

NATAKA Research Institute

Wone Press

Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series, No. 9 (2026)

Rethinking Sixty-Four Years of Papuan Resistance

From the Psychopathology of a Moral Spectacle to a Sovereign State-Building Strategy

Yamin Kogoya

First published on PhilPapers: 9th May 2026 | This revised edition: 7th August 2026

The Papuan Ancestors

The Papuan ancestors never begged to exist. They never asked other people for permission to live on their own land. They never sought recognition through demonstrations, petitions, speeches or appeals to distant authorities. They did not organise themselves around the hope that someone else would one day acknowledge their humanity, restore their dignity or grant them the right to survive. They simply existed, organised their world, and defended it. They did not beg for food because the land provided for them. They were not homeless because the land was their home. They did not search for an identity because they already belonged to their families, clans, ancestors, languages, rivers, mountains and the living world that sustained them. Their existence was neither accidental nor incomplete. It was organised. They did not think of themselves as primitive, savage, backward, pagan, heathen, uncivilised or inferior to other human beings. They did not measure themselves against foreign standards because those standards did not yet exist within their world. They did not believe that they were deficient, underdeveloped, unintelligent, incomplete or not yet fully human. These ideas did not originate in Papua. They arrived with civilisation.

Along with colonial expansion came a whole new vocabulary of existence — a civilisational grammar that first renamed the Papuans before seeking to reorganise their world. Demonisation preceded domination. Dehumanisation justified conquest. Re-humanisation promised redemption. Development promised salvation. Progress promised arrival. Education promised transformation. Religion promised another kingdom. These ideas entered the Papuan mind one by one, not as isolated concepts, but as an interconnected system of assumptions about what it means to be human and how one ought to live.

Within the framework of Psycho-Cosmocide, however, these are not independent ideas, but rather expressions of the Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus (CPCV): a parasitic civilisational logic that progressively alters a people's perception to the point where they begin to distrust their own world and abandon their own categories of existence. They then seek completion within the civilisation that originally convinced them of their own incompleteness. Therefore, the greatest conquest was not the occupation of Papuan land. Rather, it was the gradual displacement of the Papuan world's confidence in itself.

This paper begins with the conviction that, before they can rebuild their future, Papuans must first remember what kind of people they were before they were taught to forget.

Abstract

This paper provides a concise historical and strategic analysis of West Papua's political development from 1945 to 2026, examining decolonisation, international mediation, incorporation into Indonesia, and the emergence of sustained resistance movements. Situating West Papua within broader post-colonial and Cold War geopolitical structures, it interrogates the tension between legal-political integration and indigenous self-determination. Despite decades of documentation, advocacy, and international appeals — including engagement with the United Nations, the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group — the structural conditions of domination remain largely intact. The paper argues that this persistence demands a fundamental rethinking of resistance strategy: a shift away from the psychopathology of permanent victimhood and moral spectacle, and towards sovereign state-building, civilisational reconstruction, and strategic leverage. Drawing on comparative cases from colonised cosmobian (peoples in cosmological relationship with their land and planet) societies in Australia, Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific, and rooted in the Psycho-Cosmocide theoretical framework, the analysis concludes with an unambiguous demand: Papuan resistance movements must transform their entire worldview — from sporadic protest to the concentrated, sovereign protection of Bumi Cenderawasih, the planet of the Bird of Paradise — or face extinction by default. This revised edition rebuilds the argument in sustained conversation with the wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus — its parasitological, participatory-extinction, settler-domain, civilisational-death-cult, soft-civil-war, land-ontology, metaphysics-of-power, and colonial-racial-genealogy papers within the Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series — so that the strategic argument advanced here stands on the full theoretical architecture developed across the series, rather than in isolation from it. This edition further restructures the whole around a single chronological spine, running from the cosmobian world before contact through to 2026, so that the theory is not applied to the history after the fact but read directly out of it, era by era.

Keywords: Psycho-Cosmocide; West Papua; Papuan resistance; Cosmobian World; Synthobian World; Wonesis; Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus (CPCV); Soft Civil War; Indigenous sovereignty; state-building; decolonisation; political philosophy; political anthropology; civilisational studies; collective memory; strategic resistance; nation-building; world-making; Indigenous political thought; colonialism.

PART I THE DIAGNOSTIC FRAMEWORK

1. Wone Kenok: The Crisis That Demands A Response

Every human being carries countless problems. Every family carries its own; every nation, community, and culture carries more again; and humanity as a whole is, by any honest accounting, drowning in crisis — ecological, political, economic, spiritual. Not every crisis, however, becomes the work of a life. Most are lived through, endured, and set down again. A smaller number become what the Lani language names a Wone Kenok: not simply a problem, but the point at which some anomaly can no longer be looked away from, and a life's remaining work reorganises itself around answering it.

In Lani cosmology, Wone names the governing principle beneath a worldview — the deep structure that organises what a people believes, values, and takes reality to be. Kenok names the moment that principle is disturbed: the point at which some anomaly in human affairs becomes undeniable, presents itself as crisis, and demands an answer — what, where, when, by whom, how, and why. A Wone Kenok is not invoked for the ordinary difficulties of family, clan, or daily life. It is reserved for the rarer diagnostic moment when something at the level of a whole cosmology has gone wrong and can no longer be looked away from.

This paper begins from one such moment. Psycho-Cosmocide itself first arrived as a Wone Kenok: a point at which every inherited category — justice, truth, history, heaven, hell, memory, progress — collapsed under scrutiny at once, leaving something closer to Descartes' ground zero than to any single new idea. Where Descartes reached 'I think, therefore I am,' what remained here was closer to nothing: an emptiness requiring not a single certainty but an entire new map, a new atlas, before anything else could be located again.¹

Psycho-Cosmocide: A New Diagnostic Framework

Psycho-Cosmocide is the term that entered that emptiness as an instrument for re-seeing what remained. Existing frameworks — Marxist analyses of extraction, postcolonial theory's account of discourse and power, human-rights reporting's language of violation — each illuminated real dimensions of the Papuan condition, but none, on their own, could name what was happening to memory, cosmology, and the very categories through which reality is perceived. What was missing was not another argument within an existing vocabulary, but the vocabulary itself: a new map, a new atlas, a new language adequate to a form of destruction that operates beneath ideology, in the architecture of perception. This diagnosis is not offered in isolation; it belongs to an interconnected body of work applying the same method across ontology, colonialism, religion, and consciousness, of which this paper is one part.

This paper's own argument is a second Wone Kenok, arrived at through the same diagnostic method: the finding that Papuan resistance itself, after sixty-four years, has become infected by the condition it resists. It is not merely opposed by the beast; substantial parts of it now sit inside the beast's own digestive system. It is not merely watching the shadows on the cave wall; parts of it have become figures within the cave, reproducing its light. It has not lost its way through any lack of courage or sacrifice, but because it has been navigating with the wrong map, for the wrong territory — in places, for a territory that survives only as the memory of what has already been consumed. What follows is the record of that diagnosis: a resistance

movement sick across all eight atlases of Papuan existence, offered not as theory applied from outside, but as testimony from inside the crisis it describes.

The Captured Word: Naming as the First Front

Before this paper's own diagnostic apparatus can be set out in full, a prior fact must be named: Papua, Papuan, and West Papua — together with the cosmopolitan people and world these words are meant to designate — are already captured inside the naming architecture of the civilisational order they resist. Every actor within Papuan resistance, from the diplomat with an Oxford degree to the rebel with a rifle in the highlands, presently thinks, argues, and organises using vocabulary, maps, categories, and time supplied by the very system under contest. This is the condition the wider corpus calls synthobian capture: the situation in which a cosmopolitan people no longer possesses the naming power over its own eight atlases of existence — the physical, the biological, the cultural, the metaphysical, the material, the spatial-temporal, the memorial, and the ultimate — and must therefore borrow, at every level, the categories of its coloniser in order even to describe its own condition.²

The physical and material atlas offers the clearest illustration. Indonesia possesses, and has exercised for six decades, the sole power to survey, divide, and rename every Papuan territory it administers — provinces, regencies, districts, villages, and the names of the mountains, rivers, lakes, and coastlines within them. A structurally identical process occurred at the level of the island as a whole: Papuans in independent Papua New Guinea were brought, through generations of colonial and postcolonial schooling, to regard West Papua as belonging to 'Asia' and their own half of the island as belonging to 'the Pacific' or 'the West' — a partition of one cosmopolitan landmass into two civilisational hemispheres that had nothing to do with the people who had always lived across it as a single world.³

This is why the first and most consequential act available to a resistance movement is not military, diplomatic, or even legal — it is ontological: the deliberate and total renunciation of the coloniser's map, name, calendar, and category, and their replacement with names drawn from the people's own ancestral cosmology.⁴ Only once this first, ontological front is engaged can the remaining atlases — myth, language, symbol, colour, calendar, memory, heaven and hell, law, and institution — be reclaimed in turn. A resistance that leaves this front unaddressed, however militarily active or diplomatically visible it becomes, continues to ratify, with every use of the coloniser's map, the very system it claims to oppose.

The Three Maps of Human Existence

Map One: The Cosmopolitan Condition

Every species, organism, and life form on this planet is, by the plain fact of biology, stuck here. Life is born, survives for a period proportional to fortune and fitness, and dies. In the interval, it eats, it reproduces, and it endures whatever violence the interval contains. This is the level at which the eight atlases of existence and seven existential cages first apply, prior to any civilisational symbolic world construction.⁵ Every noble, transcendental, or utopian idea a human society constructs — every heaven, every ethical system, every cosmology — ultimately serves this single underlying purpose: *survival*. Metaphysical aspiration becomes possible only once land, water, food, air, fire, home, family, and a coherent story that binds them together have already been secured.

From this shared condition follows what may be named the first cosmic right: every life that appears on this planet, by the sheer default of having appeared, possesses an *unconditional right* to be where it is.

No species applies for this right; no life form is asked whether it wishes to exist before existing. This is the ground on which every subsequent claim to territory, self-determination, and survival, Papuan or otherwise, ultimately rests, prior to any legal instrument that may or may not later recognise it. It is at this first map that cosmopolitan existence proper is located: modes of life organised in direct, reciprocal, cosmologically embedded relationship with land, water, and kin, in which survival technologies, story, law, and morality co-evolved with the specific ecology a people inhabited, rather than being imposed on it from elsewhere. Anthropological studies of small-scale, land-based societies—including Marshall Sahlins' influential account of the so-called 'original affluent society'—have shown that such societies, far from the impoverished condition later imperial discourse attributed to them, frequently achieved material sufficiency and abundant leisure through modest, well-calibrated demands on their environment rather than through accumulation.⁶ Conflict was not absent from this condition—inter-clan and inter-tribal warfare has long been documented in the Papuan highlands specifically—but it differed fundamentally from the civilisational wars that emerge in Map Two. These were not, as a rule, wars of cosmological replacement. They were not organised around the systematic conversion, annihilation, or substitution of one people's reality by another's through universal claims of religion, ideology, civilisation, or historical destiny.⁷

Map Two: The Civilisational Turn

The mode of existence described in Map One is transformed once a human group organises itself around the logic of extraction, production, and consumption beyond the immediate requirements of its own survival. It is here, not in Map One, that humanity's deepest conflicts first emerge: not merely over land, water, or food, but over the authority to define reality itself. Once basic survival is secured with reasonable reliability, a further and distinctly human need asserts itself: the need for a story capable of explaining why the group's existence and suffering matter, where it came from, what it ought to become, and why its way of life deserves to endure above competing alternatives. It is within this domain that heaven and hell, gods and demons, virtue and justice, sacred histories and ultimate destinies, together with the entire architecture of transcendental meaning, are generated—differently, and often incompatibly, across epochs, geographies, empires, and religions wherever this underlying human need recurs. Because each such cosmology presents itself as true, authoritative, or universally valid, and because these claims cannot all be simultaneously realised, Map Two becomes the terrain upon which humanity's bloodiest conflicts are fought—not primarily over land itself, but over whose account of the land, whose understanding of reality, and whose vision of human existence will prevail. Once one story acquires sufficient organised power, it no longer merely inhabits its own world; it seeks to reorganise the worlds of others in its own image.

Millions of human beings across history have been enslaved, trafficked, tortured, and exiled because a story classified them as available for such treatment; the transatlantic slave trade is a paradigm instance of Map Two's logic operating at continental scale, with a structurally underdeveloping effect on the African continent that outlasted the trade itself by generations.⁸ And yet, beneath the extraordinary diversity of religions, philosophies, and civilisational traditions lies a striking convergence. Human beings across radically different cultures consistently seek to live, to protect life, to be treated with fairness and justice, to find meaning in suffering, and to distinguish truth from deception. This convergence is too persistent, and too widespread across otherwise unconnected traditions, to be dismissed as coincidence. At the same

time, every cosmology, religion, philosophy, and moral order generated within Map Two—including its most exalted metaphysical claims—continues, ultimately, to serve the underlying purpose identified in Map One: the survival of individuals, communities, and the worlds they inhabit. Heaven and hell are, among other things, survival technologies.

Map Three: Power, Integrity, and the Physics of Collapse

A single human being, considered alone, has no realistic prospect of long-term survival. A group, properly organised and maintained, does. This simple asymmetry is the origin of Map Three. Once threats exceed what family, clan, or tribe can manage on their own, a further level of organisation becomes necessary: a unifying narrative capable of binding large and diverse populations to a common purpose, shared destiny, and collective system of defence and provision. This marks the emergence of large-scale political organisation. It is also, immediately, the emergence of hierarchy, because integrating diverse populations within a single order requires determining who leads, who follows, who adjudicates disputes, and who possesses the authority to enforce those decisions.

Even where such hierarchical power is generated and initially accepted, it remains structurally fragile unless a further, non-military condition is maintained: *integrity*. To sustain power requires trust; to sustain trust requires integrity; to sustain integrity requires justice; and to sustain justice requires a shared value system that the group's members are willing not merely to accept but to live, and if necessary die, for. The specific mechanism of civilisational collapse, as distinct from external defeat, follows directly from this chain: when members of a group come to feel betrayed, exhausted, or abandoned by the founding story that once bound them together, the logic of individual survival reasserts itself over the logic of collective survival, and each actor begins, rationally from their own position, to pursue personal or factional advantage at the collective's expense. The fourteenth-century historian Ibn Khaldun described a structurally identical cycle in his account of dynastic rise and decline, in which the group solidarity — *asabiyyah* — that first unites a rising power is precisely what luxury, factionalism, and internal corruption dissolve once that power has been achieved.⁹ A proverb recorded across multiple West and Central African oral traditions makes the same point more tersely: *where there is no enemy within, no enemy without can inflict lasting harm*.¹⁰

What separates a group capable of holding this chain together from one that cannot is a specific cluster of attributes: *physical capacity* joined to symbolic and *metaphysical authority*, the ability to mobilise large numbers within a clear hierarchy, a credible commitment to justice and fairness, provision of survival needs together with meaning and purpose, coordinated communication and discipline, and, underwriting all of it, trust and loyalty to the shared cause.

A single blade of grass accomplishes nothing; a handful breaks under strain; but thousands of blades bound to one handle become a broom capable of clearing a floor, or, if the moment requires it, defending the hand that holds it.

Human beings bound the same way, around one handle of shared purpose and trust, become a force no individual member could be alone — and a house divided against itself, as the saying goes, cannot stand. The peril facing any resistance movement is therefore never only the power arrayed against it, but the failure, from within, to bind itself around one handle rather than contest the captaincy of a vessel already taking on water.

History supplies concrete illustration of this principle at exactly the scale the broom describes: small, tightly bound formations that changed the course of events not by outnumbering their enemies but by combining ideological unity, rigorous discipline, secure communication, and loyalty earned rather than commanded.

The *Nizari Ismaili order* under Hassan-i Sabbah, based at the mountain fortress of Alamut from the late eleventh century, sustained itself against vastly larger regional powers for nearly two centuries through fortified strongholds, a disciplined intelligence network, and an ideological education thorough enough that individual members would act against overwhelming odds on the order's behalf.¹¹ The *Sanusi Order*, a religious brotherhood founded in Cyrenaica in the nineteenth century, combined education, spiritual authority, and community organisation into a structure capable of sustaining organised resistance against Italian colonisation long after conventional military resistance had been exhausted.¹² The *Khalsa*, instituted among the Sikhs in 1699, bound its members through a shared ethical code, a distinct discipline of conduct, and a doctrine of collective defence that transformed a persecuted community into a durable martial and spiritual order.¹³ In the Philippines, the Katipunan operated as a secret society bound by initiation ritual and internal discipline, organising and eventually igniting a revolution against three centuries of Spanish colonial rule from a membership that individually possessed no comparable military advantage over its coloniser.¹⁴

None of these formations prevailed through numbers, wealth, or superior weaponry alone. Each converted a comparatively small number of people into a durable force through the same structure already named above: shared ideology, rigorous internal discipline, secure communication, and, binding all of it, trust and loyalty that held under pressure a conventional army could not have withstood.

Beyond Morality: Survival as the Only Honest Court

Human beings, when confronted with the suffering of someone they believe to be innocent, respond with something close to moral instinct: outrage, compassion, and a demand for justice or redress. This instinct is neither mistaken nor unimportant. Yet when comparable suffering unfolds at the scale of war, empire, genocide, or civilisational conquest, moral judgement alone becomes an insufficient explanation. The forces shaping such events extend beyond the actions of individuals to the organisation of power, institutions, strategy, and survival itself. This is not a novel observation in the history of political thought, although it has seldom been expressed without qualification or euphemism. In the *Melian Dialogue*, Thucydides portrays the Athenian envoys arguing that questions of justice have practical force only where opposing parties possess roughly comparable power, whereas between the strong and the weak, "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." The Athenians proceeded to demonstrate this logic by destroying Melos after its inhabitants refused to submit.¹⁵ Herodotus's account of the three hundred Spartans and their allies at Thermopylae is remembered as an act of extraordinary heroism precisely because it proved militarily insufficient: the pass fell, and Persian numbers, rather than Spartan courage or virtue, determined the campaign's near-term outcome.¹⁶ Likewise, Josephus's account of the Jewish War reveals the same asymmetry at Jerusalem. Internal factional conflict among the Jewish defenders compounded Rome's already overwhelming material advantage, and the Second Temple was destroyed in AD 70 not because Rome possessed the superior moral claim, but because it possessed the superior organised power.¹⁷ The Berlin Conference of 1884–85, at which European powers partitioned the African continent among themselves without African participation, was not convened because Europe held superior moral standing over the societies it divided; it was convened because Europe held, at that specific historical moment,

superior organised coordination, weaponry, and continental narrative, and moral and civilisational justification followed, rather than preceded, that underlying fact of superior force.¹⁸

None of this is offered as an argument that morality is meaningless. It is offered as a diagnosis of why moral appeal alone, however well documented and however sincerely made, has not historically been sufficient on its own to reverse an established asymmetry of power. *Moral order is not an alternative to survival strategy; it is the glue that holds survival strategy* — specifically, the internal integrity described in Map Three — together once power has been generated. It cannot substitute for the generation of that power in the first place.

