proposes the disciplined work of restoring cosmological sovereignty through land, memory, reciprocity, language, ecological belonging, and collective responsibility. If Psycho-Cosmocide diagnoses how a cosmopolitan world gradually forgets itself, Wonesis asks how that cosmopolitan world might once again remember.

Ultimately, this paper has advanced a broader claim extending well beyond West Papua. Every cosmopolitan lives within a garden of meaning. Every people inherits symbolic boundaries that determine how reality is remembered, interpreted, and transmitted across generations. When those boundaries collapse, the deepest struggle is no longer simply over territory or government, but over the authority to determine which worlds shall inhabit the human mind.

The future of Papua, therefore, will not ultimately be decided only on diplomatic tables, in international courts, through military confrontation, or by constitutional negotiation. It will also be decided within the invisible architecture of consciousness itself. The deepest question confronting the Papuan people is not simply whether they will recover their land, but whether they will recover the cosmological sovereignty required to remember how to become themselves again. Until that fence is rebuilt, every political victory will remain precarious, because the garden from which the future of Papua must grow is still unfenced, and every passing civilisation remains free to enter, feed, and cultivate its own cosmological world there.

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Yamin Kogoya is a Papuan philosopher, writer, and independent researcher from the Central Highlands of New Guinea (West Papua), currently based in Australia.

His work explores the creation, transformation, and destruction of human worlds. He coined the term Psycho-Cosmocide, an interdisciplinary philosophical paradigm that examines the destruction of human worlds not only through physical violence, occupation, or ecological devastation, but also through the systematic reorganisation of human perception, memory, cosmology, and meaning. Within this paradigm, Kogoya distinguishes the Cosmobian World—organic forms of life constituted through reciprocal relationships with land, ecology, ancestry, kinship, language, memory, and the cosmos—from the Synthobian World, a synthetic mode of reality constituted through written words, images, symbols, signs, colours, institutions, technologies, monuments, and the interconnected logics of extraction, production, and consumption. Kogoya argues that, throughout history, the Cosmobian World has repeatedly been treated as the primary fuel upon which the Synthobian World depends. Within this process, Cosmobian peoples are progressively seduced, induced, assimilated, reorganised, and ultimately driven towards extinction as participants in the very systems that consume the worlds from which they emerged.

Drawing upon Indigenous cosmologies alongside philosophy, anthropology, history, religion, mythology, and civilisation studies, Kogoya develops original conceptual frameworks for interpreting the contemporary human condition. He reinterprets the world's foundational myths, epics, tragedies, and philosophical narratives as enduring civilisational archetypes through which humanity has repeatedly confronted power, mortality, memory, exile, homecoming, and extinction.

His interdisciplinary research spans philosophy, ontology, epistemology, cosmology, anthropology, Indigenous studies, comparative mythology, decolonial thought, and civilisation studies, with West Papua serving as its principal empirical, historical, and philosophical ground.

He holds a Master of Applied Anthropology and Participatory Development from the Australian National University. His academic background also includes Religious Studies, Indigenous Studies, and Asia-Pacific Studies, and he undertook advanced study in epistemology at the University of Oxford.

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