Everything human civilisation has produced — its moral, ethical, philosophical, scientific, cultural, political, and religious systems; its gods, messiahs, and prophets; its aesthetics, its arts, its every language, image, symbol, sign, and colour — has, on this analysis, served finally the one purpose Map One identified: *survival*.

This is why the question Psycho-Cosmocide ultimately puts to Papuans—and to humanity—is not who was right or wrong, who was civilised or primitive, or who possessed the truth while others held the lie. It is who survived, who went extinct, and by what means. For it is the manner in which a people survives—or fails to survive—that reveals the strength of its moral order, the integrity of its institutions, and the trust upon which its collective power rests. Questions of truth, value, meaning, and purpose can be pursued only after the more fundamental conditions of existence—land, people, memory, and the material and cultural foundations of survival—have first been secured.

The Three Maps as a Diagnostic Method

Read together, the three maps relocate the Papuan question from the terms in which it has been argued for sixty-four years without resolution—justice, recognition, and moral appeal, the domain of Map Two—to the terrain on which, this paper argues, it must ultimately be resolved: the domain of power, integrity, and organised collective survival that Map Three names. What follows traces that relocation era by era, from the cosmobian world before contact to 2026, reading Papuan history not merely as a chronicle of appeals made and rights denied, though it was certainly that, but as a diagnostic history of power sought, power partially built, power fragmented, and power that, after sixty-four years, remains unequal to its task.³³

PART II: THE COSMOBIAN WORLD BEFORE THE MAP

2. The Papuan Ancestors Never Begged to Exist

Rethinking Papuan resistance requires remembering what Papuan peoples were before the onset of colonialism. The ancestors of today's Papuans did not survive millennia of ecological and geopolitical challenge by appealing to the goodwill of strangers or the mercy of sky gods introduced to them by the civilising mission project. They identified threats, reorganised their communities, and delivered strategic responses. The Papuan highlands, lowlands, and coastlines were not spaces of passive suffering but of active, adaptive cosmobian life — life organised around, within, and through the planet itself.

The Lani, Dani, Asmat, Kimyal, Biak, Mee, and hundreds of clans and tribes built complex systems of governance, cosmology, exchange, and warfare long before the legends of Rome and Sparta were formed—and long after they faded. These were not primitive survivalists. They were sophisticated Cosmopolitan architects whose knowledge systems, political structures, and ecological practices embodied millennia of accumulated intelligence about how to exist sustainably and powerfully within a particular planetary environment. Their greatest refutation of the civilisational myth of Papuan inferiority is their own historical endurance. Had they possessed neither intelligence nor organisational capacity, they would not have sustained human societies across New Guinea for tens of thousands of years, nor would their descendants still be here, writing, thinking, and resisting today.

Papuans are not moral beggars. Their ancestors were original warriors — in every sense of the word — before the empires of the ancient world had drawn their first boundary line.

Colonialism did not destroy this capacity. It buried it. The work of this generation is not to invent something new from the ruins. It is to unbury what was always there, to re-activate the political intelligence, strategic discipline, and cosmopolitan knowledge that enabled Papuan peoples to thrive for forty thousand years before the arrival of the colonial machine. This is the world, and the people, that the chronology below begins from.

The Long Approach: From First Contact to 1945

The chronology that follows begins its dated record in 1945, but 1945 is an administrative date, not a cosmopolitan one, and treating it as the beginning of the story would repeat, in miniature, the very error this paper diagnoses: measuring Papuan history by the coloniser's calendar. The documented record shows that encounter did not arrive on a single date, for a single people, but in a slow and uneven wave that reached different Papuan peoples more than a century apart from one another — the coast well over a hundred years before the highlands, the highlands in places not until living memory.

The first recorded European settlement attempt on the mainland came in 1793, when the British naval officer John Hayes established a short-lived post near present-day Manokwari, abandoned within two years to disease and hostility. The Netherlands raised its flag at Fort Du Bus on Triton Bay in 1828, formally claiming the whole of Western New Guinea against rival ambitions — a claim that for decades remained little more than a flag and a name on a map, backed by no permanent administration.¹⁹ Sustained foreign presence began not with the state but with the mission: on 5 February 1855, the German missionaries Carl Ottow and Johann Geissler landed at Mansinam, beginning what would become known, in the Christianised memory of the coast, as Gospel Day. It was 1898 — forty-three years later — before the Dutch colonial government itself established its first permanent post, at Manokwari, followed by Merauke in 1902. For nearly half a century, in other words, the coloniser's most durable instrument on Papuan soil was not the administrator but the missionary; the Digestive System this paper names below was assembling its earliest organs — schools, conversion, the Four Gospels' first apparatus — long before the state that would later claim to have brought development to Papua had built its first office.

For the Central Highlands — the Lani homeland from which this paper's diagnosis is written — that first wave of encounter did not arrive at all until the twentieth century was more than a third over. The mountains were considered, well into the 1930s, simply unpopulated: the outside world had no evidence they held anyone. On 23 June 1938 the American Richard Archbold, flying a reconnaissance survey for a zoological

expedition, sighted from the air a broad valley of neatly terraced sweet-potato gardens — the Baliem Valley — and with it the first outside evidence that a substantial cosmopolitan society existed in the interior at all. Even then, encounter was postponed by distance and war: the first missionary did not reach the valley until 1954, and the first permanent government post, at Wamena, only in 1956 — a full century after Mansinam, and eighteen years after Archbold's flight.²⁰ Some Lani communities further west had already had one brief and inconclusive contact a generation earlier, during a 1920 expedition, and then none again for decades.²⁰

Generation 0, then, is not one generation but many, staggered across more than a century and a half — coastal peoples already several generations into engagement with missions, schools, and administration by the time highland peoples had not yet been seen from the air. This unevenness is not a footnote to the argument; it is itself evidence of the kind this paper trades in: it shows that the eight generations of gradual encounter the companion study below names did not move as a single front across a single people, but arrived region by region, valley by valley, so that one Papuan family could contain a grandparent born wholly within Generation 0 and a grandchild born already inside an encounter their grandparent had never had. The specific architecture of those thirteen generational epochs — who each generation was, when precisely it emerged, and why — remains the work of that forthcoming study, and is not invented here. What the documented record above already establishes, and what the chronology below therefore inherits, is that no single date can honestly open this history; 1945 is simply the point at which the last of these separate, staggered encounters, coastal and highland alike, was folded into a single administrative and then national timeline not of Papua's own making.

A companion study, forthcoming, traces this condition across thirteen generational epochs — from Generation 0, the Children of Wone living within the original cosmopolitan world, through eight generations of gradual encounter with outside worlds, into the Indonesian occupation, fragmentation, the Psycho-Cosmocide era, and what that study names the Last Generation. That generational history is the finer bridge this paper's argument presupposes: the coarser one, sufficient to carry the chronology below into 1945, has just been given.

PART III: SIXTY-FOUR YEARS, DIAGNOSED AS THEY HAPPENED

I trace this history not as a neutral chronicle but as evidence entered into the diagnosis already established. Each era is read simultaneously in two ways: first, as a record of what happened; second, as an account of what those events did to the eight atlases of Papuan existence and to the resistance that emerged in response. The argument that follows is therefore not imposed upon the historical record after the fact, but drawn directly from it, era by era.

3. 1945–1961: The Dutch Retreat and a Grammar Already Waiting

Following the collapse of Dutch colonial administration across the broader Indonesian archipelago after the Second World War, the Netherlands retained control over West New Guinea—now commonly referred to as West Papua—and initiated a gradual programme intended to prepare the indigenous Papuan population

for self-government and eventual independence. This political trajectory culminated on 1 December 1961 in Hollandia (now Jayapura), when Papuan national symbols, including the Morning Star flag and the national anthem, were formally introduced under a newly established Papuan representative council. Yet the racial grammar through which Indonesia's subsequent annexation would be interpreted was neither authored in Jakarta nor born in 1963. It had been assembled over centuries through European colonial knowledge, missionary discourse, and racial classification, long before Indonesian rule began.

The Colonial Genealogy of Papuaphobia

The seduction and participation of the colonised in their own domination, traced later in this paper through the Black Troop system and the figure of Enkidu, did not occur upon a blank symbolic field. It was made possible by a pre-existing racial grammar—what the wider corpus names *Papuaphobia*—assembled over centuries through European travel writing, missionary discourse, racial science, and colonial administration. This grammar conflated "Papua" with "Negro Africa" and the wider "Negro Pacific," constructed the Papuan as a racial "pygmy," perpetuated the theological afterlife of the Curse of Ham, and legitimised domination through the pseudosciences of craniometry and doomed-race theory.²¹ Indonesia did not invent this racial grammar in 1963. It inherited an already assembled representational archive from the Dutch colonial administration it succeeded—an administration that had itself justified retaining West New Guinea on the grounds that Papuans were racially distinct from Indonesians and therefore "not yet ready" for self-determination. What changed hands in the transfer of sovereignty, in other words, was not merely an administrative apparatus but a symbolic infrastructure shaped by more than a century of racialised colonial rule—one that Indonesian nationalist, developmental, and security institutions have since adapted, reproduced, and reauthorised rather than created anew.²¹ Naming, on this account, is the first violence: the Black Troop system and the Indonesianisation of Papuan consciousness traced below are not free-floating mechanisms but operate through, and are made to feel natural by, this deeper and older racial architecture.

4. 1961–1969: Annexation and the Act of Free Choice

Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the Republic of Indonesia intensified its claim to sovereignty over West New Guinea, arguing that the territory formed an inseparable part of the former Dutch East Indies. These claims culminated militarily in *Operation Trikora* (1961), launched under President Sukarno to secure the territory by force if necessary. Against the backdrop of Cold War geopolitics, international pressure eventually produced the 1962 New York Agreement, brokered by the United Nations with decisive support from the United States. Under its terms, the territory was placed under the temporary administration of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) before being transferred to Indonesian control in 1963.

The territory's political status was formally consolidated through the 1969 Act of Free Choice, in which 1,026 selected Papuan representatives—operating under heavily militarised and coercive conditions—voted unanimously for integration into Indonesia. Although the outcome was subsequently acknowledged by the United Nations through General Assembly Resolution 2504 (XXIV), the process has remained deeply contested. Papuans, scholars, activists, and international observers have long argued that it failed to satisfy the principle of genuine self-determination as articulated in the Charter of the United Nations and in the decolonisation standards that informed it.

Map Three predicts this outcome with remarkable precision. The Netherlands, weakened and internationally isolated on the Papua question, together with a United States unwilling to jeopardise its Cold War relationship with Indonesia over a territory it regarded as strategically peripheral, produced a configuration of power that the nascent Papuan administration—however sincere its preparations for independence in 1961—could not hope to match. Indonesia, by contrast, had spent roughly three centuries, first under Dutch colonial rule and then through its own revolutionary struggle between 1945 and 1949, accumulating the organisational, military, diplomatic, and political capacities required not only to claim the territory but to hold it.²² What was decided at Hollandia, New York, and finally through the Act of Free Choice was not, in the first instance, a judgement on the relative justice of the Papuan and Indonesian claims. It was a consequence of the relative balance of organised power each side was capable of bringing to bear at that particular historical moment.

What began at Hollandia in 1961 and was consolidated through the 1969 Act of Free Choice was not, on the diagnosis advanced in this paper, simply the transfer of authority from one state to another. It marked the beginning of a civilisational digestive process that must now be named in full, because everything that follows in Papuan history becomes clear only through its logic.

The Digestive System of the Beast

The monster that devours the children of a village will continue feeding until one of two things happens: either the people find the strength and power to stop it, or there are no children left to consume. Within the Psycho-Cosmocide framework, however, the monster is rarely encountered in its most obvious form. It is not merely the soldier entering a village with a weapon. That is only the visible mouth of the beast. The greater danger lies deeper within: the entire digestive system of the colonial-civilisational order through which peoples, lands, memories, and worlds are systematically consumed. What makes this possible is not brute force alone, but the Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus (CPCV), which reorganises perception until the beast itself comes to be experienced as salvation, progress, modernity, development, and even hope. This, according to the Psycho-Cosmocide framework, is the true nature of the CPCV.

Across the wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus, this beast is understood through a developmental grammar: a spectrum running from *Nature to Civilisation*; from *Civilisation into its degraded forms, Civi-lie-sation and Evi-lie-sation*; from *there into Psycho-Cosmocide itself*; and, where a people succeeds in reversing that trajectory, into *Wonesis*—the counter-movement of *Cosmobian return*. What follows is an examination of where Papuan resistance presently stands along that spectrum, and of what would be required to move it towards the still-open possibility of Wonesis.²³

The concepts developed throughout this paper are not isolated ideas but components of a layered theoretical architecture, moving from the master framework through progressively more specific levels of analysis until they become visible in Papuan political life.

Level One — Master Framework

Psycho-Cosmocide.

Level Two — Developmental Sequence and Modes of Being

The civilisational sequence Nature → Civilisation → Civi-lie-sation → Evi-lie-sation → Psycho-Cosmocide, with Wonesis representing the possibility of reversal; and, on a parallel axis, the Cosmobian mode of being (relational, reciprocal) and the Synthobian mode of being (extractive, organised through production and consumption).

Level Three — Mechanisms of Capture

The Digestive System as the institutional, economic, ideological, and administrative apparatus through which the beast operates; the Four Gospels of the Civilisational Death Cult (religiosity, development, progress, and success) as its machinery of psychological reorientation; Indonesianisation as its administrative and demographic instrument; and Papuaphobia as its racial and symbolic substrate.

Level Four — Historical Manifestations

The Good Samaritan Syndrome and the psychopathology of permanent victimhood; together with Soft Civil War as the largely invisible fragmentation—expressed through at least eight recurring forms in Papuan political history—that precedes, accompanies, and outlasts open conflict.

Each level that follows is developed through the Papuan case; none is introduced as an abstract concept or for its own sake. This beast operates not only through soldiers and weapons but through institutions, education, economic dependency, administrative structures, ideological conditioning, militarisation, religious restructuring, media narratives, and the gradual adaptation of consciousness itself. Over time, it consumes not only territories and resources but the cognitive architecture through which a people recognises reality. The deepest tragedy begins when the colonised become so thoroughly embedded within the beast's ecosystem that they begin to participate in its own mechanisms while progressively losing the capacity to distinguish what sustains them from what destroys them. Under such conditions, the monster no longer appears as an external force. It becomes internalised. Its logic enters the language, aspirations, desires, fears, institutions, and everyday survival strategies of the colonised themselves. Destruction is renamed development. Occupation becomes administration. Dependency appears as progress. Fragmentation masquerades as representation. Psychological captivity comes to be experienced as freedom. The Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus reaches its highest expression when the machinery consuming a people's world is no longer recognised as predatory, but welcomed as the very condition of their future.

The coloniser restructures the colonised into participants in their own elimination while simultaneously concealing that process from the consciousness of those undergoing it. This is why Psycho-Cosmocide is not merely a form of physical conquest. It is the systematic destruction of a people's capacity to recognise, interpret, and resist the destruction of their own world. Its greatest danger therefore lies not in external domination, but in internal disintegration. A people may continue to exist physically and biologically while gradually losing the Cosmobian capacities upon which their collective survival depends. When memory collapses, trust fragments, leadership becomes transactional, and communities grow dependent upon the very systems dissolving them, resistance begins to erode from within. Under such conditions, even genuine outrage, courage, and suffering can become trapped within repetitive cycles of reaction that exhaust themselves without producing lasting structural transformation. The final victory of Psycho-Cosmocide is reached when a people continue to resist their destruction while unknowingly reproducing the very conditions that make that destruction possible.

The period following 1969 marks the point at which these mechanisms cease to be merely theoretical. The digestive system of the beast becomes historically visible. What follows is not simply a chronology of Indonesian administration, but a record of how the institutions, narratives, and organisational structures of the post-annexation state progressively transformed the conditions of Papuan existence while simultaneously reshaping the character of Papuan resistance itself.

5. 1969–1998: Consolidation, Militarisation, and the Black Troopy System

Following integration, the Indonesian state rapidly expanded its administrative, military, economic, and political control over the territory. At the same time, Indigenous resistance consolidated under the banner of the *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (OPM), or Free Papua Movement, which became the principal symbolic and organisational centre of Papuan political and armed resistance. From the 1970s onward, state-sponsored transmigration, large-scale resource extraction, infrastructural expansion, prolonged militarisation, educational restructuring, and administrative integration progressively transformed the demographic, ecological, cultural, economic, and political conditions of Papuan existence. The digestive system of the colonial-civilisational order was now fully operational.

Yet the external expansion of state power was accompanied by an equally significant internal development. In 1971, the resistance experienced its first major organisational rupture through the Rumkorem–Prai split. Within the Psycho-Cosmocide framework, this was more than an internal political disagreement. It marked the earliest historically observable manifestation of what the wider corpus identifies as *Soft Civil War*: the gradual fragmentation of collective trust, organisational coherence, and strategic unity that recurs throughout modern Papuan political history. The Rumkorem–Prai split was therefore not an isolated event, but the first identifiable expression of a deeper pattern that would reappear in multiple forms over the decades that followed. The wider corpus traces at least eight recurring forms of such fragmentation, each weakening the collective capacities upon which long-term resistance ultimately depends.²⁴

The process described above is neither uniquely Indonesian nor uniquely Papuan. Across colonial history, one of the most effective mechanisms of expansion has been the gradual incorporation of the colonised into the machinery of conquest itself. Before examining how this mechanism emerged in Papua, it is instructive to consider one of its clearest historical expressions in the Australian frontier wars, where Aboriginal people were systematically recruited into the colonial project against other Aboriginal communities. The wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus refers to this recurring mechanism as the *Black Troopy System*.

The Australian Frontier Wars and the "Black Troopy" System

One of the most devastating historical illustrations of the monstrous system's inner logic can be found in the Australian frontier wars and the expansion of British colonial settlement across the continent. In many regions, Aboriginal men were recruited, coerced, or strategically incorporated into colonial policing systems and paramilitary patrols used to track, capture, and suppress other Aboriginal communities. In Queensland particularly, the Native Police system became one of the most feared instruments of frontier expansion. These forces — known in colonial administrative records and later in community memory as the "*black troopers*" or colloquially as "*black troopy*" — consisted of Aboriginal trackers and mounted personnel operating under the command of white colonial officers.²⁵

The Native Police operated for decades across Queensland, New South Wales, and the Northern Territory, participating in massacres, dispersals, and the systematic destruction of Aboriginal community life. Historical research has documented that these forces were sometimes deliberately recruited from nations with existing territorial disputes with the communities they were deployed against — a method of transforming inter-clan tensions into instruments of colonial pacification.²⁶ The colonial system did not simply conquer Aboriginal Australia through direct military force alone. It reorganised the internal incentive structures, fears, and survival pathways of colonised communities so deeply that some among the oppressed became absorbed into the machinery that destroyed their own people's foundations.

Within the framework of Psycho-Cosmocide, this represents one of the most lethal manifestations of the monstrous system: when the colonised themselves are transformed into instruments for the destruction of their own cosmopolitan world. The line between victim and instrument becomes tragically blurred. The colonised subject may believe he is surviving — gaining protection, wages, status, or strategic advantage — while unknowingly participating in the elimination of his own people's ecological, cultural, and political existence.

The Papuan Bureaucratic Militia System

The parallel for contemporary Papua is direct and urgent. The Indonesian state's long-term strategy of recruiting, promoting, and institutionalising a class of Papuan administrators, military auxiliaries, parliamentary representatives, and regional bureaucrats who operate within—and thereby help reproduce—the structure of Indonesian rule reflects the same underlying logic. This is what the Psycho-Cosmocide framework describes as the *Indonesianisation of Papuan consciousness*: the gradual reorganisation of Papuan aspirations, identities, and survival strategies so that they function entirely within the temporal, institutional, political, and epistemological horizons of the Indonesian state. The wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus names this mechanism the *Papuan Bureaucratic Militia System*. It refers not to Papuan public servants as such, but to the structural incorporation of sections of the colonised population into the bureaucratic, political, security, and developmental machinery through which the colonial-civilisational order governs, legitimises, and reproduces itself. In Cosmopolitan terms, it is the bureaucratic counterpart of the historical Black Troop system: the transformation of members of the colonised society into administrators of the very order that progressively dismantles the world from which they emerged.

This is what the wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus identifies as the third horror of colonised participation: destruction is no longer inflicted upon the colonised alone, but increasingly reproduced through their own participation, until the perceptual, moral, and cosmological capacities required to recognise collective extinction become themselves the first casualties of the process.²⁷ The pattern has a far older precedent. In the *Epic of Gilgamesh*, Enkidu's passage from the Cosmopolitan wilderness into the city of Uruk is accomplished not through coercion but through Shamhat's promise of belonging, prestige, pleasure, and civilisation. Within the Psycho-Cosmocide framework, this episode represents one of humanity's earliest literary accounts of a Cosmopolitan being persuaded to enter voluntarily into the machinery of his own domestication.²⁸ The same structural position reappears in contemporary Papua. Those incorporated into the bureaucratic, political, security, and developmental apparatuses that reproduce Indonesian rule occupy, within this framework, the position of Enkidu after the seduction: still recognisably emerging from the Cosmopolitan world, yet now labouring—often without recognising it—within institutions whose cumulative effect is the progressive displacement of that very world. Later in the same epic, Gilgamesh and Enkidu

together fell Humbaba and clear the Cedar Forest he protects. The wider corpus interprets this episode as one of humanity's earliest literary representations of ecological destruction carried out collaboratively by the coloniser and the incorporated Indigenous subject rather than imposed by the coloniser alone.²⁸ This is the racial grammar previously identified as Papuaphobia now operating beyond representation and within administration itself. The Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus reaches one of its highest expressions when a people no longer merely endure the machinery consuming their world, but progressively become participants in its everyday operation.

The incorporation of the colonised into the machinery of administration is only one stage of the digestive process. More profound still is the incorporation of their temporal imagination. A people who no longer organise life according to the rhythms of their own land, memory, and cosmology, but according to the developmental horizons of the civilisation that governs them, have entered one of the deepest stages of Psycho-Cosmocide. It is to this temporal transformation that the analysis now turns.

6. Indonesianisation and the Politics of the Instant Noodle Horizon

The instant noodle is perhaps the most precise analogy for the civilisational process diagnosed here. It is not merely a food product. It is a philosophy of existence. Cheap, immediate, convenient, and engineered for rapid consumption, it offers the appearance of nourishment while quietly severing the relationships upon which genuine nourishment depends. Within the Psycho-Cosmocide framework, the instant noodle becomes the symbolic logic of Indonesianisation itself.

Papua, across all eight atlases of existence, possesses a civilisational inheritance accumulated over thousands of years: ecological knowledge, food sovereignty, kinship, memory, language, spirituality, and systems of reciprocal obligation embedded within the land itself. Yet Papuans are increasingly drawn into a different civilisational bargain. They are encouraged to relinquish this ancient world in exchange for the immediate conveniences offered by the Indonesian state—salaried employment, imported commodities, government programmes, infrastructure, administrative inclusion, electoral participation, and the promise of development. The exchange resembles the choice between a living ecosystem capable of sustaining generations and an instant meal designed only to satisfy the present moment. A common saying in Papua captures this inversion with painful clarity: Papuans sell their land to Indonesia in order to buy alcohol, while Indonesia sells alcohol in order to buy Papuan land. The exchange is not merely economic. It is civilisational. A world accumulated across millennia is gradually surrendered for commodities designed to be consumed within moments. The instant noodle therefore becomes more than food. It becomes the temporal grammar of the colonial-civilisational order: the substitution of immediate gratification for long-term collective survival. Papuans who once lived within rich, complex, multigenerational systems of food production embedded in land, seasonal knowledge, ecological reciprocity, and clan exchange increasingly find themselves dependent upon imported food, government infrastructure, market economies, and state employment. The colonial diet is therefore not only nutritional. It is temporal. It is epistemological. It teaches a people to value immediacy over continuity, consumption over regeneration, and dependency over sovereignty. The Indonesianisation of Papuan consciousness has encouraged successive generations—through schooling, employment, media, religion, bureaucratic incorporation, and development programmes—to imagine their future within the temporal horizon of the Indonesian state. The future contracts to the next infrastructure project, the next government appointment, the next regional election, the next budget allocation from Jakarta. This represents a profound contraction of the Papuan temporal

imagination. A people who once organised life across generations through ecological cycles, cosmological calendars, and reciprocal obligations increasingly come to organise their aspirations around administrative time rather than ancestral time.

This temporal colonisation is among the most effective and least visible dimensions of Psycho-Cosmocide. It does not require armies to occupy the land because it first occupies the future. Schools, salaries, bureaucratic careers, development programmes, religious promises, and market opportunities gradually teach a people to imagine tomorrow only within the horizons authorised by the colonial-civilisational order. The conquest of territory is therefore completed by the conquest of time. Within the wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus, this temporal contraction is one expression of what is termed the *Four Gospels of the Civilisational Death Cult*. Religiosity, development (*pembangunan*), progress (*kemajuan*), and success (*sukses*) do not operate as independent ideals but as a coordinated apparatus of psychological and civilisational reorientation. Together they reorganise the categories through which Papuans perceive reality, gradually dismantling the Cosmobian world while presenting that dismantling as hope, opportunity, and historical advancement.²⁹ This is the operation of the corpus's *Fifth Horror*: destruction is no longer merely endured but progressively experienced as salvation. The machinery dissolving a people's world comes to appear as the very means of securing its future, until resisting the Four Gospels itself begins to feel like resisting one's own deliverance. In the vocabulary of the Cosmobian and Synthobian modes of being, the *Instant Noodle Horizon* marks the point at which a people organised through relationality, reciprocity, memory, and ecological regeneration is progressively drawn into a

Synthobian order organised through extraction, production, and consumption. Within this framework, the Synthobian world possesses no independent generative capacity of its own. It survives only by continually extracting from, consuming, and replacing the living Cosmobian worlds upon which it ultimately depends.³⁰

The Instant Noodle Horizon is therefore not merely a metaphor for consumption but a theory of political transformation. Once a people begin to imagine survival, prosperity, and hope exclusively within the temporal horizon of the colonial-civilisational order, the expansion of that order's administrative institutions no longer appears as conquest but as progress. It is within this reorganised horizon of expectation that Reformasi and Special Autonomy must be understood—not as a departure from the earlier phases of Indonesianisation, but as their institutional consolidation.

7. 1998–2013: Reformasi, Special Autonomy, and the Proliferation of Provinces

During the post-1998 Reformasi era, the Indonesian government introduced Special Autonomy legislation for Papua in 2001, promising greater political representation, cultural recognition, and economic redistribution. Nevertheless, many Papuans view the policy as insufficient and largely ineffective in addressing the foundational questions of sovereignty, militarisation, demographic marginalisation, and historical injustice. Rather than resolving tensions, subsequent territorial fragmentation and the creation of new administrative provinces have intensified political contestation and social disintegration across the region.

As of 2026, the Indonesian state has divided West Papua into six provinces, forty-two regencies, and more than seven hundred districts, with further territorial expansion proposals continuing to emerge. The Psycho-

Cosmocide framework argues that this administrative proliferation functions not merely as a development strategy but as a mechanism of settler-colonial consolidation designed to restructure Papuan cosmopolitan society around dependency upon state-controlled administrative centres. Within this system, many indigenous Papuans are increasingly drawn into intense competition over bureaucratic positions, state funding, and material redistribution — at the expense of self-managed communal and independent forms of living that Papuan peoples have practised for millennia. These expanding administrative centres have simultaneously become demographic and political ecosystems through which large numbers of non-Papuan settlers continue to enter the territory and occupy dominant positions within government, commerce, security institutions, and strategic sectors of administration. Parallel to this process has been the continued expansion of military and police deployments, including the construction of permanent security bases under the justification of maintaining national stability and combating separatism.

This restructuring operates at the ontological as much as the administrative level. Indonesia's proliferation of provinces, regencies, and districts across West Papua dissects Papuan cosmopolitan existence simultaneously across at least eight interdependent domains — the physical-material, the biological-organismic, the cultural-mythological, the metaphysical-transcendental, the techno-scientific, the space-time-conscious, the domain of ultimate mystery, and the domain of memory — with each new administrative boundary functioning as an act of naming violence that displaces the Lani concept of *Inaorak*, verified cosmological belonging, in favour of state-recognised jurisdiction. The technological and memorial domains deserve particular note: digital infrastructure and social media now function as what the corpus terms a cosmological mining pit, extracting attention and data from Papuan life even as it connects Papuan communities, while successive province-making exercises simultaneously overwrite the archive of memory through which Papuans would otherwise transmit an unbroken account of their own dispossession.³¹

The repeated subdivision of provinces, regencies, and electoral constituencies across this period is itself one of the eight recurring forms of fragmentation named above ²⁴ — state-generated this time, rather than internal to the resistance, but structurally continuous with it.

By the early twenty-first century, the struggle had entered a new arena. Administrative consolidation within Papua was increasingly matched by the internationalisation of Papuan resistance. The battlefield expanded from forests, villages, and government offices into diplomatic forums, digital networks, churches, universities, international media, and human rights institutions. Yet the diagnosis advanced throughout this paper remains unchanged: greater visibility did not necessarily produce greater leverage, nor did international recognition fundamentally alter the underlying architecture of organised power.

8. 2014–2023: Digital Era, International Diplomacy, and Age of Visibility Without Sovereignty

The contemporary crisis of West Papua is therefore characterised by overlapping catastrophes: prolonged armed conflict, widespread and underreported human rights abuses, accelerating ecological destruction, political imprisonment, mass displacement, refugee flows, demographic transformation, and unresolved questions of sovereignty for the indigenous Papuan people.

9. The Crisis of Strategy After Sixty-Four Years

The strategic crisis that follows is the clearest evidence of the condition I have named: a resistance still measuring its progress by the world's attention rather than by its own leverage.

For more than sixty-four years, the Papuan resistance has been caught in one of the most painful paradoxes of modern political history. The movement has succeeded in documenting suffering, exposing violence, preserving memory, and raising global awareness of West Papua's condition. And yet, despite decades of reports, protests, testimonies, documentaries, church campaigns, human rights appeals, international solidarity actions, and resolutions from regional bodies such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group and the Pacific Islands Forum, as well as appeals to the UN Human Rights Council, the fundamental structures of domination remain largely intact.

Papuan villages continue to be militarised. Villagers continue to be tortured, abused, and massacred. Forests continue to be cleared. Indigenous communities continue to be displaced. The political aspirations of the Papuan people remain unresolved, deferred, and systematically suppressed.

This reality demands serious intellectual and strategic re-thinking. After sixty-four years, the central question is no longer whether the world knows about the suffering of the Papuan people. It does, and not only the world, but every international socio-political and economic institution that helps support the Indonesian settler administration while exploiting West Papua.

The deeper and more urgent question is whether the resistance has become trapped within a psychological and political framework that perpetuates the very conditions of its own existence — albeit unintentionally. In other words: has the struggle become dependent on demonstrating suffering on the global stage rather than building leverage through disciplined strategic planning?

It was into this widening administrative and digital landscape that the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) was formed in 2014 as an attempt at a single negotiating voice before the Melanesian Spearhead Group, the Pacific Islands Forum, the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group, and the UN Human Rights Council — and it is this same fragmentation, reasserting itself, that produced the movement's unresolved 2023 split.²⁴

The broader organisational history of the Papuan resistance extends well beyond the present discussion, encompassing, among others, the Free West Papua movement, Papua Merdeka, the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), the Tentara Pembebasan Nasional Papua Barat (TPNPB), the Komite Nasional Papua Barat (KNPB), and the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP).

Organisations, however numerous or diverse, do not by themselves determine the trajectory of a national struggle. Beneath their differences often lies a shared psychological orientation. The next section argues that one such orientation—the persistent reliance on moral testimony as the primary currency of resistance—has become one of the defining strategic limitations of the modern Papuan movement.

PART IV: THE INTERNAL CAPTURE OF PAPUAN RESISTANCE

10. The Limits of Moral Testimony

One of the clearest expressions of this strategic trap is the reliance upon moral witness itself. The question is not whether witnessing matters—it does—but what witnessing is capable of achieving, and where its limits begin.

For decades, the international visibility of the Papuan struggle has depended upon moral testimony. Images of burned villages, tortured bodies, displaced children, grieving mothers, militarised highlands, and devastated ecosystems have circulated globally, evoking sympathy, outrage, and humanitarian concern. This strategy emerged from necessity. When a people are denied political representation and meaningful access to organised power, moral testimony often becomes the only remaining instrument through which they can speak. The hope has been that sufficient witness to brutality would eventually compel international institutions and democratic governments to intervene.

Yet history repeatedly suggests that moral outrage alone rarely dismantles deeply entrenched systems of state, military, economic, and geopolitical power. The experiences of the Rohingya in Myanmar, Palestinians in Gaza, Sahrawis in Western Sahara, and Uyghurs in Xinjiang reveal a recurring pattern: extensive documentation of suffering, widespread international awareness, periodic waves of global sympathy, yet only limited structural transformation and continuing impunity.

A prior and more uncomfortable limit precedes any question of institutional capacity or strategic interest: moral witness cannot respond adequately to suffering that it does not first recognise as suffering. Classical tragedy, however devastating, grants its victims one indispensable condition: *anagnorisis*—the moment of recognition. Oedipus knows what has happened to him. His suffering becomes conscious of itself and can therefore be named, narrated, and witnessed.

The condition confronting West Papua is closer to what the wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus terms a *Chromatic Tragedy*: suffering concealed not by darkness but by an excess of colour. The road arrives as development. The school arrives as enlightenment. The church arrives as salvation. The national language arrives as progress. Each colour, considered in isolation, may represent a genuine benefit. Taken together, however, they form a spectrum so bright that both those living within it and those observing from outside struggle to recognise it as the medium through which a deeper civilisational destruction unfolds.

An outside observer looking at West Papua therefore sees roads, schools, churches, hospitals, elections, administrative expansion, and development indicators. What often remains unseen is the underlying reorganisation of memory, cosmology, ecological relationships, temporal imagination, and collective existence that this paper identifies as Psycho-Cosmocide. A tragedy that cannot easily be recognised as tragedy by those living within it will struggle equally to be recognised by those outside who might otherwise be moved to act.³²

From the perspective of the Psycho-Cosmocide framework, this reveals a fundamental characteristic of the modern international order: states and other centres of organised power rarely act primarily from moral obligation alone. International recognition of suffering does not automatically produce justice, sovereignty, or protection. Relations between states are shaped by strategic interests, military capability, economic

influence, diplomatic alliances, resource considerations, and broader geopolitical calculations as much as—often more than—ethical consistency.

If global moral outrage alone were sufficient to secure political transformation, many of the world's longest-running conflicts would already have reached durable resolutions. The continuing conflict over Palestinian statehood illustrates this dilemma. Despite decades of extensive documentation, widespread international awareness, sustained humanitarian concern, and recurrent diplomatic engagement, the conflict remains unresolved. The question, therefore, is not simply why suffering is recognised, but why recognition so often fails to generate structural political change.

Organised Power and the Condition of Managed Survival

One answer lies in the realities of organised power. Sovereign states generally negotiate and make strategic decisions in relation to actors possessing durable political, military, economic, institutional, and diplomatic capacities. Israel, irrespective of competing moral or political interpretations of the conflict, functions as an internationally recognised state with extensive institutional, military, economic, technological, and diplomatic networks that significantly shape how other states engage with it. The argument advanced here is therefore not about the justice of any particular conflict, but about a broader historical pattern: moral recognition and humanitarian concern, while profoundly important, do not by themselves determine political outcomes.

The wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus sometimes illustrates this dynamic through the analogy of an organised criminal syndicate. The analogy is not intended as a literal description of the United Nations or its member states, but as a psychological model of how organised power functions. Like a syndicate, the international order is structured hierarchically rather than horizontally. Those possessing the greatest concentrations of military capability, economic influence, technological capacity, diplomatic reach, and strategic resources exercise disproportionate influence over the rules, priorities, and outcomes of the system. Smaller and weaker states participate within that order, but their room for independent action is constrained by the distribution of organised power above them. Within this analogy, admission to, recognition within, and protection by the international system are shaped not only by moral claims or legal principles, but by the strategic interests of the most powerful actors.

Similar dynamics can also be observed in other global conflicts. The war in Ukraine demonstrates how geopolitical interests rapidly mobilise international attention, military assistance, sanctions, and diplomatic coordination when major strategic interests are involved. Meanwhile, across parts of the African continent, prolonged civilian massacres and humanitarian catastrophes carried out by armed groups often receive inconsistent international engagement despite immense human suffering. These asymmetries reveal that global responses are rarely governed by morality alone, but by complex hierarchies of strategic value, visibility, alliances, economic interests, and geopolitical calculations.

Oppressed or marginalised peoples cannot rely solely upon emotional appeal, humanitarian visibility, or moral sympathy as the foundation of long-term survival. Within the Psycho-Cosmocide framework, if a people's entire strategy for existential survival at the level of Map One comes to depend primarily upon these Map Two currencies, the result is not strategic liberation but strategic self-neutralisation. A civilisation cannot secure its continued existence by relying indefinitely upon the moral conscience of others while neglecting the organised capacities upon which its own survival ultimately depends.

International solidarity, documentation, advocacy, and human rights work remain critically important. Yet history repeatedly demonstrates that communities lacking organised political, economic, institutional, technological, and strategic power—and, where relevant, the capacity for organised self-defence—remain profoundly vulnerable within the modern international order. Humanitarian concern may generate temporary attention, symbolic condemnations, diplomatic statements, or aid programmes, but it rarely restructures the underlying architecture of power.

This is precisely the distinction anticipated by the paper's opening theoretical framework. Sympathy is a Map Two currency. It is generated through moral testimony, competing narratives, and claims to legitimacy, and over the past sixty-four years the Papuan resistance has accumulated a considerable amount of it. Sovereignty, by contrast, has historically been a Map Three transaction, secured through organised power, institutional integrity, strategic capacity, and collective trust rather than by the relative justice of competing claims. A movement that continues to invest primarily in the first currency while seeking an outcome determined in the second will continue to receive sympathy in a currency the other side is under no obligation to accept. This is the central limitation of what the wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus terms the *Good Samaritan Syndrome*. Within this condition, resistance gradually becomes oriented towards the hope that moral recognition, humanitarian concern, or external intervention will eventually secure the conditions of liberation. International solidarity, advocacy, documentation, and human rights work remain indispensable, but they cannot substitute for the organised capacities upon which long-term collective survival ultimately depends. States intervene primarily where strategic interests, capability, and geopolitical calculation converge. Religious solidarity, historical affinity, and moral sympathy alone rarely determine political outcomes. The syndrome emerges through a deeper psychological conditioning. The coloniser does not merely occupy territory; it systematically reorganises the colonised imagination. A structure of dependency is cultivated in which the colonised increasingly experience themselves as permanently powerless, perpetually incomplete, and incapable of autonomous redemption. The search for liberation gradually turns outward towards humanitarian rescue, diplomatic intervention, foreign governments, international organisations, religious deliverance, or some future benevolent power capable of acting on their behalf and even more tragic and worst some white saviours of god or messiah would come and save them.

Under such conditions, resistance itself risks becoming enclosed within the symbolic architecture designed by the colonial order. Leaders become permanent petitioners before international institutions, humanitarian organisations, diplomatic forums, and centres of global power, submitting reports, issuing appeals, documenting atrocities, and seeking recognition in the hope that moral witness will eventually compel structural transformation. Yet the international system generally responds by managing suffering rather than dismantling the structures producing it. Humanitarian assistance, development programmes, diplomatic statements, and symbolic condemnations may alleviate immediate suffering, but they rarely reorganise the underlying architecture of power.

The consequence is a condition of managed survival. The resistance endures, yet endurance itself risks becoming incorporated into the very logic it seeks to overcome. The deepest achievement of Psycho-Cosmocide is therefore not territorial occupation alone, but the gradual capture of a people's strategic imagination—the point at which liberation itself can no longer be conceived except through the symbolic, institutional, and psychological pathways authorised by the colonising order. As Frantz Fanon observed, liberation is not bestowed upon a people; it must be achieved through the reorganisation of power itself.³⁴

Humanitarian systems often alleviate suffering without dismantling the structures that cause it. Aid treats symptoms while occupation, resource extraction, cultural fragmentation, and manufactured dependency continue underneath. This is not a critique of solidarity, but an observation about structural limitations: aid can sustain a people without ever restoring what was taken from them.

The strategic limitations described above are only one half of the diagnosis. Every prolonged political condition eventually acquires a psychological form. When dependency, moral appeal, and external expectation become the dominant grammar of resistance across generations, they cease to function merely as political strategies and begin to reorganise the inner architecture of the colonised psyche itself. It is to this deeper pathology that the analysis now turns.

The Psychopathology of Permanent Victimhood

Here I turn from what the world fails to do in response to Papuan suffering to what the condition of prolonged suffering does to the Papuan mind itself — the second half of the same diagnosis.

The *Good Samaritan Syndrome* poses both political and psychological dangers. When narratives of helplessness are rewarded on the international stage — because suffering attracts humanitarian attention — a people may begin over time to internalise the identity of permanent victims rather than that of sovereign historical actors. Resistance becomes about performing pain to maintain attention rather than reorganising power to alter the reality in which their own world is being deleted. The wider corpus names a further, closely related horror within this psychopathology: the point at which a colonised people comes to treat its own internal critics — those who name the mechanism of destruction while it is still underway — as the true source of danger, rather than the system doing the destroying. Under this inversion, the diagnostician is experienced as the threat, and the apparatus that manufactures the suffering continues to operate behind the cover of the resulting internal conflict.²⁷

This dynamic is not unique to West Papua. In his analysis of anti-colonial movements, the Martinican theorist Aimé Césaire warned of the colonisation of the mind — the process by which colonial subjects come to see themselves through the eyes of the coloniser and internalise categories of inferiority, passivity, and dependence.³⁵ Frantz Fanon built on this, arguing that psychological decolonisation must accompany political struggle; otherwise, the liberated will remain structurally subordinate even after achieving formal independence.³⁶

Within the Psycho-Cosmocide framework, this process is understood at a deeper ontological level. Colonial systems do not merely occupy territory. They colonise the psyche of the colonised and poison it from within. They divide family, clans, manipulate factions, commodify identity, institutionalise dependency, and gradually erode the cognitive and cosmological foundations through which a people understand themselves and the world around them. The result is not merely political dispossession; it is the systematic dismantling of the metaphysical architecture that enables a cosmopolitan Papuan society to be and to continue to be across generations.

This is not a single blow but a cascade. The wider corpus specifies the mechanism through a comparative model of six structural homologues with biological parasitism, each naming a distinct operation — the redirection of fear rather than its removal, the capture of an education system rather than its closure, the substitution of a people's linguistic organ rather than the silencing of their voice, the narrowing of political imagination rather than its arrest, the redirection of a people's reproductive and ceremonial energy rather

than its destruction, and the sincere internalisation of the coloniser's order by colonially formed elites, who come to defend the system not through coercion but because they can no longer distinguish its imperatives from their own aspirations. None of these operations alone would be sufficient. What makes the cumulative effect total is a further principle: each layer of a people's reality-construction accumulates upon those beneath it, so the coloniser does not need to conquer every domain with equal force. It needs only to compromise the foundational layers — land, body, language — for the damage to cascade upward automatically through memory, ceremony, and self-understanding. Read in reverse, the same logic is what makes reconstruction possible rather than merely aspirational: recovering one layer strengthens every layer built upon it.³⁷

Meanwhile, the perpetrators adapt. They learn to absorb international criticism while maintaining operations on the ground. Corporations develop public relations strategies to defuse outrage without altering their extraction practices. International institutions issue statements while avoiding structural confrontation. Global audiences become desensitised to tragedy through what Susan Sontag termed compassion fatigue.³⁸ The suffering body becomes an image consumed by the world rather than a force capable of reshaping it.

Everything traced across the preceding chapters leads to this point. A diagnosis of Psycho-Cosmocide cannot end with the actions of the coloniser alone. It must also ask what those actions have gradually produced within the consciousness, institutions, leadership, and strategic imagination of the colonised themselves. The final stage of the diagnosis is therefore also the most difficult, because it turns the analytical lens inward.

11. Diagnosing the Present (2024–2026)

Everything diagnosed above converges, in the present decade, upon one final and more difficult claim. It belongs here rather than buried within a discussion of strategy because it concerns not only what the colonial-civilisational system has done to Papua, but what prolonged participation within that system has gradually done to the resistance itself. The central claim of this chapter is therefore unsettling: the resistance has not remained entirely outside the system it opposes.

Two Governing Images: Institutional Incorporation and Slow Transformation

The wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus explains this condition through two closely related images. The first concerns institutional incorporation. Colonial administration does not merely govern the colonised; it progressively elevates selected members of the colonised population into positions of recognised authority—governors, regents, parliamentary representatives, institutional leaders, and public spokespersons. They may exercise genuine influence over local policy, resources, and administration, yet the deeper architecture of sovereignty—territory, borders, military authority, constitutional legitimacy, and the conditions under which power itself is exercised—remains external to them. They resemble rulers entrusted with the management of a kingdom whose foundations, boundaries, and ultimate authority were constructed by someone else.

The second image is that of slow transformation rather than sudden betrayal. No single appointment, promotion, qualification, or institutional privilege appears sufficient, by itself, to provoke alarm. Yet each successive stage of incorporation deepens personal investment in the structure conferring recognition until questioning that structure gradually comes to feel indistinguishable from questioning one's own identity, career, and achievements. The transformation occurs incrementally rather than dramatically. By the time the deeper architecture has become visible, the capacity to recognise it as such has often already been reorganised.

Read against the diagnosis advanced throughout this paper, this offers one explanation for why sixty-four years of extraordinary courage, sacrifice, and moral witness have not yet been converted into corresponding political transformation. The difficulty does not principally arise from a lack of commitment or courage. It arises because significant parts of the contemporary leadership now exercise genuine, often well-intentioned, authority within institutions whose deeper constitutional, territorial, and strategic foundations they neither created nor ultimately control.³⁹

This deletion cannot end with geography. The same civilisational operation that renames mountains, rivers, forests, and places also renames the people themselves: primitive, backward, undeveloped, minority, disadvantaged, impoverished, uncivilised, in need of education, in need of development, in need of saving. These are not neutral descriptions. They are the conceptual vocabulary through which the Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus progressively reconstructs a people as permanently deficient—insufficient, incomplete, unfinished, and incapable of standing without external guidance or support. Engineered dependency therefore comes to appear not as a historical achievement of colonial power but as a natural condition of Papuan existence.

This is the deeper function of the Virus: it transforms the outcomes of colonisation into the apparent characteristics of the colonised. What has been historically produced comes to be experienced as naturally given. The wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus identifies the final stage of this progression as *ontological zombification*: life continues biologically while its cosmological foundations have been progressively dismantled. A people remain physically present yet increasingly defend the very framework that displaced their own world, experiencing any attempt to name that displacement as backward, dangerous, or threatening.⁴⁰

The symbolic reclamation proposed throughout this paper must therefore extend across the same totality that the wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus identifies as the Eight Atlases of Human Existence. The task is not confined to restoring the original names of rivers, mountains, forests, and species. It also requires reclaiming the legal order that judges Papuans as citizens of another state, the calendar that measures Papuan historical time against another nation's independence, the curriculum that teaches Papuan children the heroes of others before their own ancestors, the courts that adjudicate Papuan life through another people's legal language, and even the category of "development" through which Papuan existence is continually measured and found wanting.

Colonial domination does not reorganise one atlas while leaving the others intact. It progressively reprograms all eight as an interconnected architecture of existence. This is why the recovery of any single atlas strengthens every atlas built upon it, and why the recovery of land—fundamental though it is—cannot by itself restore a Cosmobian world if language, law, memory, education, time, and meaning continue to

be organised according to the categories of the colonising civilisation. A people may recover territory while remaining governed by another civilisation's grammar of reality.⁴¹

What is required is not a translation exercise — swapping a colonial word for a Papuan synonym while the underlying grammar of deficiency stays exactly where it was. It is a new lens: a vocabulary, symbol-system, and calendar built from Papuan cosmopolitan categories on their own terms, answerable to Papuan cosmology rather than to the categories of the system measuring Papuan worth against it. A people cannot see a different reality through an instrument built to produce only one. As long as Papuans continue to describe themselves as minority, disadvantaged, undeveloped, or dependent — even in the language of their own resistance, even in the documents written to move the world to sympathy — the architecture of Psycho-Cosmocide continues operating undisturbed beneath the political argument being made against it. The categories must be invented, not borrowed and inverted.

None of this argues against the diplomatic and institutional strategy this paper recommends elsewhere. A movement can and must pursue recognition, build institutional capacity, and engage the machinery of international law using the tools available in the present, while carrying out this deeper civilisational task on its own, longer timeline. The two are not substitutes. Institution-building without ontological reclamation risks winning recognition inside a system whose vocabulary still names Papuans as incomplete; ontological reclamation without institutional capacity risks a coherent Papuan self-understanding with no leverage to defend it. Both must proceed together, at their own respective speeds, or the sovereignty eventually won will still be measured, described, and governed in the coloniser's terms.

The argument now reaches its most comprehensive level of diagnosis. Everything described throughout this paper—the Digestive System, the Black Troopy System, the Instant Noodle Horizon, the Good Samaritan Syndrome, and the reorganisation of the Papuan psyche—can ultimately be understood as different expressions of the same underlying process. The Eight Atlases provide the architecture through which that total process becomes visible.

The Eight Atlases of Capture

The wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus understands human existence as organised through Eight Interdependent Atlases of Existence. Colonial domination in West Papua has not been confined to any single one of these domains. Rather, it has progressively occupied, reorganised, and redefined each atlas simultaneously, producing not eight separate injuries but a single interconnected architecture of capture.

At the *physical and material* level, rivers, mountains, forests, and territories have been renamed, redrawn, partitioned, and governed by authorities the Papuan people did not choose. At the *biological and organismic* level, Papuan bodies have been subjected to militarisation, displacement, demographic transformation, and the long-term consequences of settler expansion. At the *cultural and mythological* level, ancestral names, stories, ceremonies, symbols, and systems of meaning have been progressively displaced by the vocabulary of development, progress, civilisation, and national integration. At the *metaphysical and transcendental* level, cosmological orientation has increasingly been reorganised around imported categories of heaven, hell, salvation, and religious authority. The process extends further still. At the level of *particle and energy*, land, forests, minerals, and ecological systems are increasingly transformed into raw material for economies organised elsewhere. At the level of *space and time*, Papuan historical experience is measured according to the calendars, commemorations, and administrative rhythms of another nation. At the level of *memory and*

consciousness, history is increasingly archived, taught, narrated, and remembered through the sequence, language, and institutional priorities of the colonising order. Finally, at the level of the *ultimate unknown*, even the horizon of Papuan destiny—the question of what the future exists for, and what kind of civilisation Papuans are meant to become—is progressively supplied from outside the Cosmopolitan world itself.

No single atlas can be recovered in isolation. Each depends upon, reinforces, and continually reshapes the others. This is why partial victories—a restored place name, a legal reform, a successful court case, or even the recovery of territory—cannot by themselves restore a Cosmopolitan world while the remaining atlases continue to operate according to the grammar of the colonising civilisation. The wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus therefore understands liberation not as the recovery of one domain of existence, but as the progressive reclamation of the entire architecture through which a people remembers, inhabits, and reproduces its world.

The diagnosis is now sufficiently developed to permit a comparative test. If Psycho-Cosmocide describes a general civilisational process rather than an isolated Papuan experience, its principal mechanisms should be recognisable wherever Cosmopolitan worlds have confronted expanding colonial-civilisational orders. The analysis therefore turns from the particular to the comparative.

PART V: LESSONS FROM OTHER COSMOBIAN AND COLONISED PEOPLES

Comparative Lessons

Before turning from diagnosis to programme, I test the mechanism just described against other cosmopolitan and colonised societies, to establish what is structural to this condition and what is merely local to West Papua.

The Sahrawi People: Recognition Without Leverage

The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) has been recognised by more than eighty states, maintains a functioning government in exile, and has been represented by the Polisario Front as an organised liberation movement since 1973. Yet Morocco continues to exercise effective control over most of Western Sahara. The Sahrawi case demonstrates that international recognition, diplomatic legitimacy, and moral support do not by themselves alter the underlying distribution of organised power. Recognition without corresponding strategic leverage produces symbolic sovereignty rather than effective self-determination.⁴²

For the Psycho-Cosmocide framework, the lesson is direct. Recognition belongs principally to the moral and diplomatic register of Map Two, whereas sovereignty is ultimately determined within the strategic register of Map Three. The Sahrawi experience therefore illustrates one of the paper's central propositions: moral legitimacy and international recognition are necessary conditions for political liberation, but they are not sufficient. Without organised political, institutional, economic, diplomatic, and strategic power capable of altering the balance of forces, recognition risks remaining largely symbolic while the underlying structures of domination continue substantially unchanged.

The Vietnamese Model: Discipline as Liberation

The Vietnamese struggle under Hồ Chí Minh illustrates a different strategic lesson. Confronted first by French colonial rule and later by extensive American military intervention, the Vietnamese independence movement developed extraordinary organisational discipline, ideological coherence, long-term strategic planning, and the integration of political, military, diplomatic, and psychological forms of struggle. Its endurance was not secured through moral testimony alone, but through the systematic conversion of suffering into organised capacity and organised capacity into political leverage.

Within the Psycho-Cosmocide framework, the Vietnamese experience demonstrates the transition from Map Two to Map Three. The movement certainly documented suffering and appealed to international opinion, but it did not rely upon moral recognition as the principal engine of liberation. It simultaneously built institutions, cultivated disciplined leadership, organised popular participation, developed military capability, and sustained a long-term strategic vision capable of altering the balance of power itself. In this sense, the decisive question was not whether the world recognised Vietnamese suffering, but whether the Vietnamese people could reorganise themselves into a force capable of determining their own political future.

The lesson for the Papuan case is not that Vietnam should be copied, for every historical struggle unfolds under different geopolitical, cultural, and historical conditions. Rather, the lesson is structural: no people secure enduring sovereignty by suffering alone. Suffering must be transformed into organisation, organisation into disciplined capacity, and disciplined capacity into the forms of political, institutional, economic, diplomatic, and—where necessary—defensive power through which a people can sustain its own existence.⁴³

The African National Congress: Institution-Building in Exile

The African National Congress (ANC), particularly under Oliver Tambo's leadership during the decades of exile, offers another important strategic lesson. Confronted by the apartheid state, the ANC did not allow exile to become organisational paralysis. It progressively developed diplomatic networks across Africa, Europe, Asia, and the wider international community, sustained international solidarity as one component of a broader strategy, cultivated ideological coherence, and prepared successive generations of leaders capable not merely of resisting apartheid but of governing beyond it.

Within the Psycho-Cosmocide framework, the ANC demonstrates that exile need not become political suspension. International recognition was treated as a means rather than an end, while institution-building, leadership development, diplomatic engagement, and organisational continuity remained central priorities. The movement sought not only to expose injustice but to accumulate the capacities required to replace the system it opposed.

The lesson for the Papuan case is therefore institutional rather than historical. Liberation movements cannot rely indefinitely upon protest, moral testimony, or international sympathy alone. They must simultaneously cultivate leadership, preserve organisational discipline, develop durable institutions, educate future generations, and prepare for the practical responsibilities of self-government. The question is not simply how to end domination, but whether a people is preparing itself to govern once domination ends.⁴⁴

Timor-Leste: The Strategic Conversion of Moral Argument

Timor-Leste's achievement of independence in 2002 offers another important strategic lesson. Despite confronting the same Indonesian state that continues to govern West Papua, the Timorese struggle was sustained through decades of armed resistance, clandestine internal organisation, diplomatic engagement, diaspora mobilisation, institution-building, and the careful use of international law. Moral testimony remained indispensable, but it became politically effective because it was coupled with organised capacities capable of acting when a decisive geopolitical opportunity emerged following Indonesia's political and economic crisis during the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the subsequent fall of President Suharto.⁴⁵

Within the Psycho-Cosmocide framework, Timor-Leste illustrates the strategic conversion of Map Two into Map Three. International sympathy did not automatically produce independence. Rather, moral legitimacy, diplomatic advocacy, institutional preparation, and organised resistance converged with a favourable geopolitical moment to generate sufficient political leverage for self-determination to become achievable.

The lesson for the Papuan case is therefore one of preparation rather than prediction. No movement can determine when history will present a strategic opening, but it can determine whether it possesses the organisational discipline, institutional capacity, diplomatic networks, leadership, and collective coherence required to act when that opening arrives. Moral argument becomes historically decisive only when organised power is prepared to convert recognition into political transformation.

The Jewish Strategic Model: Spirit and Organisation

The Jewish historical experience offers one of the most important strategic lessons within the Psycho-Cosmocide framework, particularly because many Papuans and other Melanesian Christians have come to understand their own history through Biblical narratives. For some, this has extended to identifying themselves with the lost tribes of Israel or locating Papuan destiny almost entirely within the sacred history, genealogies, prophecies, and covenantal promises recorded in the Bible. Over generations of missionary formation, the history of ancient Israel has become, for many, not merely a religious tradition but the principal framework through which reality itself is interpreted.

Within the missionary Christian cosmology introduced to Papua, no people occupy a more central place than the Jewish people. They are presented as the covenant people, the custodians of Scripture, the ancestors of the Messiah, the recipients of prophetic promises, and the community through whom God's redemptive history unfolds. If any people could have believed that divine election alone guaranteed their survival, it would have been them.

Yet the historical record presents a different lesson. Across centuries of conquest, exile, dispersion, persecution, and repeated attempts at annihilation, Jewish survival depended not upon passive expectation but upon continual organisation, institutional continuity, communal discipline, political adaptation, and, at critical moments, military preparation. From the Maccabean Revolt against the Seleucid Empire in 167 BCE, through the preservation of Jewish communal life across the diaspora, to the formation of the Haganah and Irgun before the establishment of the modern State of Israel, and later the development of national institutions, intelligence capabilities, and organised defence, it has been disciplined human organisation that has repeatedly secured Jewish continuity across nearly three millennia.⁴⁶

Within the Psycho-Cosmocide framework, this is the decisive lesson. The Jewish experience demonstrates that Map Two and Map Three never abolished the necessity of Map One. Covenant, prophecy, sacred history, kingship, genealogy, law, and messianic expectation did not suspend the material conditions of collective existence. They depended upon them. Indeed, the Hebrew Bible itself repeatedly narrates the consequences of failing to preserve the material, political, and institutional foundations of national life. Its prophets consistently warned not only of spiritual decline but of the collapse of leadership, justice, social cohesion, and the conditions necessary for the continued existence of the covenant community. Even within the sacred narrative itself, no prophet, angel, Messiah, or external power permanently substituted for the responsibility of the people to organise, defend, discipline, and reproduce the conditions of their own survival.

This is not an assessment of the morality of any contemporary conflict, nor an endorsement of the policies of any modern state. Palestinians possess their own history, identity, and legitimate grievances, just as the Jewish people possess theirs. The observation advanced here is entirely strategic. Few historical experiences demonstrate more clearly that enduring spiritual identity must be accompanied by enduring institutional, political, educational, economic, and organisational capacity. Faith was never permitted to become a substitute for preparation. Prayer never replaced responsibility. Hope never abolished organisation.

The implication for the Papuan case is therefore profound. The same missionary tradition that introduced Papuans to the sacred history of Israel also, in many contexts, encouraged an expectation that liberation would ultimately arrive through providence, external intervention, or the fulfilment of prophecy. For many colonised Papuans and Melanesians, the history of Israel became so central that it gradually displaced their own ancestral cosmologies as the primary framework through which they interpreted existence. The wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus argues that this becomes dangerous when Map Two begins to consume Map One—when sacred stories, promises, and expectations become detached from the disciplined work of organising the material, institutional, and civilisational conditions upon which those very stories have always depended.

The deepest lesson of the Jewish experience is therefore not theological but civilisational. It is that the preservation of a people's spirit has always required the preservation of the world that allows that spirit to endure. A people who loses Map One cannot indefinitely sustain Map Two or Map Three. The history of Israel, read strategically rather than sentimentally, repeatedly returns to the same conclusion: faith without organisation does not preserve a civilisation; organisation is the vessel through which faith survives across generations.

The diagnosis is now complete. A people cannot remain indefinitely in the language of injury, however necessary that language has been. The task that follows is greater: to move from explaining the destruction of a world to consciously rebuilding one. The final part of this paper therefore turns from diagnosis to programme, from critique to reconstruction, and from survival alone to the deliberate creation of a renewed Cosmobian future.

PART VI — REBUILDING THE PAPUAN WORLD: BUMI CENDERAWASIH OR OBLIVION

If there is a Papuan generation after us, it will not remember our meetings, declarations, offices, speeches, elections, titles, or arguments. They will remember only the world we left behind. Their question will not be, "Who was right?" It will be, "What happened? Why did they not fight back?" They will say they, because by then there will no longer be an us.

12. From Emotional Reaction to Civilisational Project

What I propose from here is not consolation but a programme: the movement from diagnosis to reconstruction.

The next phase of Papuan resistance cannot be based solely on protest. It must also involve reconstruction. This process must cultivate internal cohesion, strategic education, economic self-organisation, technological literacy, psychological resilience, cultural continuity, and disciplined political coordination. Most importantly, it must generate power bases so that Papuans can sit at the bargaining table with leverage rather than dependency.

If a system that devours Papuans is itself systemic—structured, institutionalised, programmed, and executed with clear objectives, precise time management, resource coordination, laws, regulations, curricula, symbols, images, colour systems, and mechanisms of display—then Papuan resistance must respond with equal or even greater rigour.

The sentiments behind Papuan resistance are strong and valid, but sentiment alone cannot erupt only in temporary moments of outrage whenever another tragedy occurs. Tragedies will continue to occur. What Papuans need is not merely reactive emotion, but the construction of an alternative system—an alternative reality grounded in long-term vision, organisation, discipline, memory, and collective survival.

Communities that are fragmented and possess little organised power cannot negotiate effectively. A divided resistance movement remains perpetually vulnerable to infiltration, co-optation, exhaustion, and manipulation. The failure of many anti-colonial movements — from the early nationalist movements in sub-Saharan Africa to the internal fractures within Palestinian political organisations — demonstrates that movements are not defeated primarily because they lack moral legitimacy. They are defeated because they lack coordination.⁴⁷

The required transformation is as much psychological as political. The Vietnamese resistance under Hồ Chí Minh, the internal discipline of the Cuban revolutionary movement, and the long-term strategic planning of the ANC under Oliver Tambo all illustrate the same principle: a liberation movement that does not develop strong institutional capacity will not survive a prolonged encounter with a determined and well-resourced state apparatus.⁴⁸

Reconceived through the Psycho-Cosmocide paradigm, conflict of this kind operates across a spectrum running from hard civil war (open armed confrontation), through medium civil war (institutionalised and

intermittently violent contests for power), to soft civil war — the largely invisible process of psychological and civilisational fragmentation that precedes and outlasts both.²⁴ At least eight distinguishable forms of this fragmentation can be traced through Papuan political history: inherited precolonial territorial plurality; regional division between coast and highland; ideological division among incorporationist, gradualist, federalist, and independentist positions; organisational division among rival claimants to the legacies of 1961 and 1971; armed-command fragmentation, in which a national title routinely coexists with decentralised practical authority; leadership and constitutional conflict over who may appoint commanders and which congress is supreme; state-generated administrative fragmentation through the repeated subdivision of provinces and electoral constituencies; and narrative fragmentation, in which the movement possesses no single agreed account of its own founding moment — the same eight forms already traced above at their respective dates, from the 1971 Rumkorem–Prai split through the 2001–2013 pemekaran years to the 2014 ULMWP formation and its 2023 split. All three forms of civil war — hard, medium, and soft — appear to operate simultaneously, not only between Papuans and the Indonesian state but among Papuans themselves, over the future of Papuan society.²⁴

This does not mean abandoning humanitarian advocacy. International solidarity still matters. Human rights documentation still matters. Global awareness still matters. However, these must function as secondary instruments within a broader strategy rather than forming the central foundation of the movement. Without internal strategic development, increased visibility produces only dependency. External solidarity is meaningful only when anchored in a robust internal organisation.

I state what follows as the conclusion the diagnosis leaves no honest way to avoid.

This is the final and most important argument of this paper, and it must be stated without euphemism, without diplomatic softening, and without the comfortable vagueness that has characterised too much commentary on the Papuan situation. It is stated here as a civilisational ultimatum — not to outsiders, but to Papuans themselves, and most directly to those who claim to speak for, lead, and protect the Papuan people.

The world — including the United Nations, the European Union, the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group, the Pacific Islands Forum, the Melanesian Spearhead Group, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the BRICS grouping — deals with the Indonesian state in Jakarta because that state has the power and means to compel engagement. As a sovereign people under Indonesian occupation, Papua possesses immense and lethal potential power: land, resources, geography, strategic location, and cosmopolitan continuity spanning forty millennia. But Jakarta has been exploiting this power for decades to build its own empire while Papuans have been petitioning, demonstrating, and performing their suffering for audiences that lack both the will and the leverage to intervene on their behalf.

You cannot beg the United Nations, the Pacific Islands Forum, the Melanesian Spearhead Group, ASEAN, or the BRICS — because they are not made up of human beings with consciences, but of platforms where states gather to manage their interests. Papua has been on the menu for a very long time.

Papuan resistance leaders must now make a cosmopolitan decision — not a political manoeuvre, not a tactical adjustment, not another resolution or press release or social media campaign. A cosmopolitan decision. They must decide whether to remain in the posture of the sheep waiting for rescue, or whether to reorganise the totality of Papuan political will, cultural memory, economic capacity, and strategic intelligence around the only foundation from which real sovereignty can be generated: Bumi Cenderawasih — the planet of the Bird of Paradise — the land itself.

The Planet as the First Sovereignty

If Papuan resistance groups are true protectors of Papua — not merely of a political flag or an identity category or a diaspora brand — then their entire worldview must be transformed. Not reformed. Transformed. The shift required is not from one form of protest to another. It is from a paradigm of reactive, sporadic, moment-to-moment activities — protests, rallies, lobbies, resolutions, appeals to international bodies, victim-hood performances on social media — to a paradigm organised around one absolute, non-negotiable centre of gravity: the protection, sovereignty, and regeneration of Bumi Cenderawasih.

Bumi Cenderawasih is not a metaphor used in this paper. It is the actual planetary substrate of Papuan life, identity, cosmology, economy, and future.⁴⁹ The ontological thesis developed across the corpus's land-ontology work is exact on this point: land is not one value to be weighed against others but the irreducible ground of being itself, prior to any metaphysical claim built upon it — thinking presupposes embodiment, embodiment presupposes ecology, and ecology presupposes land, so that every cosmology requires land as its canvas before it can become a picture at all. The forests, rivers, mountain systems, coastal ecologies, species networks, and climate systems of the island of New Guinea constitute the only non-negotiable condition of Papuan civilisational continuity. Without the land, there is no language. Without the language, there is no memory. Without the memory, there is no people. The protection of Bumi Cenderawasih is therefore not one policy priority among several. It is the condition of possibility for every other priority.

13. Consolidating Power from the Planet Outward

The strategic architecture of a genuine Papuan sovereignty movement must begin from the planet and work outward — not begin from foreign capitals and work inward. This means building the following, in this order:

First: Ecological and Territorial Consolidation

First, ecological and territorial consolidation. Every village, clan, and community structure must be reoriented towards the active defence, documentation, and governance of its specific territory within *Bumi Cenderawasih*. This is not romantic traditionalism. It is the most strategic act available to a stateless people in the twenty-first century. Where the *Epic of Gilgamesh* records Enkidu joining in the felling of Humbaba's cedar forest, ecological consolidation is its deliberate reversal: the refusal to destroy the living world on behalf of the civilisation that first seduced that destruction.²⁷

The defence of land, however, begins with the defence of the memory of land. A territory that has lost its names, stories, myths, genealogies, sacred places, and ancestral histories has already begun to disappear, even if its forests and mountains remain physically intact. Every river, mountain, valley, forest, hunting ground, ceremonial site, and settlement must therefore be systematically documented according to the language, memory, and cosmology of the people to whom it belongs. This documentation must include the original Cosmobian names of places, the stories attached to them, the genealogies of the families, clans, and tribes who hold custodianship over them, and the ecological knowledge accumulated across generations. Wherever possible, these records should be verified, witnessed, and signed by the recognised elders and customary custodians of each land area before that living memory passes away.

This is the foundational task of what the wider corpus calls *Inaorak*: the recovery and verification of authentic cosmological belonging. Inaorak is not merely a land register or cadastral exercise. It is the reconstruction of the living relationship between land, language, memory, genealogy, law, ecology, and identity. Once this work has been completed, every foreign or colonial place name imposed upon that territory should, wherever possible, be removed from Papuan usage and replaced with the original Cosmobian names preserved within the language historically spoken on that land. Reclaiming names is therefore not symbolic decoration. It is the restoration of the cognitive and civilisational architecture through which a people recognises its own world.

Only after this foundation has been secured can the wider work of political reconstruction proceed with integrity. The mapping of customary boundaries, the documentation of ecological knowledge, the establishment of community-controlled systems of resource governance, and the formation of territorial alliances across clan boundaries together constitute the material and civilisational foundation of any future negotiating position. Much of this work can begin immediately at the village level without waiting for complete political unity elsewhere in the programme: customary land councils recording boundaries, sacred sites, ecological knowledge, genealogies, and patterns of resource use in forms controlled by the communities themselves and capable, where necessary, of serving as evidence in future legal, political, or diplomatic processes.

Land is placed first because it is the one foundation upon which every other atlas of existence depends. The Indonesian state may redraw administrative boundaries, rename provinces, enact new regulations, or alter institutions, but it cannot create the ancestral relationship between a people and its land. A documented, defended, and internally recognised territorial foundation—anchored equally in ecology, memory, genealogy, and Cosmobian naming—is therefore the indispensable precondition for every subsequent step in the reconstruction of the Papuan world. It is here that rebuilding must begin.

Second: Economic Self-Organisation

Second, economic self-organisation. The dependence of Papuan communities upon Indonesian state administration, corporate employment, externally controlled markets, and the monetary architecture of the colonial state is not a natural condition. It is one of the most successful achievements of Psycho-Cosmocide. Throughout this paper, the Synthobian world has been described as a mode of existence organised through extraction, production, consumption, accumulation, finance, investment, and perpetual expansion. Within that logic, the economy is primarily understood as the circulation of money and commodities. The wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus rejects this definition entirely.

For the Papuan resurrection, economy must first be understood as a mode of being before it becomes a mode of exchange. A people's economy is the way they organise life itself: their relationships with land, food, kinship, reciprocity, memory, labour, obligation, ceremony, and survival. Money is only one possible instrument within that larger civilisational order. When money becomes the organising principle of existence, rather than serving life, the Synthobian system has already displaced the Cosmobian world.

The reconstruction of a Papuan economy therefore begins by recovering the principles of reciprocity that long sustained Papuan societies before colonial incorporation. The wider corpus proposes that Papuan communities should gradually develop their own locally governed systems of value, exchange, reciprocity, and obligation. Whether these take the form of new community currencies, customary exchange instruments, cooperative credit systems, or renewed Cosmobian media of exchange—such as shells, pigs,

ceremonial objects, or other culturally recognised forms of value—will differ across Papuan societies. The principle is more important than the instrument. A people that cannot define value for itself will ultimately have its value defined by others.

Such systems are not intended simply to replace one currency with another. They are intended to restore economic sovereignty by allowing Papuan communities to organise increasing portions of their daily lives according to Papuan priorities rather than the extractive imperatives of the colonial economy. Every transaction conducted within such a system becomes an act of strengthening Papuan reciprocity rather than reinforcing the mechanisms through which wealth, labour, and resources continually flow outward into structures that sustain the occupation itself.

Only upon this foundation can wider economic reconstruction emerge. Community-controlled food systems, clan-based cooperative enterprises, customary resource governance, local manufacturing, fisheries, coffee production, forest economies, and other productive activities should increasingly be organised according to these principles rather than remaining dependent upon externally controlled administrative and commercial systems. Diaspora capital and remittances should likewise be redirected away from short-term consumption and towards the construction of long-term Papuan institutions capable of sustaining future generations.

None of this requires political sovereignty before it can begin. It requires a different conception of economy itself. The wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus therefore argues that the first economy of a free people is not money but organised reciprocity. From that foundation, markets, trade, production, exchange, investment, and technology may all develop, but they develop as servants of the Cosmopolitan world rather than as instruments of the Synthobian system. Economic liberation, in this sense, is not merely the accumulation of wealth. It is the reconstruction of an entire mode of being through which Papuans once again determine what has value, how value circulates, and ultimately what kind of civilisation their economy exists to sustain.

Third: Psychological and Intellectual Reconstruction

Third, psychological and intellectual reconstruction. The first place at which Papuan resurrection must begin is not the parliament, the courtroom, or the battlefield. It is the Papuan mind itself. Every durable civilisation is first constructed internally before it becomes visible externally. Throughout this paper, the Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus has been described as operating through language, images, symbols, signs, colours, institutions, education, religion, and everyday habits of thought. If this diagnosis is correct, then reconstruction must begin through the deliberate recovery of those same domains.

Language therefore becomes the first front of civilisational reconstruction. A people who continue to describe themselves entirely through the language of another civilisation will inevitably continue to perceive themselves through that civilisation's categories. The wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus therefore proposes that Papuans begin the long-term work of constructing a common national linguistic foundation while simultaneously preserving the extraordinary diversity of the island's original Cosmopolitan languages. This requires an immediate gathering of Papuan linguists, historians, elders, educators, writers, and customary authorities to undertake what should be regarded as a civilisational emergency: determining the foundations of a common Papuan national language and developing its grammar, vocabulary, orthography, numbering system, calendars, symbols, educational materials, and literary tradition. The objective is not to

erase Papuan linguistic diversity, but to create a shared national language through which that diversity can communicate, preserve itself, and reproduce a common Papuan consciousness.

This work must proceed alongside the systematic preservation of every Papuan language. The myths, stories, genealogies, place names, ceremonial traditions, ecological knowledge, oral histories, and ancestral memories of every clan and nation should first be documented in their original languages before being translated into the emerging national language. In this way, the national language becomes not an instrument of homogenisation but a repository through which the entire Cosmopolitan inheritance of Papua is protected and transmitted across generations.

The same principle applies to the symbolic world. Psycho-Cosmocide argues that language never operates alone. Every civilisation also reproduces itself through images, colours, signs, architecture, calendars, rituals, educational systems, and public symbols. Reconstruction therefore requires Papuans to critically examine the symbolic universe through which they have learned to understand themselves. Symbols, images, colours, and representations inherited through colonial institutions should no longer be accepted uncritically as neutral. Wherever colonial iconography has taught Papuans to associate superiority, holiness, civilisation, beauty, or ultimate authority exclusively with external peoples, cultures, or representations while simultaneously associating Papuan identity with deficiency, primitiveness, darkness, or dependence, those symbolic hierarchies should be consciously re-examined and progressively replaced with symbols rooted in Papuan Cosmopolitan reality. This is not the rejection of spirituality itself. It is the decolonisation of the symbolic imagination through which spirituality has been represented.

Reconstruction also requires institutions capable of reproducing this new consciousness. Papuan communities should progressively establish their own community schools, research institutes, publishing houses, media organisations, cultural academies, and places of collective learning grounded in Papuan cosmology. These institutions should teach not only literacy, history, science, and practical skills, but also the Cosmopolitan understanding of life, the principles developed throughout this paper—including Maps One, Two, and Three—the Eight Atlases of Human Existence, the responsibilities of stewardship, courage, reciprocity, memory, sacrifice, and collective survival. Their purpose is not merely to educate individuals but to reproduce an entire civilisation.

This third front does not wait upon complete political sovereignty. Language documentation, oral history archives, community schools, translation projects, cultural academies, and locally organised educational programmes can begin immediately through the initiative of villages, clans, churches, customary institutions, and the Papuan diaspora. Larger institutions—universities, research institutes, publishing houses, and national academies—will emerge as the ecological and economic foundations described above become capable of sustaining them. The modest institutions are therefore not secondary to the larger ones. They are the seeds from which the future intellectual life of a free Papuan civilisation must grow.

Fourth: Strategic Political Consolidation

Fourth, strategic political consolidation. The fragmentation of the Papuan resistance across competing organisations, diaspora factions, regional interests, generations, and ideological traditions is not a sign of political vitality. Within the Psycho-Cosmocide framework, it is one of the most successful outcomes of the colonial system itself. A people confronting a civilisational emergency cannot afford to reproduce internally the very fragmentation that has been imposed upon them externally.

When the survival of a nation, its history, its memory, and its future are all at risk, resistance movements no longer possess the luxury of allowing personal grievances, organisational rivalries, historical resentments, or public disputes to take precedence over the national interest. This is particularly true in an era in which social media has become a permanent theatre of surveillance, political manipulation, and information gathering. Every public division becomes intelligence for opponents, every unresolved dispute becomes an opportunity for infiltration, and every personal conflict weakens the collective capacity for survival.

The wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus therefore insists that, within such conditions, the first political question is not who was right or wrong, good or bad, popular or unpopular. The deeper question is whether those entrusted with the future of the nation possess the discipline to place the survival of *Bumi Cenderawasih* above their own reputations, ambitions, historical grievances, or institutional loyalties. A movement that cannot organise disagreement without fragmentation risks becoming the principal obstacle to its own liberation. The tragedy is not that enemies oppose the movement. The tragedy is that those who sincerely seek to save Papua may, through their inability to act collectively, become part of the mechanism preventing its survival.

Political leadership must therefore be measured not by visibility but by responsibility. Resistance cannot become a permanent career sustained by the continual performance of suffering without corresponding advances in organisation, institution-building, or strategic capacity. A movement that repeats the same appeals, the same demonstrations, and the same diplomatic routines decade after decade without critically examining their effectiveness risks confusing activity with progress. Within the language of Psycho-Cosmocide, this resembles prisoners in Plato's cave who remain captivated by the shadows before them while mistaking the repetition of those shadows for movement towards freedom.

This is why the wider corpus argues that the resistance must move beyond the psychology of permanent victimhood described earlier. Humanitarian advocacy, international solidarity, documentation of abuses, and appeals to international law remain indispensable, but they cannot constitute the strategic centre of the movement. They become politically effective only when supported by disciplined internal organisation and by forms of leverage that make Papuan interests consequential within the calculations of other states and institutions. International organisations—including the United Nations, the Pacific Islands Forum, the Melanesian Spearhead Group, ASEAN, the European Union, and other multilateral bodies—primarily mediate relationships among organised political actors. They are most effective when they can facilitate, recognise, monitor, or implement outcomes generated through political negotiation and organised leverage rather than substitute for them.

The same demand for strategic reflection extends to every component of the resistance, including armed organisations. The wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus argues that every strategy should be evaluated not only by its courage or symbolic significance but by whether it advances the long-term objective of political freedom. Actions that generate immediate attention yet fail to strengthen the movement's strategic position, organisational capacity, or negotiating leverage require continual reassessment. The central question is not whether sacrifice has occurred—Papuan history leaves no doubt that it has—but whether sacrifice is being translated into forms of power capable of changing the political conditions under which future generations will live.

This is the hardest of the six fronts because it has already been attempted and has fractured more than once in living memory, from the 1971 Rumkorem–Prai split to the 2023 division within the ULMWP. A structure

capable of surviving a future attempt at unity cannot depend solely upon a single leader or a single organisation claiming exclusive authority. It requires institutions capable of representing regions, generations, customary authorities, churches, women, youth, the diaspora, and resistance organisations within transparent procedures for deliberation, succession, accountability, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Political consolidation, in this sense, is not the elimination of disagreement. It is the construction of institutions strong enough to contain disagreement without allowing it to become fragmentation.

A united voice creates legitimacy, and legitimacy strengthens leverage. Yet legitimacy alone is not enough. It must be continually translated into organisational, diplomatic, economic, intellectual, and strategic capacity. Colonial systems have rarely responded to moral argument alone. They respond when organised peoples alter the political environment within which decisions are made. The task of the Papuan resistance, therefore, is not simply to remain morally right. It is to become sufficiently organised that the future of Bumi Cenderawasih can no longer be treated as politically optional.

Fifth: The Consolidation of Power Itself

Fifth, the consolidation of power itself. The reconstruction proposed throughout this paper ultimately converges upon one question: how does a people generate sufficient power to secure its own continuity? This question cannot be avoided, because every civilisation that has endured has ultimately answered it in practice, whether consciously or unconsciously. The wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus argues that the greatest mistake of many colonised peoples has been to reduce power either to armed force or to economic wealth, while overlooking the deeper architectures from which both derive their legitimacy and durability.

Power, within this framework, is not a singular phenomenon but an ecology. It accumulates across multiple layers of existence, each reinforcing the others until together they become capable of reproducing an entire civilisation. The corpus distinguishes four interdependent forms of power through which both colonisers and colonised organise, defend, and reproduce their worlds.

The first is *coercive power*: the capacity to compel behaviour through the threat or application of organised force. Throughout history, armies, police, prisons, intelligence services, and legal institutions have all expressed this form of power. It is the most visible manifestation of authority, yet paradoxically the least stable. Coercion is expensive to maintain, constantly generates resistance, and survives only while sufficient material resources remain available to sustain it. Every empire built exclusively upon coercion eventually confronts the limits of coercion itself.

The second is *symbolic power*. Civilisations are not held together by weapons alone but by the symbols through which reality becomes intelligible. Flags, monuments, maps, currencies, national anthems, school textbooks, heroes, ceremonies, colours, religious narratives, constitutions, and collective myths all participate in the production of legitimacy. They teach a population what is sacred, what is normal, what is possible, and what is unthinkable. Colonisation therefore always begins by repainting the symbolic world before it secures the physical one. Whoever controls symbols progressively governs perception; whoever governs perception gradually governs behaviour.

The third is *epistemic power*: the authority to determine what counts as legitimate knowledge and who possesses the right to produce, preserve, and transmit it. Schools, universities, research institutes, archives, libraries, media organisations, publishing houses, and increasingly digital platforms all participate in this struggle. Colonisation succeeds not only by suppressing Indigenous knowledge but by persuading the

colonised that knowledge becomes legitimate only after it has been authorised by institutions external to themselves. The result is a civilisation that gradually forgets how to recognise its own intelligence except through the approval of another.

The fourth and deepest form is *ontological power*. This is the capacity to define being itself: to determine who a people are, what they are, what they are worth, what they should aspire to become, and how reality itself ought to be understood. It is here that the Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus operates most effectively. The virus does not begin by occupying territory. It begins by reconstructing existence itself until the colonised unconsciously inherit the categories through which they understand themselves. Primitive, modern, developed, backward, majority, minority, civilised, Indigenous, first world and third world, develop end underdevelop, inferior and superior and every civilisational categorical framework ever invented are never merely descriptive categories. They are ontological instruments through which entire populations are positioned within a hierarchy of existence.

Yet none of these forms of power, however sophisticated, can sustain a civilisation by themselves. The wider corpus argues that beneath coercive, symbolic, epistemic, and ontological power lies an even deeper integrating principle: *trust*.⁵⁰

Trust is the invisible architecture through which all other forms of power become durable. Armies collapse without trust between commanders and soldiers. Economies disintegrate when trust disappears from exchange. Institutions lose legitimacy when trust in their integrity evaporates. Knowledge cannot be transmitted without trust in teachers, elders, and traditions. Even cosmologies survive only because generations trust the memory entrusted to them by those who came before.

Trust is therefore not merely another form of power. It is the force that binds every other form into a coherent civilisational whole. A society possessing immense military capacity but little trust gradually fragments from within. A wealthy economy without trust becomes corrupt. An educational system without trust produces credentials rather than wisdom. A religion without trust degenerates into ritual. Conversely, communities possessing relatively few material resources but deep reservoirs of mutual trust often display extraordinary resilience across generations because trust enables cooperation, sacrifice, reciprocity, long-term planning, and collective discipline.

The strategic lesson for Papua is therefore profound. The future of *Bumi Cenderawasih* cannot depend upon accumulating coercive power alone, nor solely upon international recognition, economic development, or symbolic affirmation. It depends upon rebuilding the trust capable of integrating every dimension of Papuan existence: trust between clans, trust between regions, trust between customary authorities and younger generations, trust between the homeland and the diaspora, trust between intellectuals and communities, trust between resistance organisations, and ultimately trust in the possibility that Papuans can once again organise themselves as the authors of their own civilisation.

Within the Psycho-Cosmocide framework, this is why trust occupies the highest position in the hierarchy of power. Civilisations are not ultimately destroyed because they lose weapons or wealth. They are destroyed when the trust that once held their world together is progressively dissolved. Likewise, they are not ultimately reborn when they recover territory alone. They are reborn when trust becomes strong enough to regenerate coercive capacity, symbolic legitimacy, epistemic confidence, and ontological integrity into a single living civilisation. It is this reconstruction of trust that Wonesis identifies as the deepest foundation of Papuan resurrection.

As the wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus has consistently argued, human beings—and indeed all organisms and forms of life on this small planet suspended within an immeasurably larger cosmos—exist within multiple, overlapping systems of constraint. These existential cages operate simultaneously across the physical, biological, cultural, metaphysical, technological, temporal, memorial, and ultimately unknowable dimensions of existence. Human civilisation itself unfolds through what this corpus identifies as the *Eight Atlases of Human Existence*, each constituting a distinct yet interdependent domain through which life becomes organised and reproduced.

Among these, however, two atlases have historically exercised the greatest influence over the destiny of peoples: the physical and the cultural. Material existence provides the conditions for survival, while culture provides the symbolic architecture through which that survival acquires meaning. Although religions, philosophies, and metaphysical systems frequently claim to transcend these conditions, history repeatedly demonstrates that they rarely abolish them. Instead, they become sophisticated survival technologies operating within them. Humanity continues not by escaping its existential cages but by continually reorganising them.

The wider corpus therefore proposes what it calls the *Canvas Principle*. The physical world is the canvas upon which every civilisation paints its reality.⁴⁹ Upon that canvas each people inscribes its language, names, symbols, colours, stories, myths, genealogies, ceremonies, laws, institutions, calendars, memories, and visions of the future. These symbolic structures shape perception; perception shapes emotion; emotion directs desire; desire produces meaning; and meaning ultimately governs the trajectory of collective existence. Colonial domination therefore does not begin with military occupation alone. Its deepest achievement is the systematic erasure and replacement of the symbolic architecture through which a people experiences reality itself.

Papua may continue to exist geographically while ceasing to exist civilisationally. The mountains remain, yet their names change. The rivers continue flowing, yet their stories disappear. The forests endure, yet their guardians are forgotten. The land remains physically present while the cosmological world that once animated it is progressively dismantled. In its place emerges another reality painted with different languages, different maps, different colours, different institutions, different aspirations, different calendars, and ultimately a different civilisation.

The Indonesian project is therefore not simply territorial occupation. It is the implantation of another civilisation into the perceptual architecture of the Papuan mind. It enters language, education, administration, memory, aspiration, imagination, and consciousness until the categories through which Papuans understand themselves are no longer generated from the Cosmobian world but from the Synthobian one. The wider corpus describes this process through the comparative logic of parasitology. Just as certain parasites redirect the behaviour of their hosts while leaving the host physically alive, the Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus progressively redirects the perception, memory, and aspirations of the colonised until participation in the system consuming them appears normal, desirable, and even morally necessary.⁵¹ The final stage is what the corpus terms *ontological zombification*: biological life continues while the cosmological foundations that once gave that life coherence have been progressively replaced.

From this diagnosis emerges the central proposition of the Psycho-Cosmocide paradigm. A civilisation cannot ultimately be saved by protesting the destruction of its world while continuing to reproduce the categories through which that destruction is organised. It must progressively recreate another world. This is the purpose of *Wonesis*.

Wonesis is not a political party, an ideology, a theology, a manifesto, or a programme of government. It is a civilisational orientation. It points towards the long work of recreating the Cosmobian world through land, language, memory, reciprocity, institutions, education, courage, discipline, and collective responsibility. It begins wherever a people consciously choose to rebuild rather than merely resist, to generate rather than merely react, and to become the authors of their own reality once again.

Whether the Papuan people ultimately choose this path cannot be decided by any theory, publication, institution, or individual. That responsibility belongs to the living generation itself. The purpose of the Psycho-Cosmocide corpus has never been simply to describe the architecture of extinction. It has been to illuminate, while there is still time, the conditions under which a civilisation may yet remember itself, reorganise itself, and continue to exist.

Every civilisation is ultimately confronted by the same question. Not whether it once existed, but whether it possessed the wisdom, courage, discipline, and imagination to recreate itself before its memory disappeared. The future of Bumi Cenderawasih now depends upon the answer.

Sixth: Civilisational Non-Participation and Symbolic Reclamation

This is perhaps the most radical—and ultimately the most necessary—front of reconstruction. It begins with one of the deepest diagnostic questions posed by the wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus: *why do colonised peoples progressively organise their education, employment, economy, political aspirations, future planning, investment, identity, and everyday existence within the very system that, if left uninterrupted, will ultimately eliminate them as a distinct people?*

The wider corpus argues that this paradox cannot be explained by physical domination alone. It arises through the combined operation of two mutually reinforcing forces. The first is the Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus (CPCV), which progressively reorganises perception, memory, language, desire, aspiration, and consciousness until participation in the colonial order appears natural, beneficial, and morally desirable. The second is the continuing presence of organised coercive power—military force, administrative authority, surveillance, legal institutions, and the ever-present possibility of punishment—which legitimises and stabilises that psychological reorganisation. Fear initiates the process. The Virus normalises it. Eventually, what began as survival under domination comes to be experienced as progress, development, education, opportunity, success, and even salvation.

This diagnosis leads to an unavoidable question that Papuan resistance leaders must ask with complete honesty. *Why do almost all Papuan children still enter colonial schools from kindergarten to university? Why do almost all Papuans continue to seek employment, status, education, careers, titles, security, and recognition almost exclusively within the structures established by the very system they seek to resist? Why does participation continue to appear more rational than departure?*

Within the Psycho-Cosmocide framework, these questions do not reveal a failure of individual character. They reveal that something far deeper has occurred within the collective psyche itself. When an entire people comes to organise its hopes, ambitions, imagination, education, economy, and future inside the architecture of its own progressive elimination, the disturbance is no longer merely political. It is civilisational. Something fundamental has gone wrong in perception, memory, belief, consciousness, and the very structure through which reality is interpreted.

For this reason, the first responsibility of Papuan resistance leadership is not only to oppose the colonial system but to become the living embodiment of an alternative one. They must become a different way of seeing, thinking, organising, educating, remembering, producing, governing, and existing. They must become, in effect, a new light by which Papuans can orient themselves, a new world toward which people can move, and a new reality capable of attracting participation away from the one currently consuming them.

This is the task the wider corpus names Wonesis. Wonesis is not simply a theory or a slogan. It is the beginning of an alternative civilisational direction. It points toward a mode of existence in which Papuans progressively withdraw their dependence upon the structures that reproduce Psycho-Cosmocide and instead begin rebuilding the Cosmobian world through land, memory, language, reciprocity, institutions, education, and collective responsibility.

This does not occur through command or coercion. It occurs because people recognise that another way of living has become possible. Every school established outside the logic of dependency, every community institution organised around Cosmobian principles, every reclaimed place name, every restored language, every cooperative economy, every documented genealogy, every child taught the history of their own people before the history of others, every act of reciprocity rooted in Papuan rather than colonial priorities becomes an invitation to leave one civilisation while entering another.

Public education therefore becomes one of the highest responsibilities of the movement. Resistance leaders must continually help their people understand where they are, how they arrived there, who benefits from the existing order, where the present trajectory leads, when participation becomes self-destructive, and what practical alternatives already exist. Reconstruction begins not when the colonial system changes, but when increasing numbers of Papuans consciously choose to withdraw their imagination, labour, loyalty, and future from the structures that require their participation in order to endure.

The final objective of civilisational non-participation is therefore not isolation but regeneration. Psycho-Cosmocide argues that no parasitic system can survive indefinitely without the continual participation of its host. Wonesis begins where that participation gradually ends and the long work of recreating a living Cosmobian world begins.

The Exodus narrative offers another profound illustration of the principle developed throughout this paper. Moses did not seek to improve the conditions of Hebrew slavery by negotiating better labour policies within Egypt. He did not campaign for greater political representation inside Pharaoh's administration, nor attempt to reform Egyptian civilisation from within. The entire logic of the Exodus was different. Liberation required departure. Egypt had to be left before a new covenant, a new law, a new people, and ultimately a new civilisation could emerge.

Within the Psycho-Cosmocide framework, the significance of the Exodus is therefore not merely geographical but ontological. Leaving Egypt was not simply a physical movement from one territory to another. It was the progressive abandonment of an entire civilisational order. The Hebrews departed not only from Egyptian land but from Egyptian sovereignty, Egyptian political authority, Egyptian economy, Egyptian identity, Egyptian symbols, Egyptian calendar, Egyptian social order, and the worldview through which Egypt understood reality. Physical departure was inseparable from civilisational departure.

This is precisely the distinction that Psycho-Cosmocide seeks to recover. A people cannot remain fully organised within the institutions, language, economy, education, symbols, aspirations, and metaphysical

categories of a civilisation that progressively dissolves them while expecting to recreate an alternative civilisation at the same time. Reconstruction requires more than protest against the existing order. It requires the deliberate creation of another order capable of attracting participation away from it.

The lesson for Papua is therefore neither theological nor symbolic. It is civilisational. The deepest question is not whether Papuans can obtain a more favourable position within the existing colonial system, but whether they can progressively recreate a Cosmobian world capable of becoming the primary place in which Papuans organise their language, memory, education, economy, institutions, law, spirituality, and collective future. Wonesis points towards precisely this movement. It is not an escape from reality but the reconstruction of another reality.

Within this reading, Egypt is not merely a place. Egypt is a mode of being. The Promised Land is not merely another territory waiting at the end of history. It is the recreation of a civilisation organised around a different covenant between land, memory, people, and existence itself. Read in this way, the Exodus becomes less a story about migration than about ontological transformation: a people cease participating in the civilisation that enslaves them and begin building the civilisation through which they intend to survive.

The Non-Participatory Strategy

The diagnosis advanced throughout this paper ultimately converges upon one practical principle: *a civilisation cannot indefinitely survive by continually participating in the institutions, symbols, economy, education, and worldview of the very system that progressively dismantles it.* Every colonial project ultimately depends upon the continued participation of the colonised. The coloniser may initiate conquest, but only the continual participation of the colonised reproduces that conquest across generations. The deepest strategic question therefore becomes not simply how to resist the colonial system, but how to progressively cease reproducing it.

The first response proposed by the Psycho-Cosmocide paradigm is therefore the doctrine of *civilisational non-participation*. This does not begin with armed confrontation, electoral politics, or diplomatic negotiation. It begins with a gradual withdrawal of civilisational dependence. The wider corpus proposes that Papuans progressively reduce their dependence upon Indonesian-controlled institutions wherever genuine alternatives can be created: educational systems, administrative structures, symbolic worlds, bureaucratic careers, economic dependency, developmental apparatuses, and the psychological architecture through which colonial reality continually reproduces itself. In their place must emerge institutions generated from the Cosmobian world itself: land-based education, customary governance, community economies, reciprocal exchange, ancestral languages, local memory systems, ecological stewardship, and institutions answerable first to Papuan civilisation rather than to external administrative authority.

This principle is not merely political. It is ontological. It asks not simply who governs Papua, but which civilisation Papuans participate in every day through their language, labour, imagination, education, economy, memory, and aspirations. A people who remains psychologically organised within another civilisation will inevitably reproduce that civilisation, regardless of their political slogans.

Within the wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus, this movement is named *Wonesis*.⁵² Wonesis is not simply resistance. It is civilisational departure.

The corpus offers a governing image. Imagine a magnificent ship celebrated as the greatest vessel ever constructed. Its upper decks glitter with music, lights, celebration, wealth, and promises of endless progress. Below deck, however, countless unseen workers shovel fuel into engines that no longer carry the ship toward any destination. Unknown to many passengers, the vessel has already struck the reef. Water slowly enters its lower chambers. The music continues. The celebrations continue. Promotions continue. Elections continue. Markets continue. The appearance of movement conceals a deeper reality: the ship is no longer travelling toward life but drifting toward collapse.

Wonesis begins when a people recognise this condition and refuse to continue feeding the engines. It is the decision to stop investing one's labour, memory, intelligence, aspirations, children, and future into a civilisation whose underlying trajectory have become self-destructive. More importantly, it is the decision to begin constructing another vessel before the first one finally disappears beneath the sea.

This is why the Exodus remains one of the most profound civilisational metaphors available. Moses did not seek merely to improve the conditions of Hebrew slavery within Egypt. He did not negotiate for better housing, greater political representation, improved education, or fairer labour regulations while leaving the Hebrew people inside Pharaoh's civilisation. Liberation required departure. Egypt had to be left before another civilisation could be born. The covenant, the law, the calendar, the institutions, the memory, the identity, and the future all emerged only after the people had begun withdrawing themselves from the civilisation that had defined them as slaves.

Within the Psycho-Cosmocide framework, Egypt therefore ceases to be merely an ancient geographical location. Egypt becomes a mode of being. The Exodus becomes an ontological event. It is the progressive refusal to organise one's existence within the categories, institutions, aspirations, and symbolic universe of the civilisation that consumes it.

For Papuan Cosmopolitan societies, this departure does not require migration toward another promised land. The promised land already exists. It is *Bumi Cenderawasih* itself. The journey is therefore not outward but inward. It is the return to land, the return to ancestral languages, the return to memory, the return to customary law, the return to ecological reciprocity, the return to clan responsibility, and ultimately the return to a civilisation capable of reproducing itself independently once again.

The work necessarily begins with symbolic reclamation. Mountains, rivers, forests, villages, sacred places, species, and landscapes across New Guinea must once again be known by the names through which they entered Papuan memory rather than those imposed by colonial administration. Languages must again become the primary custodians of reality. Genealogies must again become the archives of belonging. Calendars must again measure Papuan time. Stories must again transmit Papuan civilisation. Before a people can recover their land, they must first recover the language through which that land becomes intelligible.

Nearly every colonial project in history has ultimately been organised to prevent precisely this level of civilisational withdrawal. Colonisation does not merely seek obedience. It seeks participation. It requires the colonised to educate their children within colonial schools, earn their livelihoods within colonial economies, imagine success through colonial values, remember history through colonial narratives, and ultimately defend the civilisation replacing their own. This is why the Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus works most effectively when participation comes to feel voluntary.

The revolution proposed here is therefore neither primarily military nor primarily electoral. It is civilisational. It proceeds through millions of conscious decisions made across generations: decisions about language, education, economy, memory, symbols, kinship, land, governance, and meaning. Every act of genuine Cosmobian reconstruction withdraws energy from the system that consumes it while simultaneously strengthening the civilisation that seeks to replace it.

This is the deepest meaning of Wonesis. It is not merely the rejection of one world. It is the deliberate recreation of another. A parasite survives only while its host continues to sustain it. Likewise, a colonial civilisation ultimately depends upon the continual participation of those whose worlds it has displaced. The long work of Papuan resurrection therefore begins wherever that participation progressively ends and the recreation of the Cosmobian world progressively begins.

PART VII: TOWARDS PAPUAN SOVEREIGNTY

A Final Word to Papuan Resistance Leaders

The strategic dream demanded by this historical moment is not the dream experienced in sleep. It is not a vision received in private revelation, nor the comfort of imagining that history will somehow resolve itself while villages continue to burn. It is the disciplined dream of civilisation itself: a dream constructed in daylight through organisation, sacrifice, institutional imagination, intellectual courage, and the relentless application of strategic intelligence to the problem of collective survival.

A people confronting extinction cannot entrust decisions determining the fate of future generations to omens, mystical certainty, emotional symbolism, inherited superstition, or the expectation that supernatural intervention will accomplish the work history has repeatedly required human beings to undertake themselves. Dreams, symbols, ancestral wisdom, spiritual experience, and religious conviction all possess their place within the Cosmobian world. But none of them absolve a people from the responsibility of understanding reality as it is.

A bird entering a house is not necessarily a prophecy; it may simply have found an open window. An animal dying slowly during a hunt is not necessarily announcing the destiny of a nation; it may simply reflect the path of the arrow. Likewise, no people should formulate the future of an entire civilisation upon interpretations that cannot distinguish symbolic meaning from material reality. The survival of a nation requires something more demanding: accurate knowledge of allies and adversaries, disciplined analysis of changing geopolitical conditions, understanding of power, resources, institutions, timing, technology, demography, ecology, and the long historical forces shaping the world in which decisions must actually be made.

This is the paradigm shift that the Psycho-Cosmocide framework ultimately proposes. It does not reject spirituality, memory, symbolism, ancestral intuition, or religious life. It insists only that, when an entire civilisation stands at the edge of disappearance, spiritual imagination must be joined to disciplined intelligence. A people cannot remain suspended indefinitely between the collapse of their original Cosmobian world and imported systems of meaning that, however spiritually significant, cannot by themselves organise the practical conditions of collective survival. At some point, waiting must give way to building.

That building begins by recovering the capacity to think independently once again. More than five centuries of civilisational programming have taught countless Indigenous peoples to understand themselves through categories supplied by others. The first act of liberation is therefore not political. It is cognitive. It is the recovery of the ability to describe reality in one's own language, according to one's own categories, while remaining fully capable of understanding the wider world in which that reality must survive.

The Papuan resistance must therefore move beyond the expectation that moral truth automatically produces political victory. History offers little support for such a belief. Many peoples have possessed justice while remaining conquered. Many civilisations have spoken truth while disappearing, nonetheless. Morality alone has never reorganised power. Power must itself be reorganised.

This is why the wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus consistently argues for *decolonial praxis*: not criticism without construction, but reconstruction; not resistance without institution-building, but sovereignty; not memory preserved as grief alone, but memory transformed into disciplined organisation capable of defending the civilisation from which that memory came.

A monster that has fed upon a people for sixty-four years will not cease because its victims have explained their suffering with greater eloquence. It will not cease because another report has been written, another resolution adopted, another documentary released, or another protest organised. It will cease only when continuing to consume *Bumi Cenderawasih* becomes strategically, economically, diplomatically, psychologically, and civilisationally more costly than respecting its existence. That transformation cannot be achieved through sympathy alone. It requires organised leverage.

If Papuan resistance is to become more than historical memory, emotional inheritance, or symbolic identity, it must progressively consolidate every available form of power: ecological, demographic, economic, educational, symbolic, institutional, intellectual, technological, diplomatic, and moral. It must begin from *Bumi Cenderawasih* itself, because no civilisation has ever been rebuilt from abstraction alone. Every enduring civilisation has first been rebuilt upon the land that gave it birth.

The wider Psycho-Cosmocide corpus has repeatedly returned to a single question: *How does a civilisation disappear?* This paper has attempted to offer one answer. Civilisations rarely vanish only because they are conquered from outside. They disappear because the categories through which they understand themselves are progressively replaced until participation in another civilisation becomes indistinguishable from participation in their own extinction.

The question that therefore remains is no longer for this paper to answer. It belongs to the living generation.

Will Papuans continue investing their intelligence, labour, memory, children, institutions, language, economy, and future into the civilisation that is systematically replacing their own? Or will they begin the longer, harder, and more demanding work of recreating the Cosmobian world through Wonesis?

History cannot decide this. Neither can the United Nations, Indonesia, Australia, the Netherlands, the Pacific, the Church, nor any future generation. Only Papuans can.

A Manifesto on the Psychopathology of Colonisers and the Colonised

The colonial system has no human soul.

Colonialism is not a person.

Although it appears as a person, it is not a human being.

It carries no human soul. It holds no human mind. It moves without human spirit.

It was never endowed with ethics, cursed with morality, burdened with integrity, or graced with virtue.

Do not mistake the hand for the machine. Do not hate the instrument and forget the system.

It is a system.

A system does not sleep. A system does not love. A system does not tire. A system does not care about your thoughts, your beliefs, your desires, your morality, your compassion.

This system has its own morality.

This system is not immoral — it is simply different.

It has constructed its own ethics, its own logic, its own definitions, its own targets, its own objectives, its own meanings, its own purposes.

It operates with perfection — for itself.

You cannot judge it by the laws of your god, your morality, your ethics, your virtue.

It does not live under your god's law. It has written its own scripture. It follows its own covenant.

It executes that covenant without hesitation, without apology, without mercy.

The system does not say sorry.

It does not feel guilty.

It does not forgive — because to forgive would imply that it believes it has wronged you.

It does not believe it has wronged you.

Mercy is not something it understands.

You cannot appeal to its conscience. It has no conscience.

Those who kneel before it, asking for grace, are kneeling before a machine and calling it God.

The machine will not answer. The machine will continue.

It does not speak your language.

The colonised speak a language that the system neither understands nor wants to understand.

Your arguments. Your morality. Your logic. Your vocabulary of dignity. Your syntax of sovereignty.

These are sounds it cannot hear — not because it is deaf, but because it has decided your language does not exist.

It has built its own grammar. It writes in its own tongue.

When you argue with the coloniser using the language of the colonised, it is like speaking into a closed room — an echo chamber in the belly of the beast's digestive system.

The door was never designed to open from your side.

The coloniser's heaven is the colonised's land: rich, open, and taken.

For the coloniser, paradise is not earned. It is extracted.

The coloniser and the colonised worship different gods. They speak different languages.

This is not a misunderstanding — it is a structure:

invented, controlled, and managed for the extinction of the colonised and the survival of the coloniser.

You are not fighting a misunderstanding.

You are not fighting people who simply need educating.

*You are fighting a system that has its own substitutes for soul, conscience, and mercy:
logic, law, and power.*

It will not stop because you explained yourself well.

It will not stop because you made human rights resolutions at the UN, the PIF, the MSG, or the ACP.

It will not stop because you scream for human rights — because the system will never recognise your right to be human.

It will not stop because you pray — to your god, your gods, your goddess, your messiah.

It will not stop because you march, cry, or scream on the street.

It will not stop because you hold weekly, monthly, and annual meetings.

It will not stop because your social media profile carries revolutionary slogans and many followers.

It will only stop when the colonised realise that the coloniser's hell is the resurrection of the colonised — the moment the dead rise and remember who they were before the land was taken from them.

It will only stop when you wake up and realise that you are inside the digestive system of the belly of a beast — and you dismantle every structure that sustains it: root by root, grammar by grammar, god by god, symbol by symbol, image by image, institution by institution.

Know what you are facing.

Then begin.

Conclusion

The chronology traced throughout this paper spans the long arc of Papuan history, from Generation 0—the Children of Wone living within the original Cosmobian world—to the civilisational crisis confronting Papua in 2026. Read as a whole rather than as isolated historical episodes, and set against the comparative record of the Sahrawi, Vietnamese, South African, Timorese, and Jewish struggles examined above, it reveals a consistent pattern. The struggle over Papua has never been merely a contest over territory, political authority, or international recognition. It has been, at its deepest level, a struggle over the conditions through which a people perceive reality, remember their past, organise their present, and imagine their future. The central argument of this paper is therefore that the greatest danger facing Papua today is no longer military occupation alone, nor territorial annexation, nor political domination in their conventional forms. It is the gradual reorganisation of the Papuan world until Papuans themselves come to inhabit, defend, and reproduce the very civilisational order that is dissolving the foundations of their own existence. A people do not disappear only when their land is taken. They disappear when the categories through which they understand themselves, remember themselves, and organise themselves are replaced by those of another world. For this reason, the Papuan question cannot be resolved through diplomacy alone, nor through armed struggle alone, nor through moral appeals, development programmes, international advocacy, or electoral participation in isolation. These may each have their place, but none addresses the deeper civilisational condition diagnosed throughout this study. Resistance that does not restore the organisational, psychological, ecological, and cosmological foundations of Papuan existence risks becoming another mechanism through which Psycho-Cosmocide reproduces itself. The task before this generation is therefore greater than liberation in the conventional political sense, though it does not set that liberation aside; it is the reconstruction of a sovereign Papuan world, of which political independence is one necessary front among several. That reconstruction begins with recovering the capacity to see through Papuan eyes, to remember through Papuan memory, to think through Papuan categories, and to organise once again around Papuan relationships to land, kinship, ecology, reciprocity, and the living cosmos. Sovereignty, in this sense, is not only the restoration of political independence; it is also the restoration of a people's capacity to generate, sustain, and defend their own reality, without which political independence, if won, would remain difficult to hold.

This diagnosis is offered, not as an unfalsifiable article of faith, but as a reading of evidence that the coming years will test. It would be weakened if Papuan institutions, land relations, and cosmological memory were found to be strengthening rather than eroding across this period, or if political independence, achieved through conventional means, proved sufficient on its own to reverse the deeper civilisational pattern traced

here. The record examined throughout this paper does not yet show that. But the honest posture toward one's own argument is to say so, and to leave the question open to the history still being written.

This returns us to the Wone Kenok from which this paper began. A Wone Kenok is not simply a crisis to be observed; it is a crisis that demands a response equal to the scale of the disorder it reveals. The question facing Papuans after sixty-four years of resistance is therefore no longer whether injustice has occurred. That question has already been answered by history. The question now is whether a new generation possesses the courage, discipline, imagination, and civilisational intelligence to rebuild a world capable not merely of resisting extinction, but of enduring beyond it.

What was once organised can be organised again. What was buried can be remembered. What was captured can be reclaimed. The future of Papua will not be determined solely by the power of those who seek to govern it, but by whether Papuans themselves recover the capacity to become, once again, the authors of their own world.

Land without air, water, food, and fire cannot sustain life. Air, water, food, and fire without human beings possess no lived meaning. Human beings without home and family become little more than another biological species struggling to survive. Home and family without memory and story become shelters without belonging. Story without people cannot be remembered, and people without story cannot know who they are. Every layer of existence depends upon the one beneath it, and all of them ultimately return to the land. Land is therefore not merely territory. It is the first condition of existence, the foundation upon which food, water, air, fire, home, family, memory, identity, and existence itself become possible.

The only valuable question every Papuan must ask is: will they lose their land, or retake it? All other questions of life have no value or meaning, because the value and meaning of existence depend on land.

Notes

1. René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, trans. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), esp. the Second Meditation on the cogito.
2. Kogoya, Yamin. "The Three Maps of Survival: A Psycho-Cosmocide Prolegomenon on Land, Story, and Power." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 30 (2026). On the Eight Atlases of Human Existence specifically, see also Kogoya, Yamin. "Psycho-Cosmocide: The Silent Invasion of Mind, Meaning, and Cosmos." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 2 (2026).
3. Kogoya, Yamin. "The Papuans: A Stranded Cosmobian Society on the Highway of Civilisation." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 14 (2026).
4. Kogoya, Yamin. "West Papua: Ontological Cages and Colonial Consent: Myth, Power, and the Colonial Structuring of Reality." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 4 (2026).
5. Kogoya, Yamin. "The Seven Existential Cages: A Speculative Decolonial Ontology." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 3 (2026).
6. Marshall Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972), 1–39.
7. Karl G. Heider, *Grand Valley Dani: Peaceful Warriors*, 3rd ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace, 1997), on ritual warfare among the Dani.
8. Toby Green, *A Fistful of Shells: West Africa from the Rise of the Slave Trade to the Age of Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019); Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London: Bogle-L'Ouverture, 1972).
9. Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), esp. bk. 2–3 on asabiyyah and dynastic decline.
10. See John S. Mbiti, *African Religions and Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Heinemann, 1990), on the proverb form and function in African oral tradition generally.
11. Bernard Lewis, *The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967).
12. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949).
13. J. S. Grewal, *The Sikhs of the Punjab*, The New Cambridge History of India II.3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
14. Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses: The Story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1956).
15. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1972), bk. 5, chs. 84–116 (the Melian Dialogue).
16. Herodotus, *The Histories*, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), bk. 7, chs. 201–233.
17. Flavius Josephus, *The Jewish War*, trans. G. A. Williamson (London: Penguin, 1981), bks. 5–6.
18. Thomas Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa: White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912* (New York: Random House, 1991), 239–255.
19. Pieter Drooglever, *An Act of Free Choice: Decolonization and the Right to Self-Determination in West Papua* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2009).

20. Karl G. Heider, *Grand Valley Dani: Peaceful Warriors*, 3rd ed. (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace, 1997); Anton Ploeg, "First Contact, in the Highlands of Irian Jaya," *Journal of Pacific History* 30 (1995): 227–239.
21. Kogoya, Yamin. "The Making of Papuaphobia: Colonial Genealogy, Racial Formation, and Psycho-Cosmocide." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 28 (2026).
22. John Saltford, *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962–1969* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200*, 4th ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Drooglever, *An Act of Free Choice*.
23. Kogoya, Yamin. "The Ecosystem of Papuan Extinction: A Five-Hundred-Year Civilisational Architecture of Ecosystemic Replacement, Structural Containment, and Manufactured Extinction." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 6 (2026). See also Kogoya, Yamin. "Psycho-Cosmocide: A Theoretical Framework for the Systematic Destruction of Indigenous Cosmologies, Consciousness, and Metaphysical Order." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 1 (2025), for the foundational statement of the framework.
24. Kogoya, Yamin. "West Papua's Soft Civil Wars: The Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus and the Architecture of Collective Fragmentation and Collapse." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 24 (2026).
25. Jonathan Richards, *The Secret War: A True History of Queensland's Native Police* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2008); Raymond Evans, *A History of Queensland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 69–102. See also Timothy Parsons, *The African Rank-and-File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the King's African Rifles, 1902–1964* (Oxford: James Currey, 1999).
26. Ros Kidd, *The Way We Civilise: Aboriginal Affairs—The Untold Story* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1997). See also Henry Reynolds, *This Whispering in Our Hearts* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1998).
27. Kogoya, Yamin. "The Labyrinth of Papuan Extinction: Paradox, Participation, and the Collapse of Recognition." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 19 (2026).
28. Kogoya, Yamin. "Gilgamesh and Enkidu: Participatory Extinction and the Seduction of the Cosmobian Being." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 20 (2026).
29. Kogoya, Yamin. "The Four Gospels of a 'Civilisational' Death Cult in West Papua: Religiosity, Development, Progress, and Success." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 21 (2026).
30. Kogoya, Yamin. "Cosmobian and Synthobian: Two Modes of Being — From Ecological Reciprocity to Synthetic Civilisation." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 26 (2026).
31. Kogoya, Yamin. "Remaking the Settler World from Inside the Papuan World: Colonial Consciousness and the Struggle for Reality in West Papua." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 13 (2026).
32. Kogoya, Yamin. "A Papuan Tragedy Is More Tragic Than Tragedy: Beyond the Architecture of Tragedy." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 12 (2026). See also Kogoya, Yamin. "The Ecosystem of Papuan Extinction: A Five-Hundred-Year Civilisational Architecture of Ecosystemic Replacement, Structural Containment, and Manufactured Extinction." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 6 (2026).
33. Kogoya, Yamin. "The Three Maps of Survival: A Psycho-Cosmocide Prolegomenon on Land, Story, and Power." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 30 (2026).
34. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 1–62. See also Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

35. Aimé Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism*, trans. Joan Pinkham (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000 [1955]).
36. Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (New York: Grove Press, 1967 [1952]).
37. Kogoya, Yamin. "The Ecosystem of Papuan Extinction: A Five-Hundred-Year Civilisational Architecture of Ecosystemic Replacement, Structural Containment, and Manufactured Extinction." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 6 (2026). See also Kogoya, Yamin. "Colonial Parasites and Colonised Hosts: The Psycho-Cosmocide of Cosmobian Existence in West Papua." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 18 (2026).
38. Susan Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), 93–114.
39. Kogoya, Yamin. "West Papua: Ontological Cages and Colonial Consent: Myth, Power, and the Colonial Structuring of Reality." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 4 (2026).
40. Kogoya, Yamin. "Cosmobian and Synthobian: Two Modes of Being — From Ecological Reciprocity to Synthetic Civilisation." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 26 (2026).
41. Kogoya, Yamin. "Psycho-Cosmocide: The Eight Atlases of Human Existence, the Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus, and the Parasite–Host Model." PhilArchive preprint, 2026. See also Kogoya, Yamin. "From the Wreckage: Eight Atlases of Human Existence Under Total Colonial Domination — A Psycho-Cosmocide Analysis from West Papua." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 11 (2026).
42. Erik Jensen, *Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012); Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy, *Western Sahara: War, Nationalism and Conflict Irresolution* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2010).
43. William J. Duiker, *Ho Chi Minh: A Life* (New York: Hyperion, 2000); David W. P. Elliott, *The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, 1930–1975*, 2 vols. (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003).
44. Luli Callinicos, *Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains* (Cape Town: David Philip, 2004); Raymond Suttner, *The ANC Underground in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2008).
45. Sara Niner, *Xanana: Leader of the Struggle for Independent Timor-Leste* (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2009); Damien Kingsbury, *East Timor: The Price of Liberty* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
46. Martin Gilbert, *The Holocaust: The Jewish Tragedy* (London: Collins, 1986); David Tal, *War in Palestine, 1948: Strategy and Diplomacy* (London: Routledge, 2004); Benny Morris, *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008).
47. Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
48. Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed., *The Revolutions of 1989* (London: Routledge, 1999); Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).
49. Kogoya, Yamin. "Beyond the Papuan Rebel: Land as First Ontology — A West Papuan Philosophical Perspective." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 23 (2026).
50. Kogoya, Yamin. "The Metaphysics of Power: Indigenous Survival and Lani Cosmology." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 5 (2026). See also Kogoya, Yamin. "The Three Maps of Survival: A Psycho-

Cosmocide Prolegomenon on Land, Story, and Power." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 30 (2026).

51. Kogoya, Yamin. "Colonial Parasites and Colonised Hosts: The Psycho-Cosmocide of Cosmobian Existence in West Papua." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 18 (2026).
52. The concept of "Wonesis"—the ninth and final stage of the civilisational sequence within the Psycho-Cosmocide paradigm, denoting the return and regeneration of cosmobian consciousness after civilisational collapse—is developed in full theoretical detail in Yamin Kogoya, "Wonesis: Framework, Belonging, and the Antidote to Psycho-Cosmocide," *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 16 (2026). See also Yamin Kogoya, "The Ecosystem of Papuan Extinction," *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 6 (2026), for the full CPCV spectrum within which Wonesis operates as counter-movement.

Bibliography

- Agoncillo, Teodoro A. *The Revolt of the Masses: The Story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan*. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1956.
- Callinicos, Luli. *Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains*. Cape Town: David Philip, 2004.
- Césaire, Aimé. *Discourse on Colonialism*. Translated by Joan Pinkham. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000 [1955].
- Descartes, René. *Meditations on First Philosophy*. Translated by John Cottingham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Drooglever, Pieter. *An Act of Free Choice: Decolonization and the Right to Self-Determination in West Papua*. Oxford: Oneworld, 2009.
- Duiker, William J. *Ho Chi Minh: A Life*. New York: Hyperion, 2000.
- Elliott, David W. P. *The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, 1930–1975*. 2 vols. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003.
- Evans, Raymond. *A History of Queensland*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Evans-Pritchard, E. E. *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949.
- Fanon, Frantz. *Black Skin, White Masks*. Translated by Charles Lam Markmann. New York: Grove Press, 1967 [1952].
- Fanon, Frantz. *The Wretched of the Earth*. Translated by Richard Philcox. New York: Grove Press, 2004 [1961].
- Gilbert, Martin. *The Holocaust: The Jewish Tragedy*. London: Collins, 1986.
- Gleijeses, Piero. *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002.
- Green, Toby. *A Fistful of Shells: West Africa from the Rise of the Slave Trade to the Age of Revolution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019.
- Grewal, J. S. *The Sikhs of the Punjab*. The New Cambridge History of India II.3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Heider, Karl G. *Grand Valley Dani: Peaceful Warriors*. 3rd ed. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace, 1997.

- Herodotus. *The Histories*. Translated by Robin Waterfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Ibn Khaldun. *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*. Translated by Franz Rosenthal. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.
- Jensen, Erik. *Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate*. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012.
- Josephus, Flavius. *The Jewish War*. Translated by G. A. Williamson. London: Penguin, 1981.
- Kidd, Ros. *The Way We Civilise: Aboriginal Affairs—The Untold Story*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1997.
- Kingsbury, Damien. *East Timor: The Price of Liberty*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Kogoya, Yamin. "Beyond the Papuan Rebel: Land as First Ontology — A West Papuan Philosophical Perspective." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 23 (2026).
- Kogoya, Yamin. "Colonial Parasites and Colonised Hosts: The Psycho-Cosmocide of Cosmobian Existence in West Papua." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 18 (2026).
- Kogoya, Yamin. "Cosmobian and Synthobian: Two Modes of Being — From Ecological Reciprocity to Synthetic Civilisation." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 26 (2026).
- Kogoya, Yamin. "The Ecosystem of Papuan Extinction: A Five-Hundred-Year Civilisational Architecture of Ecosystemic Replacement, Structural Containment, and Manufactured Extinction." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 6 (2026).
- Kogoya, Yamin. "The Four Gospels of a 'Civilisational' Death Cult in West Papua: Religiosity, Development, Progress, and Success." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 21 (2026).
- Kogoya, Yamin. "From the Wreckage: Eight Atlases of Human Existence Under Total Colonial Domination — A Psycho-Cosmocide Analysis from West Papua." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 11 (2026).
- Kogoya, Yamin. "Gilgamesh and Enkidu: Participatory Extinction and the Seduction of the Cosmobian Being." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 20 (2026).
- Kogoya, Yamin. "The Labyrinth of Papuan Extinction: Paradox, Participation, and the Collapse of Recognition." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 19 (2026).
- Kogoya, Yamin. "The Making of Papuaphobia: Colonial Genealogy, Racial Formation, and Psycho-Cosmocide." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 28 (2026).
- Kogoya, Yamin. "The Metaphysics of Power: Indigenous Survival and Lani Cosmology." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 5 (2026).
- Kogoya, Yamin. "A Papuan Tragedy Is More Tragic Than Tragedy: Beyond the Architecture of Tragedy." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 12 (2026).
- Kogoya, Yamin. "The Papuans: A Stranded Cosmobian Society on the Highway of Civilisation." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 14 (2026).
- Kogoya, Yamin. "Psycho-Cosmocide: A Theoretical Framework for the Systematic Destruction of Indigenous Cosmologies, Consciousness, and Metaphysical Order." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 1 (2025).
- Kogoya, Yamin. "Psycho-Cosmocide: The Eight Atlases of Human Existence, the Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus, and the Parasite–Host Model." PhilArchive preprint, 2026.
- Kogoya, Yamin. "Psycho-Cosmocide: The Silent Invasion of Mind, Meaning, and Cosmos." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 2 (2026).

- Kogoya, Yamin. "Remaking the Settler World from Inside the Papuan World: Colonial Consciousness and the Struggle for Reality in West Papua." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 13 (2026).
- Kogoya, Yamin. "The Seven Existential Cages: A Speculative Decolonial Ontology." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 3 (2026).
- Kogoya, Yamin. "The Three Maps of Survival: A Psycho-Cosmocide Prolegomenon on Land, Story, and Power." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 30 (2026).
- Kogoya, Yamin. "West Papua: Ontological Cages and Colonial Consent: Myth, Power, and the Colonial Structuring of Reality." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 4 (2026).
- Kogoya, Yamin. "West Papua's Soft Civil Wars: The Civilisational Psycho-Cosmocide Virus and the Architecture of Collective Fragmentation and Collapse." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 24 (2026).
- Kogoya, Yamin. "Wonesis: Framework, Belonging, and the Antidote to Psycho-Cosmocide." *Kurumbi Wone Working Paper Series* No. 16 (2026).
- Lewis, Bernard. *The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Mbiti, John S. *African Religions and Philosophy*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Heinemann, 1990.
- Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948.
- Morris, Benny. *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008.
- Niner, Sara. *Xanana: Leader of the Struggle for Independent Timor-Leste*. Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2009.
- Pakenham, Thomas. *The Scramble for Africa: White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912*. New York: Random House, 1991.
- Parsons, Timothy. *The African Rank-and-File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the King's African Rifles, 1902–1964*. Oxford: James Currey, 1999.
- Ploeg, Anton. "First Contact, in the Highlands of Irian Jaya." *Journal of Pacific History* 30 (1995): 227–239.
- Reynolds, Henry. *This Whispering in Our Hearts*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1998.
- Richards, Jonathan. *The Secret War: A True History of Queensland's Native Police*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2008.
- Ricklefs, M. C. *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200*. 4th ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- Rodney, Walter. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. London: Bogle-L'Ouverture, 1972.
- Sahlins, Marshall. *Stone Age Economics*. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972.
- Saltford, John. *The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962–1969*. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.
- Sontag, Susan. *Regarding the Pain of Others*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003.
- Suttner, Raymond. *The ANC Underground in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2008.
- Tal, David. *War in Palestine, 1948: Strategy and Diplomacy*. London: Routledge, 2004.
- Thucydides. *History of the Peloponnesian War*. Translated by Rex Warner. London: Penguin, 1972.

Tismaneanu, Vladimir, ed. *The Revolutions of 1989*. London: Routledge, 1999.

Waltz, Kenneth. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.

Zunes, Stephen, and Jacob Mundy. *Western Sahara: War, Nationalism and Conflict Irresolution*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2010.

About the Author

Yamin Kogoya is a Papuan philosopher, writer, and independent researcher from the Central Highlands of New Guinea (West Papua), currently based in Australia.

His work investigates one of the most enduring questions of human existence: how worlds are created, transformed, and destroyed. He is the originator of the Psycho-Cosmocide paradigm, an interdisciplinary philosophical framework that examines the destruction of human worlds not only through physical violence, occupation, or ecological devastation, but through the systematic reorganisation of perception, memory, meaning, and reality itself. Within this framework, he argues that words, images, symbols, signs, colours, institutions, and technologies do not merely represent the world—they participate in creating, reorganising, and erasing the conditions through which human beings inhabit it.

Kogoya introduced the concepts of the Cosmobian World and the Synthobian World to distinguish two fundamentally different modes of human existence. The Cosmobian World refers to forms of life constituted through reciprocal relationships with land, ancestry, kinship, memory, ecology, language, and the cosmos. The Synthobian World refers to synthetic, engineered systems of existence organised through abstraction, institutions, technology, production, and civilisational processes. The relationship between these two worlds forms the central philosophical architecture of his research.

Drawing upon Indigenous cosmologies together with philosophy, anthropology, history, religion, mythology, and civilisation studies, Kogoya develops original conceptual frameworks for interpreting the contemporary human condition. His work re-examines humanity's foundational myths, epics, tragedies, religions, and philosophical traditions as enduring civilisational architectures through which societies organise reality, negotiate meaning, confront mortality, remember the past, imagine the future, and participate in their own survival or extinction. Although grounded in the historical experience of West Papua, his research addresses broader philosophical questions concerning civilisation, consciousness, memory, belonging, power, and the future of human worlds.

He holds a Master of Applied Anthropology and Participatory Development from the Australian National University. His academic background also includes Religious Studies, Indigenous Studies, and Asia-Pacific Studies, and he undertook advanced study in epistemology at the University of Oxford. His research and commentary have appeared in *SBS News*, *RNZ Pacific*, *Asia Pacific Report*, *The Fiji Times*, and *The Jakarta Post*.

Kogoya is the founder of the NATAKA Research Institute, an independent research institute dedicated to the philosophical and historical study of human worlds and the conditions under which societies survive, transform, or become extinct.

Published by Wone Press | An imprint of the NATAKA Research Institute
psychocoscocide.com | info@psychocoscocide.com
© 2026 Yamin Kogoya. All rights reserved.